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THE LAND AND NAVAL FORCES CLAUSE 
Dakota S. Rudesill*  
Abstract 
 
What is the constitutional textual basis for key 
statutes that constrain the national security 
apparatus and condition the President’s ability to 
direct it – statutes that are neither spending 
limitations, nor war declarations or authorizations 
for the use of military force (AUMFs), nor militia 
laws?  There are a series of such statutory 
frameworks, including the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ), Posse Comitatus Act and its 
relatives (particularly parts of the Insurrection Act), 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the 
covert action statute, anti-torture laws, and the War 
Powers Resolution.  The best or at least strong 
additional textual footing for these statutes, this 
article argues, is Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of 
the Constitution.  This clause gives Congress the 
power “To make Rules for the Government and 
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”  Although 
the common assumption is that this Land and Naval 
Forces Clause is a single enumerated power, this 
article theorizes the Clause as providing Congress 
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two powers: a well-recognized Internal Regulation 
power over military justice and other internal affairs 
of the national security apparatus, and also an 
External Government power over operations.  This 
article analyzes the Clause’s text, counter-
authoritarian origins, and its constitutional 
interpretation since the Founding Era.  This article 
argues for the Clause’s constitutional rediscovery 
and embrace as primary textual footing for a series 
of vital statutory frameworks that govern the 
military and the Intelligence Community at the 
intersection of liberty and security, and regarding 
the use of force and cyber operations.  Ultimately, 
the Clause’s power is contingent: Congress must use 
it and other legal actors must give life to its statutes 
and constitutional values for it to be meaningful.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the United States Constitution 
provides Congress the power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and 
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”  This Land and Naval Forces 
Clause1 is textually located within the wheelhouse of Congress’s 
legislative powers regarding national security.  The Clause has been 
understood since the Founding to grant Congress authority over military 
justice, and it has been cited by the Supreme Court in landmark cases.2  
This provision’s full history and significance beyond the military justice 
context, however, are unappreciated, in some respects ambiguous, and 
insufficiently studied.3 
 
 1. There is no consensus on what to call the Clause.  The Supreme Court recently referenced part 
of it (as explained below) as the “Military Regulation Clause.”  See United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 
387, 394-95 (2013).  Other cases simply quote it, or give the Clause different names.  See, e.g., United 
States v Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 272 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (“Rules and Regulations Clause”) (Baker, J., concurring).  
Some scholars reference “the Government and Regulation power.”  See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, 
The Separation and Overlap of War and Military Powers, 87 TEX. L. REV. 299, 332 (2008).  Others 
reference the “Rules for the Government and Regulation Clause.”  See David J. Barron & Martin S. 
Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb – A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
941, 1082-83 (2008) [hereinafter Lowest Ebb Part II].  Some practitioners call it the Make Rules Clause.  
I term it the Land and Naval Forces Clause to emphasize its subject matter and distinct language versus 
other Article I, Section 8 war powers.  
 2. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006) (Clause cited along with others 
providing Congress national security powers, in case rejecting President’s order regarding trials of post-
9/11 detainees as violation of UCMJ); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643-44 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (Clause cited in canonical national security separation of powers case). 
 3. This article, like other articles focused on individual clauses of the Constitution, employs 
common interpretive approaches without being about constitutional interpretation.  See Andrew Kent, 
Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. 
L. REV. 843, 857 (2007) (article on Define and Punish Clause not intended to resolve larger originalist 
debates); John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1054 (2013) (article on 
Necessary and Proper Clause does not endeavor to engage with originalist conversation in systematic 
fashion or set out originalist theory).  Reserving the interpretive methodological implications of this study 
for a future work, this article does close textual and structural analysis, including intratextual work; 
considers a range of originalist evidence that bears on Framer understanding and original public meaning 
(different methodological focuses between which this article does not choose); gathers and analyzes 
relevant parts of the constitutional record, including via empirical analysis of legislative citations and 
3
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This article urges the constitutional rediscovery of this neglected 
“cryptic” Clause4 – rediscovery of its text, counter-authoritarian purposes, 
constitutional history, and the growing contemporary importance of 
statutes written pursuant to it.  Relying on the Clause, Congress can 
restrain the national security apparatus and the President’s use of it 
regarding military justice and discipline, espionage, cyber operations, and 
regarding surveillance, interrogation, and other liberty infringements.  
The conventional assumption is that the Clause – which we will also 
reference as the Forces Clause, or Clause 14 – provides a single 
enumerated power.5  This article theorizes the Forces Clause as containing 
two powers.   
The well-established understanding of the Forces Clause is what this 
article conceives as the Internal Regulation power.  It provides Congress 
authority over the internal affairs of the national security apparatus, from 
writing the military’s criminal code to regulating training, organizational, 
and personnel matters.6  The “land and naval Forces,” broadly conceived, 
include not just the uniformed military, but individuals and organizations 
that support and operate in concert with them, inside and also beyond 
what is today the Department of Defense.   
The Supreme Court has not yet explicitly articulated a second 
understanding of the Forces Clause but has invited it.  In his canonical 
Youngstown (1952) concurrence, Justice Robert Jackson hinted at such a 
power.7  More recently, in a case related to Congress’s Internal Regulation 
power, United States v. Kebodeaux (2013), the Court edited the Clause’s 
text to exclude the term “Government,” focusing the Court’s analysis 
instead only on Congress’s power to “make Rules for the . . . Regulation 
of the land and naval Forces.”8  This article takes up the Court’s implicit 
 
analysis of doctrinally key cases; and on the basis of all of these addresses the constitutional ethos of the 
Clause.   
 4. The Supreme Court has observed the Clause’s language is “cryptic.”  See Reid v. Covert, 354 
U.S. 1, 21 (1957).  Professor Prakash remarks that the Clause is “seemingly unremarkable” but 
enormously important.  Prakash, supra note 1, at 331. 
 5. Article I provides Congress enumerated powers and implicit subordinate powers necessary for 
their exercise.  See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring) (“The 
power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute in the President.  Both powers 
imply many subordinate and auxiliary powers.  Each includes all authorities essential to its due exercise.”); 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-07 (1819) (necessity of implied powers); Mikhail, 
supra note 3, at 1128-32 (discussing implied and unenumerated powers).  My argument is that the Forces 
Clause can be understood to provide two enumerated powers that carry such implied and auxiliary powers, 
for example to organize and control the sizable civilian intelligence apparatus that supports the “land and 
naval Forces.” 
 6. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 767 (1996) (Clause provides Congress 
authority to regulate military justice, a power “no less plenary” than others in Article I). 
 7. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643-44 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 8. See United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 394-95 (2013) (Forces Clause and Necessary 
and Proper Clause allow Congress to require former servicemember convicted of sex crime to register as 
4
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challenge.  On the basis of both hints and strong signals in the text, 
originalist evidence, and subsequent constitutional record, this article 
theorizes the Clause as carrying a second power we can ground in the term 
“Government.”  What this article terms the External Government power 
provides Congress legislative authority to write statutory “Rules” 
controlling operations of the national security apparatus that involve third 
parties, both at home and abroad.9  Locating this power in the Forces 
Clause fills a gap and addresses a reliance interest: this operations-
controlling power of Congress is reflected in a series of longstanding and 
important statutory frameworks, and the Forces Clause’s sibling clauses 
in Article I, Section 8 are in many instances less easily read to provide it.  
These statutory frameworks are in relevant part not appropriations 
conditions, nor war declarations or authorizations for the use of military 
force (AUMFs) that approve armed conflicts, nor militia laws.  
This article makes several contributions to our understanding of the 
Forces Clause.   
First, this article makes clear that the Forces Clause is an important part 
of the national security Constitution.10  The Clause concerns nothing less 
than civilian legislative control over the national security apparatus.  It 
reflects the commitment of the Framers to checks on a chief Executive 
and standing military they feared held inherent authoritarian potential.   
Second, this article focuses squarely on the Forces Clause and deepens 
our understanding of it in its constitutional context.  This article analyzes 
the Clause’s text, examines its origins and constitutional history to the 
present day, and theorizes and explores its dual understandings.  In 
contrast, to date the Forces Clause has rarely received the thorough 
substantive treatment in the legal literature accorded other constitutional 
provisions.11  Often, courts and scholars cite the Forces Clause seriatim 
 
sex offender under statute of general applicability not limited to current or former military personnel). 
 9. Several scholars view the Clause as providing power over not just discipline of “the land and 
naval Forces” but over operations as well.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A 
BIOGRAPHY 188 (2005) (Clause provides power to limit and proscribe President’s use of force, if not 
prescriptively direct it); DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND 
CONGRESS 1776 TO ISIS 22-24 (2016) (legislative power in Clause to limit military operations); Randy 
E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 140 (2001) 
(“Congress has complete power to command or govern the army and navy, not merely the power to 
regulate them”); Prakash, supra note 1 (Clause provides Congress power to direct military operations and 
control all aspects of the military and war).  Cf., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES § 1197 (4th ed. 1873) (conceiving Clause entirely in its military justice and 
discipline aspect); JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 155, 159-60 (2005) (denying existence of congressional power to limit 
presidential use of the military via statute). 
 10. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION (1990) (discussing 
concept). 
 11. Other important provisions have been the focus of one or a series of scholarly articles.  See, 
e.g., Mikhail, supra note 3 (Necessary & Proper Clause); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The 
5
Rudesill: The Land and Naval Forces Clause
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
396 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
with other constitutional provisions, without distinction.12  Where courts 
and scholars have made substantive inquiries, they have illuminated the 
Clause in partial fashion.  The Forces Clause has been well cited for what 
this article conceives as its Internal Regulation power over military 
justice, and some originalist scholars have posited what this article 
conceives as the External Government power – but the originalists often 
stop with the Founding Era.13  All Article I powers relevant to national 
security operate in context with Executive powers (especially those of the 
Commander in Chief, analyzed under the Youngstown framework), a 
general subject that has also received extensive inquiry.14  Without 
recapitulating that separation of powers scholarship, this article explores 
the work the Forces Clause in particular is doing. 
Third, this article provides empirical analysis of citation to the Forces 
Clause.  The recent legislative record is especially rich, reflecting both 
Internal and External theories of the Clause.  It also reflects inconsistency 
and confusion.  In dozens of bills, Members of Congress are relying on 
the Forces Clause for legislative authority over Executive branch 
 
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb – Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008) [hereinafter Lowest Ebb Part I]; Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part II, 
supra note 1; Kent, supra note 3 (Define and Punish Clause); Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process 
Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71 (1974); Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 
54 HARV. L. REV. 181, 187-94 (1940). 
 12. For seriatim references, see, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 103-357, at 128 (1993) (Conf. Rep.) 
(discussing section 654 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, citing the Clause 
along with Army and Navy Clauses as constitutional authority for statutory “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
policy banning openly gay and lesbian individuals from the military); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 
591 (2006) (example of undistinguished seriatim citation, along with four other Article I, Section 8 
provisions); Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. 
& POL’Y. 455, 461-62 (2005) (including Forces Clause in a list of constitutional clauses, “all of which 
suggest that Congress was well within its constitutional authority in banning torture”). 
 13. The judicial originalist treatments are a line of military justice cases.  See, e.g., Loving v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 767 (1996).  Three scholars have given the Forces Clause focused analysis 
in originalist works centered on broader topics: AMAR, supra note 9 (discussing Clause in full treatment 
of the Constitution’s text and origins); Barnett, supra note 9 (engaging with meaning of the Clause’s term 
“Regulation” in article about the Commerce Clause); Prakash, supra note 1 (most extensive academic 
originalist analysis to date of the Forces Clause in article about overlapping and exclusive Article I and II 
powers).  For other scholarly mentions, see, e.g., JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL 
SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS TIMES 268 (2007) (mention of Clause in connection with Posse Comitatus 
Act); WILLIAM C. BANKS & STEPHEN DYCUS, SOLDIERS ON THE HOME FRONT 28, 34 (2016) (Clause 
mentioned in discussion of law regarding domestic military operations); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL 
WAR POWER 7 (2d ed. 2004) (one of 10 listed Article I, Section 8 clauses vesting war powers generally 
in Congress); W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION 118 (1992) 
(Clause mentioned as potential authority for Congress to regulate covert action); Barron & Lederman, 
Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 733 & nn.129-30, 787-88 (courts have construed Clause broadly 
regarding internal discipline of armed forces and in Hamdan extended it to detainee treatment; Executive 
power theorists ignore key drafting history). 
 14. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring); Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11; Lowest Ebb Part II, supra note 1 
(extensive treatment of constitutional clashes of Article I and II powers). 
6
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activities outside of the national security apparatus – authority the Clause 
does not provide.   
Fourth, this article urges recognition of the Clause as providing the best 
or at least strong additional constitutional footing for vitally important 
national security statutory frameworks (recognizing that statutes can rely 
on more than one textual provision for their constitutionality).15  The 
Internal Regulation power is not only the primary textual basis for the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (as is well understood), but 
also provides authority, in concert with other Article I clauses, for 
voluminous annual authorization acts that regulate in detail the military 
and national security bureaucracy.  The Forces Clause’s External 
Government power, meanwhile, is reasonably and best understood to 
provide primary authority for a series of statutory frameworks at the 
center of the national security regulatory regime.  These include the Posse 
Comitatus Act and its relatives (closely linked other laws regarding 
domestic use of military regulars, especially portions of the Insurrection 
Act), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the covert action 
statute, detainee treatment laws (including the statutory ban on torture), 
and the War Powers Resolution.  These External Government statutes 
place limits on how the Commander in Chief may employ “the land and 
naval Forces.”  These statutes provide “Rules” that resonate with the 
Clause’s counter-authoritarian purposes and with the Constitution’s ethos 
– its meta-project – of balancing liberty and security in a manner that 
protects both. 
Fifth and finally, this article contributes to the understudied and related 
subjects of intelligence and the Constitution, and cyber operations and the 
Constitution.  The “land and naval Forces” plainly subjects the large 
military intelligence establishment inside the Defense Department to 
Congress’s “Rules,” as it does the military’s U.S. Cyber Command.  The 
Clause should also be understood to give Congress legislative control 
over the two independent, non-military intelligence agencies: the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI).  Several of the key statutory frameworks that this 
article argues can be grounded in the Forces Clause – most notably FISA 
and the covert action statute – govern the intelligence apparatus.  
Meanwhile, Congress’s growing, bit-by-bit government of cyber 
operations finds its best constitutional footing in the Forces Clause, as 
well.   
Although today the Force Clause’s significance is often lost outside of 
the military justice community, it is due for constitutional rediscovery.   
This article begins in Part I with a summary of what is settled and what 
 
 15. See, e.g., United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387 (2013) (Forces Clause and Necessary and 
Proper Clause operate together to provide authority for statute). 
7
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is enduringly less clear about the well-established Internal Regulation 
power.  Part II analyzes the constitutional record of explicit engagement 
with the Clause for evidence of an External Government power.  The 
Constitution’s text, Founding Era evidence, and subsequent citation 
record in the three branches indicate that it is not imperative but is 
reasonable to understand the Clause to provide Congress two powers. 
With the reasonableness of a dual reading established, Part III focuses 
on the important work the Clause should be understood to be doing in the 
modern national security legal regime.  The Forces Clause should be cited 
by courts and other participants in the constitutional law conversation not 
only as the primary constitutional textual basis for the UCMJ, but also as 
constitutional authority for a series of statutory frameworks governing use 
of force, surveillance, and interrogation.   
Part IV continues the argument for the Clause’s constitutional 
rediscovery.  This Part appraises the Clause’s contemporary relevance in 
our time of new lawmaking dynamics (including declining congressional 
use of its legislative powers, expanding Executive power, and production 
of secret law), change in the national security environment and 
particularly its growing cyberization, and increasingly volatile politics 
and policy.  These trends reveal the value of the guardrails provided by 
laws written pursuant to the Clause.  They make Congress’s ability to 
write further such “Rules” more important. 
This article’s Conclusion emphasizes that the Clause’s power, like all 
powers of Congress, is contingent.  Congress must use it, and other legal 
actors must give life to its statutes whether or not courts are involved, or 
risk its loss.  In the national security space, most constitutional citation, 
practice, and decisions escape judicial review because of secrecy, 
problems of standing, and other judicial doctrines and practical 
impediments.  Our constitutional order therefore depends on the integrity, 
commitment to the rule of law, and knowledge of leaders, legislators, 
lawyers, and personnel in the field.  Their work – on matters as seemingly 
unexciting as Department of Defense personnel management, and as 
potentially consequential as covert actions, cyber attack, and nuclear 
weapons – will better reflect constitutional values to the extent it is 
informed by rediscovery of the dual powers of Article I, Section 8, Clause 
14.   
In this regard, this article is doing more than simply answering the 
Supreme Court’s implicit question in Kebodeaux, correcting Congress’s 
misunderstanding of the Clause, and contributing to the constitutional 
conversation about the Forces Clause, intelligence, cyber, and other 
matters.  This article’s analysis is important because enhancing our 
knowledge of the Clause deepens appreciation for its constitutional values 
of counter-authoritarian legislative control over the national security 
8
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enterprise, an apparatus of colossal resources and power that both protects 
and inherently imperils liberty.  Deeper appreciation for the Clause in turn 
puts the statutes that rely upon it on firmer constitutional footing.  Of 
course, a statute can rely on an Article I clause even if Congress cites no 
clause, if the statute does not reflect the precise language of a clause, or 
if the statute’s purpose differs from the spirit motivating a clause’s 
inclusion in the Constitution.16  But Congress and other legal actors 
strengthen the constitutional standing of statutes when, through citation 
and analysis, they ground statutes on constitutional textual provisions that 
share the legislation’s animating purposes.  In this instance, citation to the 
Clause in connection with vital statutory frameworks will underscore the 
constitutionality of laws that protect people – here and abroad – from the 
ability of the national security apparatus, under presidential direction, to 
surveil, covertly influence, interrogate, detain, adjudicate, and kill.   
I. INTERNAL REGULATION 
The text of the Land and Naval Forces Clause does not mention 
military justice, nor military discipline, nor the internal affairs of the 
national security apparatus.  But it has been clear since the Founding that 
the Clause provides Congress expansive power over military justice and 
discipline.  Questions endure at the margins about the scope of what this 
article conceives as the Internal Regulation power regarding some aspects 
of military justice, control of the national security apparatus beyond the 
military justice system, and in the context of the President’s powers. 
In his classic mid-Nineteenth Century Commentaries on the 
Constitution, Justice Joseph Story wrote that regarding military justice 
and discipline, “[t]he whole power is far more safe in the hands of 
Congress than of the executive.”17  The rationale for this power’s 
assignment to Congress by the Framers was essentially counter-
authoritarian, protecting Americans who serve in (or find themselves in 
the hands of) the federal armed forces.  Unless the elected representatives 
of the people (and at that time the chosen Senate representation of the 
state legislatures)18 could control military discipline, “the most summary 
and severe punishments might be inflicted at the mere will of the 
executive.”19  Military courts were also viewed in the Founding Era as 
 
 16. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 564-71 (penalty to compel purchase 
of health insurance constitutional as a tax under Art. I, § 8, cl. 1).  The “question of the constitutionality 
of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.”  
Id. at 570. 
 17. STORY, supra note 9.   
 18. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (direct election of Senators), superseding, id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1-2 
(selection of Senators by state legislatures). 
 19. STORY, supra note 9.  In two dissents, Justice Story provided further brief comments on his 
9
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less forgiving to defendants than civilian courts.20  Congressional 
authority over military courts provided a democratic feedback mechanism 
for the people.  Although early Congresses tended not to cite the 
Constitution chapter and verse, the early Congresses passed military 
justice codes using the language of the Forces Clause: the Army “shall be 
governed by the rules and articles of war” that Congress writes, and the 
Navy is subject to Congress’s “rules and regulations” for its “Better 
Government.”21   
The subsequent constitutional history of explicit citation to the Forces 
Clause in Congress (in connection with the separate Army and Navy 
codes and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) that replaced 
them in 1950, and related legislation), in the Executive branch, and in the 
courts makes clear that Congress’s power over military justice flows 
primarily from the Forces Clause,22 and in some circumstances in 
connection with other congressional powers.23  The courts continue to 
emphasize that the Clause has counter-authoritarian purposes, that 
 
understanding of the Clause.  He viewed the power to govern and regulate the armed forces as incident to 
the power to Raise and Support Armies and Provide and Maintain a Navy, and that the Forces Clause was 
added by the Framers ex abundanti cautela.  Similarly, the Declare War power in Story’s view necessarily 
includes the Marque and Reprisal and Regulate Captures powers, and these separate enumerated powers 
were in like fashion added by the Framers in an abundance of caution.  See Brown v. United States, 12 
U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 151 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting); cf., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
174 (1803) (presumption against surplusage in reading the Constitution).  Justice Story also observed that 
the Forces Clause’s powers cannot be assumed by states if the federal government does not use them.  See 
Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 68-69 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting).  Story in neither dissent 
elaborated on the extent or number of the powers the Forces Clause provides. 
 20. See 3 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 208 (Yale 
Univ. Press 1911) (1819); Gordon D. Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original 
Understanding, 71 HARV. L. REV. 293, 319 (1957). 
 21. See An Act to Recognize and Adapt to the Constitution of the United States the Establishment 
of Troops Raised Under the Resolves of the United States in Congress Assembled, Act of Sept. 29, 1789, 
ch. 25, § 4, 1 Stat. 95, 96 (repealed 1790); An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the 
United States, Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 1-13, 1 Stat. 112, 119-21.  These statutes re-enacted military 
justice codes written prior to the Constitution.  See Am. Art. of War of 1775 and 1776, reprinted in 
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 953-71 (2d ed. 1920).  See also WINTHROP, supra, at 21-
24 (early history of U.S. military justice); An Act for the Better Government of the Navy, Act of Apr. 23, 
1800, ch. 33, 2 Stat. 45.  For other notable code statutes that used the language of the Clause in their 
enacting clauses, see Am. Art. of War of 1806, § 1; and Am. Art. of War of 1874, § 1342, reprinted in 
WINTHROP, supra, at 976, 986.  Use of the terms “Government” and “Regulation” likely reflects 
overlapping definitions of the terms (see Part II.A in main text). 
 22. See discussion the record of citation to the Clause in the three branches, discussed in Part II 
infra; Uniform Code of Military Justice, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 109 (1950) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 801- 946 (2016); earlier military justice codes cited in supra note 21; Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 
748, 767 (1996) (authority over military justice flows from Forces Clause); WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 
17 (military justice codes are enacted pursuant to Forces Clause).   
 23. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1957) (“limited and extraordinary” circumstances 
exist in which non-military person is effectively part of the military, and in those instances military 
jurisdiction rests not on the Necessary and Proper Clause expanding the reach of the Forces Clause, but 
on the Forces Clause plus the larger grant of war powers being operative); and infra notes 30-31. 
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statutes written to it overcome presidential action, but also that Congress 
may delegate and shares its authority with the Executive.24   
Several issues are well-settled.  For example, the question of whether 
the Bill of Rights applies to military justice was resolved in the twentieth 
century.  Beyond the Fifth Amendment’s carve-out of “cases arising in 
the land or naval forces” regarding grand juries, the Constitution is 
textually not clear about whether the Bill of Rights protects service 
members from actions by the political branches, especially pursuant to the 
Commander in Chief and Forces Clauses.  Congress by statute, and the 
civilian appellate court that handles military justice appeals, provided and 
sometimes exceeded several guarantees of the Bill of Rights, and then the 
Supreme Court endorsed the Bill’s application as well, with allowance for 
specific aspects of military service and the separate military justice 
system.25  Even though the Bill of Rights applies generally and doctrine 
continues to evolve, the Supreme Court emphasizes that Congress retains 
“primary responsibility for the delicate task of balancing the rights of 
[service members] against the needs of the military.”26  Statutes written 
pursuant to the Forces Clause “ordering military affairs” are entitled to 
the “highest deference” by courts.27    
Additionally, it is now well-settled that the reach of military 
jurisdiction is grounded in the status of the defendant, in two broad 
categories.  One category includes prisoners of war, other alleged enemy 
fighters, or other persons in the hands of the military in the field.28  A 
 
 24. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 765-68. 
 25. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1987) (collecting rights affected by statute 
pursuant to Forces Clause); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976) (right to counsel protects service 
members, operating differently in the military justice system); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 202-03 
n.30 (5th Cir. 1975) (UCMJ statute and courts “extended the constitutional rights of servicemen beyond 
those accorded to civilians,” for example regarding notice and discovery).  The Supreme Court applied 
the Bill of Rights to service members after many years of doubt, conflicting dicta, and originalist 
argument.  See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (Bill of Rights applies with allowances for 
military context); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142-43, 146-47, 149, 152-55 (1953) (dicta endorsing 
Bill’s application); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 137-38 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring) 
(skeptical dicta); Henderson, supra note 20, at 293-94 (discussing conflicting jurisprudence and arguing 
that Framers did believe the Bill should apply); Frederick Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of 
Rights: The Original Practice I, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23-32 (1958) (arguing Framers did not intend Bill 
to apply, presenting originalist evidence about service member access to counsel). 
 26. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 767 (quoting Solorio, 483 U.S. at 447).  
 27. See id. at 768. 
 28. Enemy fighters (and certain other accompanying personnel) can be prosecuted in military 
courts inter alia for violations of the laws of war under several articles of the UCMJ.  See UCMJ, arts. 2, 
18, 21 (2016) (see 10 U.S.C. §§ 802(a)(9), 802(a)(13) (prisoners of war)), 818(a) (general courts-martial 
jurisdiction “to try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal”), 821 
(military commissions, provost courts, and other military tribunals may try offenses under statute or the 
law of war).  Also, enemy fighters may be prosecuted under the Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. 
L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 948c) (2009)) (“Any alien 
unprivileged enemy belligerent is subject to trial by military commission as set forth in this chapter”).  See 
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second category includes persons formally or functionally in the federal 
“land and naval Forces.”29  Generally, to minimize the scope and use of 
military jurisdiction beyond those in uniform, the Supreme Court has 
made clear that civilians generally may not be subject to military justice 
if the civil courts are open and operating.30   Civilian dependents of 
military personnel generally may not be court-martialed pursuant to the 
Forces Clause, even when they murder service members.31  As a general 
matter, neither may former service members.32  Civilian employees and 
military contractors are also usually not subject to court martial.   
Beyond its core grant of authority to Congress over the U.S. military’s 
criminal code as applied to current U.S. military personnel, there is both 
clarity and some ambiguity regarding the wider sweep of the Internal 
Regulation power.  
It is clear that the Forces Clause provides Congress expansive power 
to regulate the internal affairs of the military apparatus beyond military 
justice.  That is, to set personnel policies and to control the supporting 
bureaucracy (originally the Departments of War and the Navy, and today 
 
also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006) (President bound to follow Congress’s statutes on 
military justice and detainees written pursuant to the Forces Clause and other Article I, section 8 clauses). 
 29. The Supreme Court sees military status as reflecting the “natural meaning” of the land and 
naval forces referenced in the Forces Clause and the Fifth Amendment.  After a doctrinal experiment with 
service-connection of the offense, the status of the defendant has for three decades been the test instead.  
See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439-41 (1987) (military status), overturning O’Callahan v. 
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (service connection); but cf., Solorio, 483 U.S. at 456-57 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that military status is an overbroad test).  Some courts will finely parse definitions of 
being “in” the military or “the land and naval Forces.”  See, e.g., United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 269 
(C.A.A.F. 2012). 
 30. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 131 (1866).  In a concurrence with three others, 
Chief Justice Chase engaged with the Forces Clause, asserting that the Clause provides authority for 
military trial of military personnel without a jury, but also that “soldiers or civilians, unless in cases of a 
controlling necessity,” may not be tried absent an act of Congress.  Id. at 139-40 (Chase, C.J., concurring); 
but see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590-93 & n.23 (2006) (reserving question of whether Chief 
Justice Chase was correct that President has independent authority to convene military commissions).  
Chief Justice Chase wrote that Congress could have authorized military trial of a civilian, but pursuant to 
the Declare War and Army Clauses, not the Forces Clause. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 139-
42.  See also Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 514 (1878) (“hostility of the American people to any 
interference by the military with the regular administration of justice in the civil courts” was well known 
at Founding). 
 31. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 
1, 19-23 (1957) (plurality) (on rehearing, Court holds that Forces Clause does not provide court-martial 
authority over civilians who murdered their service member spouses while posted overseas, because of 
protections of Fifth and Sixth Amendments). 
 32. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955) (limiting military justice 
jurisdiction over civilians to “least possible power adequate to the end proposed,” a test not met regarding 
former service member who is therefore a civilian “entitled to have the benefit of safeguards afforded 
those tried in the regular courts”); see also McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 
285 (1960).  However, Congress pursuant to the Forces Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause may 
require former service members to register as sex offenders.  See United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 
387, 393-95 (2013). 
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the Department of Defense).33  Congress has done this detailed regulation 
throughout the republic’s history, from First Congress laws “for 
regulating the Military Establishment” to frequent congressional citation 
to the Clause in recent decades in connection with legislation concerning 
military property, organization, awards, personnel benefits, and service 
conditions, including sexual orientation stipulations.34   
Because the Clause has often been cited seriatim and undistinguished 
with other clauses, or no clause has been cited at all, however, it is less 
clear precisely how much of this personnel and bureaucratic regulation 
authority comes particularly from the Forces Clause and how much is 
shared with or flows instead from its sibling clauses in Article I, Section 
8, especially the powers to raise and support Armies and to provide and 
maintain a Navy.35  Similarly indeterminate vis-à-vis the powers rooted 
in other clauses are the precise contours of the powers regarding 
conscription that the courts have also traced in part to the Forces Clause, 
and organizing forces raised through enlistment or conscription.36   
 
 33. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983) (Clause allows the Congress “plenary 
control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment, including 
regulations, procedures, and remedies related to military discipline”); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 
232-33 (1981) (Clause provides Congress authority over military retirement pay that can preempt state 
divorce rules); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 890 (1961) (Clause and its 
Article I, Section 8 siblings allow Congress to control access to military installations).   
 34. For detailed regulation of the military in the Founding Era, see, e.g., An Act for Regulating 
the Military Establishment of the United States, Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, §§ 1-13, 1 Stat. 119, 121 
(creation and detailed organization of army subject to “such rules and articles” of war written by 
Congress); An Act for Continuing and Regulating the Military Establishment of the United States, and 
for Repealing Sundry Acts Heretofore Passed on that Subject, Act of Mar. 3, 1795, ch. 44, §§ 4, 9, 1 Stat. 
430, 430-31 (it is “a condition of the enlistments of the cavalry, that they shall serve as dismounted 
dragoons, when ordered to do so”; troops on western frontier get additional rations of “two ounces of flour 
or bread, and two ounces of beef or pork” plus salt); An Act to Provide a Naval Armament, Act  of Mar. 
27, 1794, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 350 (authorizing naval force with specified numbers of ships, canon, and crew, 
and ration stipulations varying by day of the week); An Act to Amend the Act Intituled [sic] “An Act to 
Amend and Repeal, in Part, the Act Intituled An Act to Ascertain and Fix the Military Establishment of 
the United States, Act of May 22, 1798, ch. 46, § 2, 1 Stat. 557, 557 (regarding pay and duties of a named 
officer with the rank of Major); An Act for the Better Government of the Navy, Act of Apr. 23, 1800, ch. 
33, § 1, arts. II, IX, 2 Stat. 45, 45-46 (military justice code also stipulating religious services and 
prohibiting the stripping of clothes from crew of captured ships).  Distinguishing the authority that flows 
from the Forces Clause versus the Army and Navy Clauses is especially challenging in legislation passed 
by early Congresses because Founding Era legislators were often both in the same laws regulating federal 
armed forces and legally creating or blessing them under the new Constitution.  Similarly, some of the 
provisions in the military justice codes concerning detainees, including the 1800 naval code supra and the 
modern UCMJ, could find primary or additional footing in the Captures Clause.  For legislation providing 
detailed regulation of the armed forces in recent years, see Parts II.C.1, III.A.2, and IV.B below.   
 35. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 12-13.  These clauses are usually referenced here as the Army 
Clause and Navy Clause, and are also known as the Raise and Support Armies Clause and the Provide 
and Maintain a Navy Clause. 
 36. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 343-44, n.16 (1990) (authority for drafting 
National Guard personnel into the Army of the United States provided by the Army, Navy, Forces, Declare 
War, and Necessary and Proper Clauses, and statutes enacted pursuant to them, such as 39 Stat. 211 § 
111, (1916), operating separately from but in connection with the Militia Clauses); Rostker v. Goldberg, 
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Another frontier of the Internal Regulation power involves whatever 
authority the Clause provides over “the land and naval Forces” beyond 
the Army and Navy (and their outgrowths, the Air Force and Marine 
Corps).   
An exception to the ban on court martial of non-military personnel, 
based in Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ, operates where civilians so closely 
accompany and operate with the military in the field during times of 
hostilities that they become effectively part of the military.37  The 
Supreme Court has indicated that this military jurisdiction flows from 
Forces Clause authority and in some instances from the operation of other 
powers in the Constitution, as well.38  Article 2(a) of the UCMJ also 
provides military jurisdiction over several categories of individuals who 
are outside the uniformed military but so closely associated that they can 
in the judgment of Congress be punished by court martial as such.  These 
persons at the penumbral edges of “the land and naval Forces” include 
retirees entitled to pay, retired reservists receiving military hospital care, 
non-military prisoners serving sentences imposed by court martial – and 
also members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
the Public Health Service, “and other organizations, when assigned to and 
serving with the armed forces.”39    
  A number of important parts of the national security apparatus have 
 
453 U.S. 57, 59-60, 80 (1981) (rejecting Due Process challenge to a male-only draft registration under the 
Selective Service Act, on the basis of the Forces, Army, and Navy Clauses); Arver v. United States, 245 
U.S. 366, 377 (1918) (Selective Draft Cases) (wartime conscription authority found in Army, Navy,  
Declare War, Necessary and Proper, and Forces Clauses).  The Court does not clarify whether the Forces 
Clause provides some authority for conscription itself, or for merely regulating it.  Id.  It is also 
indeterminate precisely how much Forces Clause authority operates more generally in connection with 
the Army and Navy Clauses.  See, e.g., An Act for Regulating the Military Establishment of the United 
States, Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, §§ 1-12, 1 Stat. 119, 119-21 (1790) (size, organization, pay, clothing, 
rations, oath, and other stipulations for U.S. land forces). 
 37. See UCMJ, art. 2(a)(10), 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2016).  This exception has roots in early 
American military justice codes, which were following the pre-Independence British Articles of War.  See 
Art. of War, sec. XIV, art. XXIII (1765) (British); Am. Art. of War, art. XXXII (1775) (first American 
articles of war); UCMJ, art. 2(10) (1950) (first UCMJ); id. art. 2(10), 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2016) 
(modern article); see also WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 941, 956 (reprinted Articles of War). 
 38. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1957) (plurality); United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 269 
(C.A.A.F. 2012) (civilian contractor accompanying U.S. military in Iraq could be tried under UCMJ art. 
2(a)(10)); id. at 272-76 (Baker, C.J., concurring) (agreeing that civilian contractor defendant was 
sufficiently “in the armed forces” for purposes of UCMJ, but emphasizing that war powers of the Congress 
and the President beyond the Forces Clause needed to be implicated – as here – for an extraordinary 
extension of military jurisdiction over a civilian during hostilities). 
 39. See UCMJ art. 2, 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2016) (persons subject to UCMJ).  See also UCMJ, art. 
5, 10 U.S.C. § 805 (2016) (“This chapter applies in all places”).  See also Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000) (persons “employed by or accompanying the Armed 
Forces outside the United States” may be tried in the civilian Article III courts for crimes outside the 
United States, providing a commonly used alternative to military jurisdiction in UCMJ art. 2(a)(10), 10 
U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2016)). 
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supported federal regulars40 since the Founding, and are regulable under 
the Forces Clause.  Examples include the naval auxiliary (the modern 
Coast Guard), the intelligence community, privateers (the Founding Era’s 
glorified pirates and perhaps today’s contractors), and the bureaucracy 
that aids former military personnel.41  Such an understanding would be 
consistent with the Coast Guard’s inclusion under military justice 
jurisdiction, along with the other federal personnel and contractors 
accompanying and aiding the armed forces.42  Notably, the vast majority 
of U.S. intelligence agencies, personnel, and funding have been housed 
within the Department of Defense and its predecessors, and are frequently 
regulated by Congress through the same policies and legislation.43  The 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) – although civilian entities – are nevertheless 
closely associated with the armed forces: their funding flows through 
Department of Defense appropriations, the CIA supports military 
operations analytically, and CIA officers often accompany the military in 
the field.44  Also, Congress in our time has frequently invoked the Clause 
as constitutional authority for bills concerning the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (for more on the Clause in Congress, see Part II.C 
below).45  Ultimately, the Forces Clause’s authority over “land and naval 
Forces” beyond the military and Pentagon is logical and well established 
– if not precisely demarcated.  
Finally, the extent of Clause’s Internal Regulation power in relation to 
 
 40. “Regulars” in military parlance means the primary, often standing, armed forces, as 
distinguished from militia or other reserve forces, and supporting auxiliaries (e.g., intelligence, medical). 
 41. One could add militia to this list.  However, the two Militia Clauses immediately following 
the Forces Clause can be read to provide similar and separate powers over the militia, as discussed infra 
in Part II.A. 
 42. See UCMJ art. 2(a), 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2016). 
 43. See, e.g., the annual National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs), discussed in Parts III and 
IV. 
 44. See Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 241, 258-
62 (analyzing Congress’s process for providing funding for intelligence and other classified activities).  
Regarding Congress’s powers over intelligence, the context is textual ambiguity: the term is not in the 
Constitution.  General skeptics of Article I power over intelligence point to Federalist 64’s observation 
that in the context of treaty negotiations persons possessing “useful intelligence” will be more comfortable 
sharing it with the President than Congress.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay).  But that is not a 
full argument against the ability of Congress to control the intelligence instrument via statute.  Instead, it 
points toward restricting confidential information flows to Congress.  That may impinge on congressional 
oversight, but does not defeat the entire notion of congressional regulation of intelligence.  On the other 
hand, there are powerful accountability and self-government reasons to allow the elected representatives 
of the people to control the intelligence apparatus.  There is by now also the precedent of thick practice: 
a longstanding record of Congress legislating regarding the intelligence apparatus, annually and 
repeatedly.  See Part III infra for further discussion.   
 45. See, e.g., H.R. 558, 112th Cong. (2011) (renaming Department of Veterans Affairs medical 
center), 157 CONG. REC. H552 (Feb. 8, 2011) (statement of Rep. Neugebauer).  For additional discussion 
of the constitutional record regarding citation to the Clause, see Part II.C below. 
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the powers of the Executive branch is reasonably well established, but 
continues to be defined.   
Under Professor Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash’s originalist 
construction of Article I and II war powers, Congress’s rule-writing 
powers under the Clause include exclusive authority over military justice; 
concurrent “regulation” power with the President over training, 
procedures, maneuvers, deployments, uses of force, and treatment of 
prisoners; and also concurrent power over types of war, escalation and de-
escalation thereof, and war objectives.46  Prakash assembles evidence that 
the Framers understood that Congress has sole rule-writing power 
regarding military justice, and that Congress would always prevail over 
the Commander in Chief wherever their directives regarding training, 
discipline, or maneuvers might conflict.   
This view is attractive.  It reflects the Constitution’s commitment to 
civilian and legislative control over the military.  It reflects the conduct 
of the archetypical Commander in Chief – George Washington – who 
perceived authority to act regarding military justice and discipline, but 
also an obligation to obey Congress.47  Prakash’s view significantly aligns 
with the authoritative analysis of the constitutional record compiled by 
Professors David Barron and Marty Lederman, who conclude that the 
President is bound by statute regarding military justice but at the very 
least always retains what they term the superintendence role: the 
Commander in Chief sits atop the military chain of command.48  Without 
revisiting their extensive work, it suffices to note the reliability of their 
broad conclusions that Congress and President acting together put the 
Commander in Chief’s power at its apex,49 the President may act 
regarding the internal affairs of the national security apparatus when 
Congress is silent,50 and the President generally must observe legislated 
limitations provided they do not negate the Constitution’s positioning of 
the President at the head of the military chain of command.51   
 
 46. See Prakash, supra note 1, at 328-50. 
 47. For example, troops under Gen. Washington’s command took British prisoners, and 
Washington convened a military tribunal in 1780 in the face of silence in the American Articles of War 
about whether a British officer could be tried in military court for being a spy.  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
548 U.S. 557, 590-92 (2006).  Washington carefully followed Congress’s often detailed directives even 
when he disagreed.  See BARRON, supra note 9, at 9-13 (congressional instructions on confinement 
conditions). 
 48. See Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11; Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb 
Part II, supra note 1. 
 49. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (upholding President’s definition of 
aggravating factors in military capital case pursuant to delegation of authority from Congress pursuant to 
Forces Clause). 
 50. See supra note 47.  
 51. There is reasonable disagreement about whether constitutional questions are raised by a statute 
dating to the Civil War Era that restricts the ability of the President to relieve a commissioned officer in 
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The Supreme Court endorsed this Youngstown-grounded view of 
shared power in wartime regarding military justice and detainees in the 
landmark national security separation of powers case Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld (2006).52  The Court invoked the Forces Clause and Justice 
Jackson’s famous Youngstown concurrence in rejecting the military 
commissions President George W. Bush created after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks as at odds with the UCMJ.  But Hamdan’s citation to the Clause 
was seriatim with other Article I, section 8 powers, without specific focus 
on the Clause itself.53  The result is continued doctrinal ambiguity at the 
margins of the Clause’s ambit.  Hamdan implicated both Congress’s core 
Internal Regulation power over military justice and the External 
Government power regarding treatment of detainees captured during 
military operations.  But the extent of the powers rooted in the Forces 
Clause, as distinct from those provided by other provisions of Article I, 
section 8 remains imprecise.54  Similar uncertainty surrounds the extent 
of the President’s independent powers to convene military commissions 
absent legislation.55  The Hamdan Court sided with Congress in this clash 
of Article I and II powers regarding military justices and specifically 
military commissions, but questions about how completely Congress’s 
Internal Regulation power overcomes a defiant Commander in Chief will 
continue to arise.  Against the backdrop of expansive congressional power 
and judicial deference, answers to the questions raised here will continue 
to evolve through the ongoing interaction among the branches of 
 
peacetime without a court martial.  See Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part II, supra note 1, at 1111-
12 (questioning constitutionality); Kent H. Barnett, Avoiding Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1349, 1400 (2012) (Forces Clause and First Militia Clause provide authority for the statutory 
restriction).  
 52. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643-44 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 53. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591. 
 54. The Supreme Court has made clear that the Forces Clause, along with other clauses, provides 
Congress rule-writing authority regarding not just the most common example of military justice, the court 
martial, but also regarding a more extraordinary wartime tribunal, the military commission.  See Hamdan, 
548 U.S. at 590-96 & n.23.  However, the courts have treated the authority to convene military 
commissions differently.  In addition to reserving the question of the President’s independent authority to 
convene military commissions (see id. at 590-93 & n.23), the Supreme Court has signaled that Congress’s 
authority to grant the President power to convene military commissions flows mainly from the Declare 
War and Army Clauses, because the adjudicative work done by commissions is incident to war and 
commissions can adjudicate matters (from war crimes by enemy forces to quotidian crimes committed by 
residents of territories occupied and administered by the U.S. military) not usually tried by court martial 
or outside court martial jurisdiction.  See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 590-92 & n.21, citing Ex parte Milligan, 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139-40 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring) (speculating that the Forces Clause provides 
authority, but grounding it in Declare War and Army Clauses), and WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 831 
(seeing authority for military commissions primarily in Declare War and Army Clauses, but noting that 
the Define and Punish Clause can provide authority as well).  See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 
(1942) (emphasizing authority in Define and Punish Clause, operating in connection with Forces Clause 
rules). 
 55. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 590-93 & n.23. 
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government. 
II.  EXTERNAL GOVERNMENT 
 In quoting what it termed the Military Regulation Clause in the 
military justice-related case United States v. Kebodeaux, the Supreme 
Court without explanation edited Article I, section 8, clause 14 down to 
Congress’s power to “make Rules for the . . . Regulation of the land and 
naval Forces.”56  This Part takes up the Court’s implicit reservation of the 
meaning of the omitted textual term “Government” and the implication of 
a second power.    
A word about the scope of our inquiry is in order.  This analysis does 
not seek to revisit separation of powers doctrine generally.  It does not ask 
whether Congress has, from any source, the power to limit the President 
in national security matters through non-appropriations statutes.  The 
principle that statutes can bind the President is a precept of the 
Youngstown-informed majority view of separation of powers, as it is of 
the minority congressionalist separation of powers view that Congress 
almost always wins.  Only the minority presidentialist view – that the 
winner is almost always the Commander in Chief – disputes the binding 
power of statute generally.  Congress’s ability to legislate hard law 
regarding national security is well understood to flow from multiple 
provisions of Article I, Section 8 (e.g., Define and Punish, Declare War, 
Captures, Marque and Reprisal, Army, Navy, and Militia Clauses),57 the 
Constitution’s structure and spirit, and from the gloss of constitutional 
history.  The Forces Clause may provide some authority too for militia 
laws and authorizations for the use of military force (AUMFs) blessing 
war-scale armed conflicts, but this analysis generally sets them aside 
because they find their primary constitutional textual footing in the Militia 
and Declare War Clauses, respectively.58   
This Part explores the case for locating an External Government power 
in the Forces Clause, capable of binding the President and the national 
security apparatus via statutes that are not appropriations, militia laws, 
nor war authorizations.  This Part also explains why locating an External 
Government power in the Clause is reasonable even if the Supreme Court 
has not yet clearly and squarely articulated it, given the Constitution’s text 
and structure (discussed in Part II.A), the Clause’s origins and counter-
authoritarian purposes (discussed in II.B), and the constitutional history 
of clear citation to the Clause in the three branches (discussed in II.C).  
This body of constitutional evidence does not demand the conclusion that 
 
 56. See United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 394-95 (2013). 
 57. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10-13, 15-16. 
 58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11, 15-16. 
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there is an External Government power flowing from the Forces Clause, 
but does suggest that a dual-power reading of the Clause is reasonable and 
indeed attractive.  
A. Text 
Constitutional analysis begins with the text and structure of the 
document.  Close reading of the document’s terminology and 
organization indicates that the Forces Clause is distinctive and clearly 
provides Congress with the power to bind “the land and naval Forces.”  A 
fair reading employing usual textual tools discerns dual powers in the 
Clause, ones that this article theorizes as Internal Regulation and External 
Government powers.  Finally, it is reasonable to understand the ambit of 
the phrase “the land and naval Forces” to extend beyond the military and 
its justice system. 
The interpretive principle that each part of the Constitution ought to be 
presumed to be doing distinct work is well established, often articulated 
as a rule or canon against surplusage.59  The Supreme Court has said that 
this presumption applies to the Forces Clause.60  A similar intratextual 
principle is that differences and similarities in language in the 
Constitution should be presumed to be meaningful.61  These principles are 
not ironclad rules but do inform reasonable inferences about the meaning 
words may bear.   
Here, when read alongside its siblings and other provisions of the 
Constitution, and with the benefit of Founding Era dictionaries, the text 
of the Forces Clause provides strong indications of the distinctiveness and 
power of the lawmaking authorities it grants to Congress.  
 
 59. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that any 
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, 
unless the words require it.”). 
 60. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549-50 (2012) (in discussion of 
meaning of “regulate” in Commerce Clause, observing that if the Forces Clause is read to allow creation 
of the military it would render the Army and Navy Clauses superfluous); cf., United States v. Stanley, 483 
U.S. 669, 682, & n.6 (1987) (Forces Clause is a specific grant of power to Congress, but one that is 
superfluous if one reads the Necessary and Proper Clause broadly enough to embrace its powers). 
 61. Intratextualist analysis is common, with proponents and critics.  Compare Akhil Reed Amar, 
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999) (argument for intratextualist reading) and Adrian 
Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 730 (2000) (critique endorsing clause-focused interpretation over an intratextualism that 
assumes coherence and consistency in the Constitution), or William M. Treanor, Taking Text Too 
Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. 487 (2007) (critique emphasizing instead constitutional drafting history).  See also Eugene Volokh, 
Words That Have Different Meaning in Different Parts of the Constitution, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 
7, 2011, 6:10 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/08/07/words-that-have-different-meaning-in-different-parts-
of-the-constitution/ (assume consistent usage in Constitution subject to rebuttal by originalist contextual 
evidence).  This article’s analysis includes both intratextualist analysis and focus on the words, origins, 
and constitutional history of a particular provision. 
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The Clause is situated inside the primary fount of Congress’s 
legislative authorities: Article I, Section 8.  This section has, at its core, a 
potent grant of national security powers.  The Forces Clause – Clause 14 
– is preceded by four sibling clauses also concerning the military and 
foreign affairs.  Clause 10 gives Congress the power to define and punish 
“Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against 
the Law of Nations”; Clause 11 allows Congress to declare war, grant 
letters of marque and reprisal to privateers, and make rules regarding 
captures; Clause 12 accords the national legislature the power to raise and 
support armies; and Clause 13 says Congress may “provide and maintain 
a Navy.”62  Immediately following Congress’s Clause 14 power to “make 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces” 
are two other sibling military clauses, the dual Militia Clauses.  Clauses 
15 and 16 empower Congress to take the militia out of the hands of the 
states for federal purposes, and to control their composition, training, and 
operations when on federal duty.63  The Militia Clauses are followed by 
another sibling military clause, Clause 17, which enables Congress to 
purchase and control land from the states “for the Erection of Forts, 
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.”64  
Earlier powers in Section 8 are relevant to national security as well, 
particularly the powers to tax and spend for “the common Defence and 
general Welfare, borrow money, and regulate commerce.”65  Article I, 
Section 8 concludes with a buttressing and gap-filling Necessary and 
Proper Clause, enabling Congress to “make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers” 
and all other powers of the federal government and its components.66   
In short, the Forces Clause benefits from powerful placement and 
association, and uses distinct terminology suggesting it is doing distinct 
work in the document.  Notably, whereas the Army and Navy Clauses 
provide authority for creation and upkeep of national military forces, and 
the Declare War and Marque and Reprisal Clauses allow Congress to 
endorse the use of force, the Forces Clause uses different language – 
language that is facially about the imposition of legal controls.    
The specific terminology of the Clause clearly indicates this controlling 
power may be executed through binding law. 
The word “rule” in Samuel Johnson’s oft-cited 1755 dictionary67 is 
 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10-13. 
 63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15-16. 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1-3. 
 66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 67. Founding Era dictionaries cited in this article described as “the most useful and authoritative” 
by Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, A Note on the Use of Dictionaries, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 419, 423-
25 (2013), include 2 JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
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defined as “Government; empire; sway, supreme command.”68  The 
Clause’s “Rules,” therefore, would be embodiments of state power, 
obligating compliance.69  Elsewhere in the Constitution, the term has 
similarly strong implications.  For example, in the Bicameralism and 
Presentment Clauses, “Rules and Limitations” reference provisions of the 
Constitution itself – as binding a law as the republic can create.70  Each 
house of Congress “may determine the Rules of its Proceedings” – a 
legislative self-government power the Constitution does not qualify.71  
Congress has the power to “establish a uniform rule of naturalization” – 
power over immigration.72  The Captures Clause and Territory Clause 
also use the word “Rules” to hand Congress legislative power, in the latter 
instance regarding territories that in the republic’s early years 
geographically dwarfed the states.73  Finally, note that the Seventh 
Amendment, part of the Bill of Rights, references “the rules of the 
common law.”74  Everything the Constitution’s text tells us, in sum, 
clearly indicates that when Congress makes “Rules” pursuant to Clause 
14 it is making hard law.   
A common Founding Era dictionary defined “govern” as “to rule, 
manage, look to, take care of.”75  “Government” as a noun elsewhere in 
the Constitution, references the entire U.S. government, a public 
institution with power to make law.76  In the Second Militia Clause, 
 
(London, 1775); NATHAN BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (London, 25th 
ed. 1783); THOMAS DYCHE & WILLIAM PARDON, A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (12th ed. 
1760); SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1755); NOAH WEBSTER, 
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828).  See also, e.g., District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 646-48 (2008) (citing JOHNSON for term “bear arms”). 
 68. JOHNSON, supra note 67.  See also 2 ASH, supra note 67 (Rule as noun defined as “An 
inftrument [sic] by which lines are drawn or meafured [sic]; a precept, a canon; regularity, propriety of 
behavior; government; sway, dominion”; as a verb, rule means “to manage, to govern,” and “To have 
power, to have command”). 
 69. For use in another Founding Era context, see, e.g., Sims Lessee v. Irvine, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425, 
430 (1799) (surveyor must follow “laws and rules of government”). 
 70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2-3 (the passage “Rules and Limitations” in clause 3 references 
requirements for passage of a bill in clause 2). 
 71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.  The Captures Clause is universally 
understood to concern captures of ships and goods, and is interpreted by many commentators and the 
Supreme Court also to provide authority over captures of people.  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557, 590-91 (2006) (Captures Clause listed seriatim among several Article I powers in case concerning 
war prisoners); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch.) 110, 126 (1814).  But see John Yoo, 
Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1201-02 (2004) (Captures Clause concerns only 
property). 
 74. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  Variation in capitalization ought not be regarded as significant.  
Usage during the Founding Era was inconsistent and stylistic.  See Denys P. Myers, History of the Printed 
Archetype of the Constitution of the United States of America, 11 GREEN BAG 2d 217, 239 (2008). 
 75. BAILEY, supra note 67. 
 76. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17-18; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; id. art. IV, § 4; id. amends. I, XII, 
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“governing” indicates congressional power to control the militia when 
called into federal duty.77 
Distinguishing “Government” and “Regulation” is challenged by 
overlapping definitions from the Founding Era.  The 1783 edition of 
Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined “govern” as to “regulate, to 
influence, to direct . . . to manage, to restrain,” while another dictionary 
of the time defined “regulate” as “to set in order, to govern, direct, or 
guide.”78   
The Clause’s term “regulate” occurs at two other places in the 
Constitution of 1789 in usages that signal lawmaking power: Congress 
has the power to “regulate Commerce” and “regulate the Value” of 
money.79  “Regulate” takes adjectival form in the Second Amendment, 
which provides a right to bear arms in relation to “a well regulated 
militia.”80  Meanwhile, a dictionary from near the end of the Founding 
Era included as its second definition to “put in good order; as to regulate 
the disordered state of a nation or its finances.”81  All of these intratextual 
and dictionary references support the same original public meaning of the 
Clause’s language: power to make “the land and naval Forces” orderly 
and subject to legislated policies and standards.82    
 
XXIII. 
 77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
 78. 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, 7th ed. 1783); 
BAILEY, supra note 67, quoted in Prakash, supra note 1, at 331 n.168.  Professor Randy Barnett argues 
that Congress did not adopt the understanding of “regulation” that includes “government.”  Barnett 
grounds this conclusion about the Commerce Clause’s term “regulate” in the Forces Clause’s terminology.  
See Barnett, supra note 9, at 140.  This is circular reasoning, however, if one looks to the Commerce 
Clause to understand the Forces Clause. 
 79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 5.  See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824) 
(“regulate” in the Commerce Clause means “to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed”).  
Professor Barnett’s review of the records of state constitutional ratification debates shows that, in 
“stunning uniformity” the references suggest “regulation” meant “subject to a rule” or “make regular,” 
but not the extinguishing of something pre-existing or otherwise created.  Barnett, supra note 9, at 142.  
Cf., Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on the Supreme 
Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 972-73 (2003) (“regulation” in Article III, section 2 Supreme Court appellate 
jurisdiction context “connotes adjustment, but not radical change”).  In the Commerce Clause context, 
Barnett maintains that the original public meaning of “regulate” therefore would not sustain the federal 
government extinguishing domestic commerce.  Barnett, supra note 9, at 146.  For our purposes, we can 
observe that Barnett’s research suggests that the Forces Clause’s “Regulation” term was generally 
understood by the people to mean disciplining the military but not extinguishing it – power Congress 
instead had under the Army and Navy Clauses, the Army Appropriations Clause (a sub-clause of the Army 
Clause), and the general Appropriations Clause.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, 13; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 
7.   
 80. U.S. CONST. amend. II.  For a modern originalist construction, see District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 597 (2008) (“the adjective ‘well-regulated’ implies nothing more than the imposition 
of proper discipline and training,” citing Johnson’s dictionary of 1783). 
 81. WEBSTER, supra note 67. 
 82. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory 
of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 751 (2009) (original public 
meaning is leading originalist theory). 
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Despite the overlapping meanings of “to regulate” and “to govern” in 
Founding Era dictionaries, the Forces Clause may be fairly read to use 
these words with regard to two enumerated powers, ones that we can – 
consistent with the Court’s recent parsing – associate separately with the 
Clause’s dual active words “Government” and “Regulation.”83 
First, the Forces Clause’s language supports an inference of two 
powers because clauses akin to the Forces Clause, that have multiple key 
terms, also provide multiple powers.  The two active words at the core of 
Clause 14 are “Government and Regulation.”  Clauses 12 and 13 of 
Article I, Section 8 each have one word suggesting creation of military 
forces, and another word about upkeep (“raise and support Armies” and 
“provide and maintain a Navy”).84  The two active terms are doing 
different things.  Similarly, Professor Randy Barnett finds a parallel 
between the Forces Clause and Article III, Section 2, which provides the 
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction “with such Exceptions, and under 
such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”  Barnett sees in 
“Exceptions” a power of prohibition lacking in “such Regulations,” in 
part based on the same meaningful variation or rule-against-surplusage 
rationale that inferentially distinguishes the Forces Clause’s 
“Government and Regulation” terms.85   
In contrast, other clauses that authorize a single action typically have a 
single verb or other active word.  The Declare War Clause is one example.  
The Commerce Clause is another, and its verb – “regulate” – is present in 
the Forces Clause, along with a second active word.  Lacking reason to 
dispute application of the presumption against surplusage, textually we 
can reasonably infer two powers in the Forces Clause. 
Additionally, the theory that the Forces Clause contains two powers is 
buttressed by the language of its sibling in Article I, Section 8, Clause 16, 
the Second Militia Clause.86  Clause 16 authorizes two kinds of federal 
legislative work.  One is “organizing, arming, and disciplining, the 
Militia,” to include making state appointment of officers and state training 
of the militia subject “to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”  The 
other power in Clause 16 is “governing such Part of [the militia] as may 
be employed in the Service of the United States.”87  The first passage 
clearly gives Congress power over the Internal Regulation of the state 
militias, while the second concerns something else and uses the same 
 
 83. In the Clause, “Govern and Regulate” are nominalizations – verbs made into nouns by their 
usage, but still retaining an active implication in context.  
 84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-13. 
 85. Barnett, supra note 9, at 140.  Among scholars, Barnett gets the closest to associating the two 
distinct powers separately with the words Government and Regulation. 
 86. Accord Prakash, supra note 1, at 331 n.171 (clauses provide “much the same power”). 
 87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
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“govern” terminology found in Clause 14 in connection with the militia 
being “employed” by the federal government.  It is easy, therefore, to infer 
that this second part of the Second Militia Clause is about controlling 
operations of the militia beyond the gates of the fort.  It is also easy to see 
resonance with the linguistic structure of the Forces Clause.  Clauses 14 
and 16 textually read not just as parallel military clauses but as 
symmetrical fraternal siblings, providing both Internal Regulation and 
External Government powers over different parts of the military 
establishment.  Clause 14 allows congressional management of the 
standing federal “land and naval Forces” addressed in predecessor 
Clauses 10 through 13, while Clause 16 allows congressional 
management of the federalized militia addressed in Clauses 15 and 16.    
Finally, it is reasonable to read the Forces Clause’s text to extend 
beyond military justice and discipline, and indeed, beyond the uniformed 
military.88 
The Forces Clause uses the expansive language of making “Rules” for 
“Government and Regulation” in place of specific mention of military 
justice.  The Clause also does not include any of the terminology found 
elsewhere in the Constitution that concerns adjudications: court, crimes, 
trial, prosecution, testimony, punishment, etc.89  The Clause’s general 
phrasing likewise reaches beyond the more specific terms in the Second 
Militia Clause of “organizing, arming, and disciplining.”90 
 
 88. The Fifth Amendment has language similar to the Forces Clause, with potential intratextual 
implications.  The notion that the Forces Clause’s authority over “the land and naval Forces” is largely 
parallel to, rather than overlapping, with the authority over the militia discussed in the Militia Clauses in 
Article I, section 8 is supported by the interpretive rule that every provision is doing distinct work, by the 
different language in the clauses, and by the language of the Fifth Amendment, which excepts from its 
general grand jury requirement “cases arising in the land or naval forces, or the Militia, when in actual 
service in time of War or public danger.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  No separate reference to the militia 
would be necessary if the militia were understood by the Framers to be part of the land and naval Forces. 
  On the other hand, note that the Fifth Amendment’s exception to the grand jury requirement 
for “cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia” potentially could suggest that “land and 
naval Forces” in the Forces Clause means only the military, because of the good reasons not to expand 
military justice and its lack of grand juries and other defendant protections beyond the military.  However, 
UCMJ jurisdiction has long included the Coast Guard, an entity beyond “Armies” and “a Navy.”  
Additionally, military jurisdiction is not exclusive – current and former service members, (then and now) 
in many cases face criminal liability in civilian courts in which the protections of the Bill of Rights apply 
in full.  Third, as noted in Part I, from the first American Articles of War to the modern UCMJ, some non-
military personnel closely associated with the armed forces have been subject to military jurisdiction.  A 
plausible interpretation is that the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury carve-out for “cases arising in the land 
and naval forces” has instead meant (and means) cases prosecuted through the military justice system, not 
any case involving members of “the land and naval Forces” as more fully understood in the Forces Clause.   
 89. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (liability for “Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment” 
despite impeachment); id. art. III (references in article concerning the judiciary); id. amend. V (grand 
juries with exception for cases arising in the “land or naval forces”; criminal cases); id. amend. VII (trial 
by jury); and id. amend. VIII (cruel and unusual punishments). 
 90. The Second Militia Clause’s term “disciplining” was described by one of its drafters to mean 
“penalties, and every thing necessary for enforcing penalties.”  That suggests a military justice meaning 
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Additionally, the words “land and naval Forces” are facially broader 
than the “Armies” and “a Navy” referenced in Clause 14’s immediate 
sibling clauses.  Notably, in its modern doctrine the Supreme Court 
has said that the “natural meaning” of “the land and naval Forces” is 
the uniformed military – but has done so in its military justice 
jurisprudence, where there are good policy reasons to limit military 
penal authority and the question of the Clause’s scope beyond military 
justice is not presented.91  One can agree with the Court that civilian 
spouses and children of military personnel should not be subject to 
court martial for quotidian crimes and still read the Clause’s text more 
comprehensively for congressional control over the larger national 
security apparatus.  The Clause could reasonably be read to give 
Congress legislative power over other “land and naval Forces”: 
privateers granted letters of Marque and Reprisal, a coast guard 
auxiliary to the Navy, and the irregular forces such as spies and 
saboteurs who had operated covertly in connection with the Army and 
Navy regulars since the War of Independence.92  Other people 
professionally assisting the Army and Navy sensibly could be subject 
to Congress’s “Rules,” such as civilian personnel employed in 
supporting (and not merely related to) current and former military 
personnel – either directly as federal employees or as contractors.93  Of 
course, all of these categories of land and naval forces outside the 
regular uniformed military could be subject to Congress’s 
management under other Clauses, as well (e.g., the Coast Guard under 
the Commerce Clause, and all under the Necessary and Proper Clause).  
But that does not exclude them from the ambit of the Forces Clause, 
 
that may not have meant as much as the Forces Clause’s term “Regulation” might embrace.  See 5 
JONATHAN ELLIOTT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 464-65; 2 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 385; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, 16.  If 
the drafters meant that the Forces Clause would involve only military justice and discipline, it is 
reasonable to think they simply would have repeated this term from the Second Militia Clause. 
 91. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 (1957).  But see Kinsella v. United States ex rel. 
Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960) (suggesting potential broader scope). 
 92. See Kent, supra note 3, at 915-16 & nn.330-32 (“relatively uncontroversial” that the Forces 
Clause could operate regarding privateers authorized to fight for the United States under the Marque and 
Reprisal Clause, and their captures, governed under the Captures Clause).   
  The First Congress federalized colonial lighthouses and authorized a fleet of 10 cutters to 
enforce tariff laws – the precursors of the modern Coast Guard.  See Historian’s Office, U.S. COAST 
GUARD, http://www.history.uscg.mil/./history/articles/h_USCGhistory.asp (last updated Dec. 21, 2016).  
 93. One might also add the militia, when on federal duty, in a supporting role to legislation enacted 
pursuant to the Militia Clauses.  As part of its work via the Militia Clauses to make the militia standardized 
and interoperable with the active component, Congress could subject the militia to “Rules” written for the 
active force pursuant to Forces Clause.  See Perpich v. Dep’t of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 343-44 (1990) 
(discussing militia laws and foundation in Clauses 14 and 16).  
  An alternative or additional source of regulatory power over the personnel beyond those the 
army and navy is the Necessary and Proper Clause.  But that regulation is reasonably accommodated here, 
and, therefore, reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause is necessary. 
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as well, nor does that mean that the Forces Clause is not the strongest 
constitutional footing for related statutory “Rules.” 
In short, the words and structural placement of the Forces Clause 
provide strong signals and support reasonable inferences as to its original 
meaning.  The document’s words set parameters for the meaning the 
Clause can bear.   
Nevertheless, the text is not sufficient for a full understanding.  
Originalist interpretation is improved by contextual analysis, to include 
evidence bearing on historical context, purposes, drafting history, and 
Founding Era practice.94  All inform our sense of how the Framers and 
the public would have understood the Clause.  Having established that the 
Constitution’s text reasonably suggests both Internal Regulation and 
External Government powers based in the Clause, and that the Clause 
provides legislative authority beyond the uniformed military and its 
justice system, we turn to the Clause’s origins.    
B. Origins 
The Land and Naval Forces Clause reflects the republic’s commitment 
to the prevention of tyranny through civilian control of the military, the 
rule of law, separation of powers, and checks and balances.95  Among the 
organs of government, military forces and especially standing forces 
under the command of a single leader present inherent authoritarian risk.  
A tyrannical leader imperils the liberty of the people and their capacity 
for self-government, and also the rights of the People who serve in the 
armed forces.  The powers provided by the Forces Clause to the elected 
representatives of the People are, therefore, a limitation on executive 
power and a check against military dictatorship, reflecting a separation 
and sharing of military powers in the Constitution that in England were 
first held exclusively by the crown.  
This Part reviews the origins of the constitutional text analyzed in Part 
II.A.  This discussion primarily focuses on the emergence of an External 
Government power associated with the Forces Clause.  Because the 
External Government and the more well-established Internal Regulation 
 
 94. “[Q]uestions about the locus of authority over national security and the use of the armed forces 
should start not from ‘clause-bound interpretation’ of particular constitutional provisions, but from an 
overall understanding of the Constitution of foreign affairs.  Individual clauses must be read in light of 
the overall constitutional structure” and purpose.  H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY 
OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 154 (2002).   
 95. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 613-14 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The 
doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency 
but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but by means of the 
inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to 
save the people from autocracy.”)). 
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understandings are associated with the same Clause, however, this 
analysis necessarily references them both in tracing its origins.  This 
section of Part II also identifies key questions about the Clause’s meaning 
that will be explored through review of the constitutional record in Part 
III.C below, and Parts IV and V that follow. 
1. British and American Origins  
The Federalist and other Founding Era documents are replete with 
references to ancient Greece and Rome96 and their ultimate loss of 
liberty.97  Equal to the Framers’ fear of foreign threats was their concern 
about tyranny at the federal level, or at the state level because of a weak 
union (such as under the Articles of Confederation) that would lead to 
constant strife among the states.98  Benjamin Franklin’s famous 
observation that the Constitutional Convention had yielded “a republic, if 
you can keep it” spoke to the Framers’ hopes and fears.99 
The English experience loomed large.  The Framers were disturbed by 
competition in England between crown and parliament regarding control 
over the military.  In English antiquity, the king held virtually all relevant 
powers: to raise military forces, fund them through taxes, discipline them, 
command them in battle, and issue edicts with the force of law.  Authority 
migrated to Parliament in response to abuses of authority, foreign military 
misadventures, and growing republican sentiment, evolving to a condition 
of shared power.100    
The Magna Carta of 1215 established in principle Parliament’s 
supremacy.101  Four centuries later, the Petition of Right of 1628 objected 
to military exercises infringing on the rights of the people in language 
later echoed in the Declaration of Independence of the American 
colonies.102  The Parliament acquired independent authority to raise 
armies, and the legislature’s own forces fought and defeated those of the 
 
 96. Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists wrote under Roman pseudonyms. 
 97. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 18 (James Madison & Alexander Hamilton) (examples of weak 
ancient confederations); THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison) (“the liberties of Rome proved the 
final victim to her military triumphs”).  See also CARL J. RICHARD, GREEKS AND ROMANS BEARING 
GIFTS: HOW THE ANCIENTS INSPIRED THE FOUNDING FATHERS (2008). 
 98. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison) (danger of inter-state conflict); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton) (war among states would be frequent and violent); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton) (constant state or threat of war imperils liberty). 
 99. See 3 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 85. 
 100. For survey of English constitutional history regarding the domestic role of the military, see 
BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 15-19. 
 101. See English Translation of Magna Carta, para. 61, BRITISH LIBRARY, bl.uk/magna-
carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation. 
 102. See Eng. Petition of Right, art. VI (1628), http:// www.constitution.org/eng/petright.txt; THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 11-13 (U.S. 1776). 
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king in the English Civil War of the 1640s.  After restoration of the crown 
in 1660, concern about military abuses informed the English Bill of 
Rights’ ban in 1688 on a peacetime standing army without the consent of 
Parliament.103  The Bill of Rights more generally subordinated the 
crown’s use of the sword to the laws of Parliament, which by the purse 
by the Seventeenth Century.104  By the time of the American Revolution, 
the crown retained primary authority mainly over diplomacy, and the 
ability to direct the armed forces abroad.  At home, law enforcement and 
military matters were generally separated.105   
Expanding parliamentary control over the law and over the armed 
forces included greater legislative regulation of military justice and 
discipline.  The longstanding practice from the 1200s to 1600s had been 
for the king to issue articles of war specific to a particular campaign.  
These rules concerned military justice and the conduct of the campaign, 
and included rules on the treatment of prisoners and non-combatants.  
These articles typically expired at the end of the war or campaign.  
Reflecting the defaults of civilian authority and no standing army, the 
common law and civil courts otherwise had jurisdiction over offenses by 
military personnel.106  In response to crises of the 1600s, including brutal 
military justice against soldiers and civilians during the English Civil 
War, Parliament after the Bill of Rights had the ability to control military 
justice.  Parliament generally left most crimes by soldiers in peacetime to 
the civil courts, but the Mutiny Acts allowed for court martial for mutiny 
and sedition.107  This decision by Parliament was facilitated by grudging 
recognition that Britain needed a standing army in peacetime, and by 
agreement that the army needed to be strictly disciplined (to include 
punishment for political disorder: mutiny and other challenges to civil and 
military authorities).  The record in the 1600s and 1700s shows an 
iterative series of moves by Parliament and the crown to adjust the scope 
of crimes punishable by military justice, the severity of punishments, and 
the allocation of shared power over the military.  Parliament also provided 
implicit and explicit legislative sanction for the crown to control military 
justice and discipline abroad.108   
“Abroad” included the American colonies, where objections to British 
Army abuses were a catalyst of independence.  The colonists complained 
 
 103. See Eng. Bill of Rights, § 6 (1689), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp. 
 104. See id. §§ 4, 6; WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND 
THE POWER OF THE PURSE 11-17 (1994). 
 105. See BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 15-19. 
 106. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 760-62 (1996) (citing WINTHROP, supra note 21, 
at 17-18); 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 413 (1765); MATTHEW HALE, 
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 25-27 (1713). 
 107. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 762-64.   
 108. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 764-76; WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 18-21. 
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of general warrants and other writs that authorized invasive searches, and 
of harsh military justice imposed on colonial militia and civilians.109  The 
Declaration of Independence criticized the King for making “the military 
Independent of and superior to the Civil Power.”110  The colonists 
assailed, in essence, executive elevation of the military – and indeed, a 
standing army in peacetime – over American civil authority. 
 The language of the Forces Clause is evident in the new nation’s 
earliest legal authorities.  To counter the potential for tyranny, they 
provided for legislative control of the military’s operations, discipline, 
and commanders.    
On June 14, 1775, the Continental Congress called for a military force 
from several colonies to be raised, and stipulated an enlistment oath 
pledging soldiers “to conform, in all instances, to such rules and 
regulations, as are, or shall be, established for the government of the 
army” (emphasis added, here and hereafter).111  The Continental Congress 
then appointed a committee of five, including George Washington, to 
draft “Rules and regulations for the government of the army” – American 
Articles of War, which were enacted later that month.112  Three days later, 
on June 17, Congress commissioned Washington as General and 
“Commander in chief [of] the army of the United Colonies,” and required 
him to “regulate [his] conduct in every respect by the rules and disciplines 
of war . . . and punctually to observe and follow such orders and 
directions” from the Congress or a committee thereof.113  The Continental 
Congress’s approach to Washington’s service as Commander in Chief 
during the War of Independence would range from micromanagement 
(with congressional delegations at times in the field issuing directives) to 
grants of expansive power.114  Washington carried his congressional 
 
 109. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 86 Ind. L.J. 979, 989-993, 1002 n.131 (2011). 
 110. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); for general discussion see BANKS & 
DYCUS, supra note 13, at 5. 
 111. 2 JOUR. CONT. CONG. 90 (1775) (emphasis added, here and hereinafter). 
 112. 2 id. at 89-90.  These first Articles of War were enacted on June 30, 1775.  Id. at III. 
 113. 2 id. at 96. 
 114. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY: GEORGE WASHINGTON 93 (2004) (congressional 
delegations at the front, giving Gen. Washington orders).  In winter and spring 1776-77, while driven 
from the national capital in Philadelphia, Washington was invested by Congress “with full, ample, and 
complete” powers to raise and equip the national army; the takings power; and power “to arrest and 
confine persons who refuse to take the continental currency, or are otherwise disaffected to the American 
cause . . . .”  6 J. CONT. CONG. 1045-46 (Dec. 27, 1776).  Some commentators then and since have 
characterized this as Washington’s “dictatorship.”  See e.g., Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia 
Ratifying Convention, June 5, 1788, reprinted in PATRICK HENRY, III PATRICK HENRY 485; Virginia 
Convention Debates, June 9, 1788, IX DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 1058 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990); Brian Logan Beirne, George 
vs. George vs. George: The Commander-in-Chief Power, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 285 (2008).  
Dictatorship was a time-limited power that the republican Roman Senate would, in a moment of peril, 
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commission in his pocket throughout the war, took considerable time 
communicating with the Continental Congress, and carefully followed its 
guidance.115    
In June 1776, the Continental Congress appointed John Adams, 
Thomas Jefferson, and three others to a “committee on [British] spies” 
and directed them to revise the Articles of War of the prior year.116   Like 
the 1775 code, the amended Articles contained “rules and regulations” 
for the army.117  The Articles did not simply regulate the military 
internally and reorganize the Articles, but via a resolution added at the 
end also concerned detainees: court martial and potential capital 
punishment for espionage.118  These Articles of War were with some 
adjustments based on British rules, and were amended and re-affirmed 
under the new nation’s constitutions – the first of which was the Articles 
of Confederation.119  
2. First Iteration: The Clause in the Articles of Confederation 
Article IX of the 1778 Articles of Confederation was a long and 
disorderly compilation of enumerated powers is analogous to Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution, and contained the Forces Clause’s first 
iteration.  Article IX granted the Confederation Congress “the sole and 
exclusive right and power of . . . making rules for the government and 
 
confer for a short period on a single leader, most famously Cincinnatus.  Washington’s style of leadership, 
retirement from command of the Continental Army, and later retirement from the presidency drew 
comparisons at the time to the self-restrained Roman general and farmer.  See RON CHERNOW, 
WASHINGTON: A LIFE 444, 457 (2010).    
 115. See BARRON, supra note 9, at 6-17; CHERNOW, supra note 114, at 456 (Washington parted 
with the commission only when surrendering it to the Continental Congress at the end of the war); Barron 
& Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 774-80. 
 116. WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 22 (directive to the committee).  See also 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN 
ADAMS 224-25 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1856) http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a3_3_1-2s9.html (reporting on June 5, 1776, Continental 
Congress Committee on Spies resolution that all persons in the colonies owe allegiance and are guilty of 
treason if levying war against the colonies or adhering to the British crown, and urging colonial 
legislatures to pass laws for their punishment). 
 117. See Am. Art. of War of 1775, art. I; Am. Art. of War of 1776, § I, art. 1, reprinted in 
WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 953, 961. 
 118. The resolution was passed Aug. 21, 1776 (and ordered printed after the revised Articles 
approved the prior day), and evolved over time as discussed in WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 765-71.  See 
also Am. Art. of War of 1775, art. XXVIII (court martial of soldiers giving intelligence to the enemy); 
and Am. Art. of War of 1776, § XIII, art. 19 (court martial and potential capital punishment for 
“Whosoever” gives “intelligence to the enemy”), reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 955, 967. 
 119. See WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 17-23.  See also United States v. Lee, 4 C.M.R. 185 (A.B.R. 
1952).  The Articles of War were amended under the Articles of Confederation, most extensively in 1786.  
See WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 972-75 (reprinted 1786 amendments to the Articles regarding military 
justice).  For re-enactment of the Articles by the First Congress under the Constitution, see Act of Sept. 
29, 1789, supra note 21.  
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regulation of . . . land and naval forces, and directing their operations.”120    
The Constitution’s Army, Navy, and Militia Clauses had ancestors in 
the Articles of Confederation, as well.  The Navy Clause was most 
similar: Congress, under the Articles, could “build and equip a navy” for 
the nation.121  But ground forces were handled differently.  Congress 
could merely “agree upon the number of land forces, and . . . make 
requisitions from each state for its quota” of army regulars, who would 
proceed to locations as directed by Congress pursuant to two Marching 
Clauses.122  State legislatures shared officer appointment power with 
Congress,123 but the legislatures alone would “raise the men, and clothe, 
arm, and equip them, in a soldier-like manner, at the expense of the united 
states,”124 which was dependent on the states for money.125  Reflecting 
profound fear of tyranny, the Articles of Confederation had no 
independent Executive.  Instead, the Articles allowed Congress to appoint 
various subordinate officials, including “commanders in chief” to lead the 
armed forces.126  The Articles provided little legal basis for a standing 
national army in peacetime.127  And indeed, the Confederation Congress 
had trouble getting funding from the states for the armed forces, and 
rejected Washington’s recommendation of creation of a small standing 
national army to secure the frontier in cooperation with state militia.128  
The Articles envisioned “a firm league of friendship” of sovereign, free, 
and independent states that would bear the primary burden for the 
confederation’s defense.129  The Articles accordingly bound the states to 
“always keep up a well regulated and discipline militia, sufficiently armed 
and accounted” with ready stores.130  With permission of Congress, the 
 
 120. ART. OF CONFED. OF 1781, Art. IX.  Because the Articles are punctuated so inconsistently and 
not well organized, one can reasonably wonder how much language one should regard as part of the 
Articles’ version of the Forces Clause.  In expanding order, one could include in the Clause just the 
“government and regulation” passage; also the “directing their operations” passage; or add language 
before a semicolon but after a dividing dash (“-“) on officer appointment and commissioning.  The best 
approach is to exclude officer appointment, recognizing that the Articles often divide clauses with 
semicolons.  For similar construction of the Clause, see, e.g., BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 28.  Note 
also that the Articles make three references to Congress’s power to direct forces.  In addition to the Forces 
Clause, at two other places Article IX states that land forces provided by the states “shall march to the 
place appointed, and within the time agreed on” by Congress.  
 121. ART. OF CONFED. OF 1781, art. IX. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. arts. VII, IX.  
 124. Id. art. VI. 
 125. Id. art. VIII (“a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states” as directed by 
Congress, under the “authority and direction of the legislatures”). 
 126. Id. art. IX. 
 127. Id.  
 128. BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 29. 
 129. ART. OF CONFED. of 1781, art. II, III. 
 130. Id. art. VI. 
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states could have their own warships and armies in times of peace and 
independently wage war.131     
What did the Forces Clause mean in the Articles?   
Intratextual and intertextual analysis shows that the Articles of 
Confederation used the term “regulate” and its variations in a manner akin 
to the Constitution, equally suggestive of lawmaking power.  (The term 
“government” appeared only in the Forces Clause in the Articles).  The 
Confederation Congress could regulate currency, post offices, and trade 
with Native Americans.132  Congress could also regulate state-
commissioned vessels of war and state-issued letters of marque and 
reprisal after a war declaration by Congress.133  “Rules” established what 
“shall be legal” in the capture and disposition of adversary vessels and 
their contents.134 
The powers conferred by the Forces Clause and the larger power to 
decide to go to war were neither laterally separated nor shared powers at 
the national level under the Articles of Confederation, because there was 
no separate executive.135  But they were differentiated.  This was done 
mechanistically through a supermajoritarian voting threshold.  The Forces 
Clause, like most other legislative powers, could be exercised by simple 
majority vote of the states in Congress, with each state having one vote.  
In contrast, nine of the thirteen states had to vote for Congress to exercise 
the Articles’ powers to declare or “engage in a war,” in addition to the 
related matters of marque and reprisal, raising national military forces, 
appointing commanders in chief, approving treaties and alliances, and 
appropriating funds.136  
 
 131. Id. arts. VI, IX.  Art. VI provided permission in the form of a general ban on states having 
warships and regular land forces in peace or engaging in war, with an exception for congressional 
authorization.  A further exception is that states could engage in war if “actually invaded by enemies” or 
if made aware of imminent attack by Native Americans “and the danger is so imminent as not to admit of 
a delay till the united states in Congress assembled, can be consulted.”  States could also commission 
warships and grant letters of marque and reprisal without a congressional war declaration, “unless such 
state be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so 
long as the danger shall continue, or until the united states in Congress assembled shall determine 
otherwise.”  Similarly, the Articles allowed Congress to give the states permission to engage in 
international diplomacy; enter into international alliances and treaties; and, enter into “any treaty, 
confederation, or alliance . . . between them.” 
 132. Id. arts. IX, VI. 
 133. Id. art. VI. 
 134. Id. art. IX. 
 135. In contrast, power over regulars was shared with the states under the Articles, due to the 
dependence of the national government on troops, equipage, and money from the states, and the 
national/state shared authority over appointment of army officers.  In another contrast with the 
Constitution, under the Articles the national government had no textual power over the militia.  The 
Articles’ sole reference was its Article VI requirement for the states to maintain militia and keep them 
ready.    
 136. ART. OF CONFED. OF 1781, art. IX.  The nine-state supermajority threshold would not have 
been adjusted if the confederation had grown to fourteen or more states with the accession of Canada to 
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Internal Regulation and External Government powers and the Forces 
Clause’s counter-authoritarian purposes were evident.  As noted, the 
Confederation Congress via amendment re-enacted the Continental 
Congress’s Articles of War and controlled military operations.137  The 
Articles’ Forces Clause gave Congress complete control of these national 
forces, including the power of “directing their operations.”138  Two 
Marching Clauses stipulated that the Congress could command state-
raised forces to “march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed 
on” by Congress.139  Powers under the Forces Clause and the two 
Marching Clauses could be delegated to committee.140  As implemented 
during the War of Independence, this arrangement (and Washington’s 
famous self-restraint)141 ably functioned in counter-authoritarian fashion: 
the country did not succumb to authoritarian rule or revert to monarchy.  
But Washington, other commanders, and many other observers were 
frustrated by the often slow, questionable, and cumbersome command-
by-legislative-committee.142   
3. Second Iteration: The Clause in the Constitution143 
a. Transition from Articles of Confederation to Federal Constitution 
The Articles’ command structure was one of its several national 
security deficits.144  Congress could not compel the states to provide 
 
the Articles, or admission of other states with the permission of nine states.  Id. art. XI.  It was one of the 
Articles’ many defects that, due to the specification of nine states, if the confederation grew larger than 
eighteen states new states could be admitted even if a majority of states were opposed. 
 137. See supra note 119 (1786 amendments to Am. Art. of War of 1776); Gregory E. Maggs, A 
Concise Guide to the Articles of Confederation as a Source for Determining the Original Meaning of the 
Constitution, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 397, 404-05 (2017) (examples of Confederation Congress 
management of military and diplomatic matters, including direction of forces to protect against Native 
Americans).  
 138. Id. art. IX. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. art. X. 
 141. Washington famously squelched discussion among his officers of mutiny against Congress, 
resisted calls for him to become king, and surrendered his commission and the presidency voluntarily.  
One biographer puts it well: “His instincts were the antithesis of a demagogue’s: he feared his own 
influence and agonized over exerting too much power.”  He labored to set precedents of restraint.  
CHERNOW, supra note 114, at 442, 434-36, 455-56. 
 142. See BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 30. 
 143. A short-lived third iteration of the Clause was its inclusion in the Confederate States of 
America’s 1861 Constitution, modeled on the U.S. Constitution.  The Clause appeared there in identical 
location and form (capitalization varied).  See CONST. OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 14. 
 144. In addition to the pieces on national security discussed in footnotes below, see THE 
FEDERALIST NOS. 3-5 (John Jay), 6-7 (Alexander Hamilton).  For arguments generally by the 
Constitution’s advocates against the Articles and for the revised union, see THE FEDERALIST NOS. 15-17 
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troops or money for a national military.  The national government could 
not command the largest military forces: the state militias.  There were 
threats to the union and threats of disunion: the British, French, and 
Spanish empires, in addition to Native American tribes, threatened from 
the outside, and might be emboldened by American military weakness 
and play separately armed states off against one another.  Hamilton 
warned in Federalist No. 8 that the country under the Articles faced 
disunion, which risked large standing state armies and “War between the 
States.”145  These would engender a continual state of fear and alarm, 
empowering state executives and their militaries and inevitably 
undermine democracy and the rights of the People.146  Even so, concern 
about a tyrannous national government continued to run deep.  The 
Framers’ solution was a “large republic,” with a federal government 
strong enough to protect the country’s security and obviate the need for 
militarized states, and sufficiently limited to protect liberty.147  The 
Constitution mitigated risks associated with a national chief executive and 
a national army via internal structural limits on federal powers (via 
separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism) and 
potentially enforceable legal limits (memorialized during the Founding 
Era in the Bill of Right’s protection of the rights of the people and the 
states).148 
The Forces Clause was carried forward into the Constitution by way of 
an amendment to the original draft of the Committee of Detail, without 
 
(Alexander Hamilton), 18-20 (James Madison & Alexander Hamilton), 21-22 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 145. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 146. See id.: 
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct.  Even the ardent 
love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates.  The violent destruction of life and 
property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, 
will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions 
which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights.  To be more safe, they at length 
become willing to run the risk of being less free. 
In the context of public skepticism of standing armies, Hamilton smartly argued in No. 8 against the state 
standing armies that would result from disunion.  Knowing that a national army could be created under 
the Constitution, he also argued that a national army would not necessarily be required.  Instead, the union 
could primarily rely on its national navy and federalizable state militia, and the military efficiencies of a 
union’s scale and distance from Europe.  Ultimately, Hamilton argued that, the country would need a net 
smaller military as a union than in dis-union.  In other essays, he made the case for a national government 
able to raise a national army and direct state militias.  See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 24-29 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
 147. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison) (regarding a large republic). 
 148. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny”).  For scholarly discussion 
of the internal and external limits, see AMAR, supra note 9; BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 7; see 
generally PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE (2009); U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. 
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comment or debate.149  Or, at least most of the Clause survived: the phrase 
“directing [military] operations” was omitted.  This “directing” language 
reappeared nowhere else in the new document.  Two proposals that would 
have given it to the Constitution’s new Executive were defeated.150  Other 
changes included deletion of the Articles’ Marching Clauses, which also 
had given Congress directive power.151  Meanwhile, a commander in 
chief was no longer one or more appointees of the Congress, but rather an 
identity of the new President.152  Congress could create peacetime forces 
including a Navy and Armies raised directly from the people.153  Congress 
could pay for them itself via federal taxes and appropriations, but would 
have to act affirmatively every two years to fund the Army or it would 
disappear.154  Congress now had the power of “calling forth the Militia,” 
of “governing” it on federal duty, and of “organizing, arming, and 
disciplining” it.155 
b. Implications Generally 
What were the implications for the Forces Clause in the Constitution?   
First, the Clause, along with new congressional powers to create and 
fund regular federal forces and put state militias on federal duty, 
continued to reflect the counter-authoritarian ethos of the Founding Era, 
despite creation of the Executive.  These powers were not handed to this 
new Executive, nor to states that the Framers worried could lose their 
“republican form of government.”156  The Forces Clause stayed with 
Congress. 
If anything, the Clause now mattered more.  The Constitution’s new 
 
 149. See 5 ELLIOTT, supra note 90, at 443; 2 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 330 (the Clause “was 
added from the existing Articles of Confederation”); Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 
11, at 786. 
 150. These were the New Jersey Plan (a multi-member Executive could “direct all military 
operations”) and Hamilton’s plan (a “supreme Executive authority” would “have the direction of war 
when authorized or begun”).  For discussion, see Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 13, 
at 787-88. 
 151. The other textual change to the Clause – different capitalization – is unimportant.  See Myers, 
supra note 74.  
 152. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  The usual original understanding and 
practical reality is that the military is part of the Executive Branch.  Another view is that the military is a 
sort of fourth branch under the Constitution, a national rather than Executive agency.  See Geoffrey S. 
Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, The Political Balance of Power Over the Military: Rethinking the Relationship 
Between the Armed Forces, the President, and Congress, 44 HOU. L. REV. 553 (2007). 
 153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-13.  
 154. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.  
 155. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15-16. 
 156. The First Militia Clause allowed the federal government to take the militia away from a state 
that had lost its “republican form of government” or was on its way.  See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (Second 
Militia Clause); see also id. art. IV, § 4 (Guarantee Clause).   
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Executive – a head of state chosen nationally, with the power to veto 
Congress’s acts and the authority to command a national military that the 
national government could raise and fund on its own157 – heightened 
concern about tyranny at the national level.158  That in turn enhanced the 
importance of the checking power provided by the Forces Clause and its 
Article I siblings.   
Second, Congress’s new authority over the militia buttressed the 
significance of work done pursuant to the Forces Clause.  Regulation of 
militia discipline pursuant to the Second Militia Clause would happen in 
the context of Congress’s regulation of national regulars under the Forces 
Clause.  These powers could be synergistic.159  Congress now had 
independent authority to craft an interoperable, standardized American 
military, composed of both regular and reserve components.   
Third, the Internal Regulation power over military justice and 
discipline clearly survived the Clause’s transfer to the new Constitution.  
There are no indications in the Founding record that the power lapsed, or 
now stemmed from any other clause.   
However, few signals about the scope (much less definitions) of the 
terms “Government,” “Regulation,” and “land and naval Forces” were 
provided beyond the intratextual clues in other provisions of the 
document.    
c. Implications: External Government Power 
The new Constitution also did not plainly state its implications for the 
External Government power.  Did the power survive, and if so, in what 
form?  While partly circumstantial and inevitably incomplete, overall the 
Founding Era evidence is consistent with a reading of the Forces Clause 
that conveys to Congress an External Government power. 
To begin, what should we make of removal of the Forces Clause’s 
prescriptive power in the Articles of Confederation of “directing 
operations,” the deletion of the other Marching Clauses, and the creation 
 
 157. Professors Barron and Lederman note that the method of choosing the President and the 
presentment requirement enhanced the power of the President and reduced the risk of legislative micro-
management.  See Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 791-92.  Making it harder to 
govern and regulate, in the face of an independent Commander in Chief, made such work the Congress 
did accomplish by statute all the more important.   
 158. See, e.g., “An Old Whig,” Essay V, PHIL. INDEP. GAZETTER (Nov. 1, 1787), reprinted in 3 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 17, 37-38 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (Constitution’s new President has 
dangerous powers, having such an elected king risks tyranny). 
 159. Congress’s use of this synergistic power facilitated the evolution of the U.S. military into a 
“joint force” of interoperate active services and reserve components.  The U.S. Army, for its part, 
conceives itself as a “total force” – a team of active, reserve, and National Guard (organized militia) 
personnel. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, DIR. 2012-08, ARMY TOTAL FORCE POLICY 1 (Sept. 2012).  
Today’s “total force” sees the Guard deploy abroad on a regular basis. 
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of a new President with the identity of Commander in Chief?  
Presidentialist scholars argue that the result was a complete transfer of the 
power of military direction to the President, in preclusive form: Congress 
could not limit it by statute.160  Professors Barron and Lederman respond 
persuasively that the evidence supports no consensus about whether 
Congress or the President would have “direction” power.161  As noted, the 
Constitutional Convention considered and rejected two plans that would 
have given it explicitly to the Executive.  Instead, the Framers dropped 
“direction” from the document entirely.162  Deletion of the Marching 
Clauses supports no clear inference: their omission flowed from 
replacement of state power to raise armies with federal power.163  
Hamilton in Federalist No. 69 mentioned a “direction” power residing 
with the President.  However, Hamilton was likely referencing mainly the 
Commander in Chief’s position at the top of the military chain of 
command, for this reason: Hamilton also wrote that such direction was 
subject to law the same as were governors regarding state military forces 
under several state constitutions.164  Madison similarly was at best 
equivocal, and if anything leaned toward the Forces Clause.  In his 
Constitutional Convention notes (in one of the scant mentions of the 
Commander in Chief Clause there), Madison wrote that “direction” was 
to be an “executive function.”165  Yet after the Clause was added and the 
entire document completed, Madison told the Virginia ratifying 
convention that Congress had “the direction and regulation of the land 
and naval forces.”166  Note Madison’s substitution of the word “direction” 
for the textual term “Government” in his quotation of the Forces Clause.  
 
 160. See Richard Hartzman, Congressional Control of the Military in a Multilateral Context: A 
Constitutional Analysis of Congress’s Power to Restrict the President’s Authority to Place United States 
Armed Forces Under Foreign Commanders in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 162 MIL. L. 
REV. 50, 72-76 (1999); Oversight Legislation: Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence, 100th 
Cong. 179-81 (1987) (written response to question for the record to Charles Cooper, Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice), cited in Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra 
note 11, at 788 n.323. 
 161. See Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 787-89. 
 162. These were the New Jersey Plan (a multi-member Executive could “direct all military 
operations”) and Hamilton’s plan (a “supreme Executive authority” would “have the direction of war 
when authorized or begun”).  See 1 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 242, 244, 292.  
 163. Compare ART. OF CONFED. of 1781 art. IX, with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 164. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (the President had “nothing more than the 
supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces” but this power was no greater than 
found in one of several state constitutions that stipulated that military direction was subordinate to the law 
of the land). 
 165. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 319. 
 166. See 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1282 
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds. 1993).  “The record of the Virginia ratification debates is 
the only one in which are preserved significant remarks of the ratifiers concerning the provisions of the 
Constitution relating to the armed forces.”  See Henderson, supra note 20, at 301. 
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Madison’s usage naturally supports association of “Government” with a 
continued legislative congressional power over operations – and indeed 
continuation of a congressional prescriptive power.  Taken together, the 
evidence from Hamilton and Madison suggests that Congress, through its 
Forces Clause authority, could at the least limit operations ordered by the 
President. 
Professor Akhil Amar sees this view of the External Government 
power as reasonable, and in his originalist work goes a step farther.  He 
adds that statutes “proscribing certain uses of the military may be easier 
to justify than laws prescribing highly specific uses of armed forces in 
certain tactical situations” – general rules over “the particulars of actual 
battle command.”167  Professors Barron and Lederman disagree, seeing 
such distinctions as conveniently attractive but unsupported by the 
originalist evidence and dodging the question of whether Congress can 
govern all land and naval forces operations, or if some irreducible 
minimum of Commander in Chief power remains.168  An alternative view 
postulated by Professor Amar has been developed by Professor Prakash: 
concurrent authority for the President and Congress over military actions, 
but Congress wins if they disagree.  The President can act without 
statutory authorization in times of peril, but must observe legislation 
enacted pursuant to the Forces Clause that not only limits but also 
commands the Commander in Chief and military.169  The Prakash study, 
however, relies in significant part on Founding Era statutes that textually 
are not directive but rather permissive.170   
 
 167. See AMAR, supra note 9, at 188 (original emphasis omitted). 
 168. See Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 750-60. 
 169. See AMAR, supra note 9, at 188; Prakash, supra note 1, at 336-37. 
 170. For example, Professor Prakash writes that Congress “ordered the military . . . to occupy parts 
of disputed territory in Florida” in 1811.  See Prakash, supra note 1, at 336-37.  However, the statute’s 
text is merely permissive.  An Act Relative to the Occupation of the Floridas, Jan. 15, 1811, 3 Stat. 471, 
reads in full in relevant part: the President is “authorized, to take possession of, and occupy, all or any 
part of the territory [of West Florida], in case an arrangement has been, or shall be, made with the local 
authority of the said territory, for delivering [the territory to the United States], or in the event of an 
attempt to occupy the said territory, or any part thereof, by any foreign government; and he may . . . 
employ any part of the army and navy of the United States which he may deem necessary” (emphasis 
added).  The Act goes on to authorize, but not direct, the President to govern the territory if taken.  (This 
statute was one of four initially unpublished statutes that represented a late Founding Era experiment in 
secret law.  See Rudesill, supra note 44, at 256-57).  Prakash, supra note 1, at 337, also analogizes 
Congress’s power to order the use of force under the Forces Clause to its power to command the use of 
force via war declarations, but note that here again the text is permissive and authorizing, not directive.  
See An Act for the Protection of the Commerce and Seamen of the United States, Against the Tripolitan 
Cruisers, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 129 (1802) (declaring war against the Barbary Pirates, authorizing the use of naval 
force “as may be judged requisite by the President,” and authorizing captures and commissions to 
privateers); An Act Declaring War Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the 
Dependencies Thereof and the United States of America and Their Territories, ch. 102, 2 Stat. 755 (1812) 
(President “is hereby authorized to use the whole land and naval force” and issue letters of marque and 
reprisal (emphasis added)). 
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Reading more into statutes than they can bear, however, does not mean 
that the presidentialist view of Professor John Yoo and others is correct.  
Professor Yoo contends that the original understanding of the 
Constitution was that the Congress in a regular statute cannot place 
operational limits on how the President may employ the armed forces.  
Presidential exercise of power to protect national security is limitable only 
by denial of funding, removal of the President through electoral defeat or 
impeachment, or via politics – which is to say, presidential self-
restraint.171  Without engaging with the Forces Clause, Professor Yoo 
categorically denies an External Government power.172  This 
presidentialist viewpoint remains a minority view among scholars and 
jurists, however, because it is so at odds with the balance of originalist 
evidence.173   
It is not necessary for our purposes to revive in full the extensive 
originalist conversation.  Suffice to underscore the following.  First, the 
plain text does not dictate an understanding of the Commander in Chief 
Clause as providing a preclusive power that overcomes the Forces Clause 
or any other part of Article I.  On the contrary, the textual phrase 
Commander in Chief referenced a top military officer who in both the 
British and American contexts had always been subject to legislative 
control.174  Second, the power the presidentialist interpretation would 
 
 171. See YOO, supra note 9.  Yoo makes an exception even to Congress’s power of the purse.  
Congress cannot in Yoo’s view defund some unspecified uses of the military because Congress cannot 
via statute abrogate the Commander in Chief power.  This view is challenged by inclusion in the 
Constitution of a hard two year limit on the availability of appropriations for the army, debate in the 
Founding Era about whether the nation needed any standing military force, and by Congress’s refusal to 
provide President Washington with more than a tiny force.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12; THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton) (a federal army “dangerous to liberty” will be unnecessary if 
the federal government can employ the militia for national defense); BARRON, supra note 9, at 43-49.  
 172. Professor Yoo’s view was reflected in U.S. government arguments during the George W. Bush 
Administration in which Yoo served at the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel.  See 
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, for the Attorney General (Nov. 2, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/olc/legacy/2011/03/25/johnyoo-memo-for-ag.pdf (redacted declassified memorandum on 
President’s authority to order surveillance despite FISA statute); Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant 
Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Re: Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) to Military 
Detention of United States Citizens (June 27, 2002); Memorandum from John C. Yoo & Robert J. 
Delahunty, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President & William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Dep’t of Defense, Re: Authority for Use of Military 
Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States (Oct. 23, 2001). 
 173. See generally Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11. 
 174. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Commander in Chief would have “the 
supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the 
Confederacy” with powers inferior to those of the British King and many state governors); See BARRON, 
supra note 9, at 24 (strange for the Framers to use a term for a legislatively controlled officer “to signal 
their desire to depart from this history and free the president from all checks when it came to the conduct 
of war”); Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 785-86 (“the evidence indicates a 
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provide to the President is so colossal as to have required the Founding 
generation to abandon almost completely its deep fear of tyranny and 
skepticism of executive and military power.175  Of course, it did not.  Their 
acceptance of a national Executive and potential national army was 
reluctant at best, had to be defended during ratification, and was 
understood to be cabined by a strong Congress with a long list of 
enumerated lawmaking powers, in addition to federalism and individual 
rights (later made explicit via the Bill of Rights).176  Third, at the least, 
the presidentialist understanding of the Commander in Chief Clause – and 
perhaps of the Forces Clause, too – would be expected to engender intense 
debate that would have been reflected in the records of the Constitutional 
Convention.  Yet the Conventions records show no assertions that the 
Constitution would free the Commander in Chief from regular statutes on 
military operations, laws of the kind the Continental and Confederation 
Congresses frequently passed.  Indeed, the Convention records show little 
discussion of this new presidential identity at all – and no debate 
regarding the Forces Clause.177  Rather, as mentioned, the Convention 
considered and rejected plans to give “direction” of the armed forces to 
the executive. 
Finally, taken as a whole, the Founding Era constitutional history does 
not support the implication of the presidentialist view for our purposes: 
that the Constitution terminated the External Government power the 
Congress possessed under the Articles of Confederation.  The opposite 
conclusion is demanded by the balance of the evidence presented by 
Professors Barron and Lederman.  Their analyses provide the most 
comprehensive scholarly study of presidential and military action 
contrary to the express or implied will of Congress – Youngstown 
Category 3 – from the Founding through the George W. Bush 
Administration.178  The history of the Constitution as applied – “gloss 
which life has written” on the cryptic constitutional text – shows that 
Washington and other Founding Era presidents did not make the sort of 
 
relatively well-developed understanding that a ‘Commander in Chief’ could be subject to legislative 
control even as to tactical matters of war”). 
 175. Justice Jackson makes this point memorably.  See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 176. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); BARRON, supra note 9, at 18-33. 
 177. There “was no recorded discussion urging or suggesting any significant change” from the 
condition under the Articles of Confederation, which was commander in chief subordination to, and 
superintending the execution of military operations in accordance with, the will of Congress (emphasis 
added).  Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 785-86.  
 178. See Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part II, supra note 1; BARRON, supra note 9.  Barron 
and Lederman’s study includes restrictions pursuant to other Clauses as well, including the 
Appropriations, Army and Navy, Militia, Commerce, Captures, and Marque and Reprisal Clauses.  Even 
so, their study does review evidence concerning law rooted in the Forces Clause: statutes restricting 
internal and external military activities not concerned with matters governed by other Article I clauses.  
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expansive, preclusive claims of Commander in Chief power that are 
common now, and indeed such claims were rare before the mid-twentieth 
century.179  From Congress’s restriction of the 1790s undeclared war with 
France to a naval war forward, there is “surprisingly little Founding-era 
evidence supporting the notion that the conduct of military campaigns is 
beyond legislative control and a fair amount of evidence that affirmatively 
undermines it.”180  Professors Barron and Lederman find firm originalist 
support only for what they term a preclusive superintendence power of 
the Commander in Chief.  That is, Congress cannot replace the President 
as head of the armed forces that Congress can create and fund (or not), 
short of removal from office after impeachment.  The precise outlines of 
what presidential superintendence powers survive attempted statutory 
limitation or direction at the Commander in Chief’s “lowest ebb” remain 
blurry – but ultimately the ebb is lower and the blur is smaller than 
claimed by presidentialists.181      
An interpretive challenge is posed by the fact that a number of statutes 
that explicitly or implicitly cabin Commander in Chief authority may 
readily find constitutional grounding in multiple Article I provisions.  For 
example, statutes authorizing and limiting aspects of the undeclared naval 
“quasi-war” with France involved action by private U.S. vessels against 
commerce benefitting France, and implicated the Captures, Marque and 
Reprisal, and Commerce Clauses, in addition to the Declare War Clause 
(if one understands the Declare War Clause to allow statutory forestalling 
 
 179. See Barron and Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part II, supra note 1, at 951-52 & 947-48, quoting 
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  Regarding constitutional gloss, see also 
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 411 (2012) (examining acquiescence in inter-branch relations); BAKER, supra note 13, at 36-38 
(gloss of practice vital to Constitution’s meaning as applied); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive 
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 527 (2003) (some in Founding generation expected that a “fixed” 
meaning of ambiguous constitutional provisions would develop via interpretation and practice); KOH, 
supra note 10, at 70 (1990) (quasi-constitutional custom reflects norms); Michael J. Glennon, The Use of 
Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 144-46 (1984) (practice 
valuable in inter-branch interactions).  
  Scholars have also found that Presidents until World War II did not tend to make the now-
common claim of independent authority to deploy forces whenever the President concludes it to be 
necessary for national defense (versus only in times of imminent peril that do not allow time to get a 
statute through Congress).  Indeed, the opposite was the case: Presidents often disclaimed such unilateral 
authority and instead requested it from Congress.  See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (2013).  See also Peter M. Shane, Rebalancing War Powers: President Obama’s 
Momentous Decision, SHANE REACTIONS (Sept. 1, 2013), https://shanereactions.wordpress.com/2013/09/ 
(discussing Obama Administration’s later aborted pursuit of congressional authorization to use force 
against Syrian regime in context of constitutional history and argument about war powers).   
 180. See Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part II, supra note 1, at 965-72; Barron & Lederman, 
Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 696.   
 181. Accord Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring) (unclear what exactly the 
Commander in Chief power involves but “[i]t undoubtedly puts the Nation’s armed forces under 
presidential command”). 
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of general war).  Of course, power to govern operations may reasonably 
flow from multiple constitutional clauses.  The question for us is the 
nature the External Government power flowing particularly from the 
Forces Clause.   
A few points are in order.  First, as in the Internal Regulation context, 
the Clause’s External Government powers can act in concert with other 
clauses by providing congressional “Rules for . . . the land and naval 
Forces” as they execute activities and policies authorized under those 
separate provisions of the Constitution.182  Through the Forces Clause, 
Congress can control the Army that Congress can create under the Army 
Clause (also known as the Raise and Support Armies Clause; see Part 
III.B.1 below regarding the Posse Comitatus and Insurrection Acts).  To 
take another example, the Secretary of the Navy’s orders to privately 
owned (“public”) armed ships – operating against shipping with France 
during the “quasi-war” pursuant to statutory authority stemming from the 
clauses mentioned above – implicated Congress’s External Government 
authority under the Forces Clause because the vessels were at that 
moment functionally part of the “naval Forces” engaged in hostilities at 
the order of a military department.183   
Second, one can imagine situations in which the other national security 
clauses in their natural meaning require more stretching if they are to 
apply.  One example is relying on Commerce Clause authority for statutes 
that are really about governing military intelligence collection targeting 
U.S. persons (see Part III.B.2 below regarding the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA)).  Similar stretching would be reliance on the 
Necessary and Proper Clause for statutory limits on military deployments 
into harm’s way without congressional authorization (see Part III.B.5 
below regarding the War Powers Resolution).   
Third, a richer understanding of how the Clause has operated will be 
facilitated by examination of how it has been explicitly construed by the 
 
 182. Other operative clauses include the Army, Navy, Declare War, Commerce, Captures, 
Guarantee, and even Marque and Reprisal Clauses.  Regarding the latter, see Kent, supra note 3, at 915-
16 & nn.330-32 (“relatively uncontroversial” that the Forces Clause allows Congress “to regulate…prizes 
and other aspects of private naval raiding and warfare,” which was often a cause of or prelude to full-scale 
war and therefore needed to be controlled by Congress). 
 183. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 170, 171 (1804).  This case did not cite the Forces 
Clause but could have.  During the undeclared naval war with France, the Congress in 1799 banned 
commercial voyages to France and authorized the President to order the Navy to seize ships sailing for 
France.  The Court ruled that President Adams’s instructions to the Navy to seize U.S. ships going to and 
from France were invalid because they went beyond Congress’s authorization regarding naval operations.  
Implicated here could be congressional power under the Commerce Clause, the Declare War Clause, the 
Forces Clause, or all three – but none were cited by Chief Justice John Marshall.  He also did not cite 
Article II, nor the presidentialist argument that this presidential power cannot be constrained.  But 
Marshall did make clear that Congress does have what we conceive as an External Government power, 
whatever its textual basis in the Constitution. 
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branches after the Founding Era, how the branches have implicitly acted 
pursuant to it, and how the Clause is especially salient relevant today.  It 
is these subjects to which we now turn, respectively, in Parts II.C, III, and 
IV. 
C. Constitutional History: Citation to the Clause in the Three Branches 
Moving beyond the Founding Era, this Part continues our review of the 
constitutional record by analyzing evidence of the Clause’s explicit or 
otherwise clear citation and interpretation by each branch of the federal 
government.  Because the Internal Regulation power is well established, 
this section focuses primarily on citations suggesting an External 
Government power.  Discussion of references consistent with an Internal 
Regulation power are included for context.  Reviewing the constitutional 
record for explicit reliance on the Clause reveals several patterns across 
the three branches. 
First, all three branches – as one would expect – have clearly 
understood the Clause to provide an Internal Regulation power.  They 
have frequently invoked it regarding its core concern, military justice.  
There is also evidence of additional Internal Regulation authority, to 
include personnel benefits for current and former personnel, and to 
regulate the broader national security apparatus beyond the Department 
of Defense and its predecessors.  Frequent reliance on the Clause over 
many years for its Internal Regulation power is readily explained not just 
by wide acceptance of the existence of an Internal Regulation power, but 
by considerations of scale and function.  The military justice system 
handles thousands of cases every year.  These proceedings generate 
constitutional questions.  Also, throughout the republic’s history a 
considerable number of voting Americans have served in the land and 
naval forces, worked in its bureaucracy, or otherwise interacted with it, 
regularly generating legislative, administrative, and judicial action.  
Finally, it is the responsibility of the organs of government to manage the 
immense and expensive national security apparatus and continually 
modify it in response to the evolving security environment.     
Second, explicit interpretation of the Clause to carry an External 
Government power has been rarer.  Among the three branches, a 
congressional power rooted in the Forces Clause over national security 
operations is most often evident in citations to the Clause by Congress 
itself.184  Engagements with the Clause by the Justice Department and by 
Justice Jackson in his landmark Youngstown concurrence have in the 
Article II and III branches kept open the doctrinal door to the External 
 
 184. Of course, Congress also produces vastly more bills, reports, and statements in the 
Congressional Record per year than the Justice Department and Supreme Court produce opinions. 
43
Rudesill: The Land and Naval Forces Clause
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
434 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
Government understanding allowed by the Constitution’s text and 
supported by the originalist record.     
The third pattern is citations that do not clearly reflect either theory of 
the Clause or are unexplained.  The record is replete with undifferentiated 
seriatim citations to the Forces Clause along with other clauses.  
Sometimes they merely suggest federal or congressional national security 
powers generally.  Most interestingly, review of the constitutional record 
shows that many Members of Congress and their staffs in our time 
misunderstand the Clause.   
As scholars have found in surveys of citations to other clauses that 
provide more than one power to Congress, the Article I, II, and III 
branches have not engaged with the Forces Clause in a holistic manner.185  
The Executive branch has been especially reluctant in published opinions 
to acknowledging an External Government power in the Clause.  Of 
course, such a power would constrain its ultimate organizational client, 
the President, regarding military operations, and the Executive branch has 
tended to endorse stronger views of Executive power in more recent 
constitutional history.  All three branches, however, have now recognized 
the Forces Clause to provide Congress legislative authority regarding 
treatment of captured personnel.  Detainee issues straddle the 
Internal/External line, implicating both military justice rules and 
operational interactions with third parties who are not part of the U.S. 
national security apparatus.    
This section examines the record of the Clause’s explicit or clearly 
implied interpretation.  This is in contrast with the work done in Part III, 
to follow: identification of statutory frameworks that ought to be 
interpreted to find constitutional footing in the Clause.  This Part’s three 
branch review proceeds in order of each branch’s placement in the 
Constitution.   
1. Legislative Branch 
a. General Record 
Since the Founding it has been common for legislation to be proposed 
and passed without citation to the specific constitutional authority upon 
which it relies.186  Of course, some statutes by their topic – such as a war 
 
 185. See, e.g., Kent, supra note 3, at 861 (interpretations of the Law of Nations Clause by the three 
branches often partial, inconsistent, or shallow). 
 186. See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 1, at 345 (noting this phenomenon regarding Founding Era 
legislation concerning use of force).  As noted in the Introduction, this practice continues today, and it is 
well-settled court doctrine that such citations are not necessary for a statute’s constitutionality.  Citations 
do, however, help us understand statutes and the Constitution, and strengthen statutes by rooting them 
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declaration – or plain text are obviously grounded in specific 
constitutional language.  In the case of the Forces Clause, legislation 
concerning operations has incorporated the Clause’s terminology,187 as 
have the texts of military justice codes throughout the republic’s 
history.188    
Digitized records show 556 explicit references to the Clause in the 
Congressional Record from 1789 to 1997, 205 references in committee 
hearings from 1824 to 2011, and 83 references in committee reports since 
1817.189  Bills and resolutions have been comprehensively digitized for 
the most recent decades, and show 47 references in legislative text over 
the two decades from 1989 to 2012.  Congress’s reference rate exceeds 
that in Supreme Court opinions and available Justice Department 
opinions.190 
A large number of legislative references reflect an Internal Regulation 
power that extends well beyond military justice.  For example, committee 
reports and Senate floor statements concerning amendments to the 
Military Selective Service Act – registration for the draft – invoked the 
Clause, in addition to the Army and Navy Clauses.191  In 1993 and 1994, 
during House discussion regarding the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law that 
 
more firmly with the Constitution. 
 187. For example, see An Act Authorizing the Employment of the Land and Naval Forces of the 
United States, in Case of Insurrections, Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (governing presidential 
employment of federal forces domestically); see also Part III.B.1 infra (discussing Insurrection Act).  To 
provide another example, during the run-up to the War of 1812 the Senate passed a resolution that 
authorized the President to employ armed merchants and privateers in protecting commerce.  The 
resolution additionally authorized the President to “issue instructions which shall be comfortable to the 
laws and usages of nations, for the government of the ships which may be employed in that service” 
(emphasis added).  See 21 ANNALS OF CONG. 2022 (1810).  One understanding of the resolution is that 
federally authorized armed merchants and other privateers became part of the Clause’s “land and naval 
Forces,” subject to Congress’s stipulations regarding the “Rules” governing their operations.  That 
additional authority to protect commerce and enlist the non-government ships may have also come from 
the Commerce and the Marque and Reprisal Clauses, respectively, is of no matter.  To this list one could 
add the Define and Punish and Law of Nations Clauses.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 188. See Am. Art. of War (1776);  Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies of 
North-America (1775); An  Act  for  the  Government  of  the  Navy, Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 
709; An Act for the Better Government of the Navy, supra note 21; Am. Art. of War (1806); Rules and 
Regulations for the Government of the United States Navy (1862); Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
supra note 22 (see especially delegated power to services to issue regulations such as in 10 U.S.C. § 
6011).  The Navy Code of 1800 in Article 37 over-rode Commander in Chief orders regarding officer 
dismissal.  
 189. Differences in time frames are due to differences in databases, which continue to develop as 
additional congressional materials are digitized.  Details on file with author.   
 190. Data sets on file with author.  Many of Congress’s references are in legislative history – 
statements, reports, and unenacted bills.  Depending on one’s view of legislative history, these materials 
can have large or small influence on our understanding of the law.  In contrast, the Article II and III branch 
opinions discussed infra have legal force (the former only within the Executive branch). 
 191. See S. REP. NO. 96-826, at 159-61 (1980) (bill would be constitutional under Army, Navy, and 
Forces Clauses); 126 CONG. REC. 13880-82, 13896 (1980) (statements of Sen. Warner & Sen. Hatfield).  
Original Act was known as the Elston Act, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604 (1948). 
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would bar gay and lesbian Americans from openly serving in the Armed 
Forces for a decade and a half, supporters emphasized the plenary and 
exclusive power that the Clause provided to Congress to make rules about 
the organization, personnel policies, and discipline of the military.192  
Similarly, legislation cited the Clause as authority for Congress to require 
military recruiter access to higher education institutions, and to bar 
veteran military burial benefits to sex offenders.193   
A smaller but significant number of references reflect an External 
Government power, stemming from the Clause or from the Clause en bloc 
along with other war-related clauses.  For example, over the past half 
century, the Clause has been invoked in Congress regarding authorization 
for use of force generally and in Iran, setting goals for military 
involvement in Yugoslavia, requiring cessation of hostilities in Libya, and 
barring U.S. troops from serving under United Nations or foreign 
command.194  
b. Current Practice: Statements of Constitutional Authority  
A House rule change allows systematic analysis of citation to the 
Clause during the three most recent completed Congresses (112th to 
114th, 2011-16).  This analysis shows frequent references consistent with 
both the Internal Regulation and External Government understandings, 
on a range of subjects.  Frequent citations to the Clause for a rulemaking 
power over the entire U.S. government, however, suggests that Congress 
frequently misunderstands the Clause.   
When Republicans assumed the majority in the U.S. House at the start 
of the 112th Congress, they created what became Rule XII(7)(c).  It 
requires that all legislation introduced in the House must be accompanied 
by insertion of a statement of constitutional authority into the 
Congressional Record.195  The new rule reflected a campaign promise of 
 
 192. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571, 
107 Stat. 1547, 1670-73 (1993).  
 193. See H. Con. Res. 36, 109th Cong. (2005) (access to higher educational institutions); H. Con. 
Res. 354, 109th Cong. (2006) (access to higher educational institutions); H.R. 5564, 110th Cong. (2008) 
(veteran burial benefits). 
 194. See S. REP. NO. 90-797 regarding S. Res. 187, 90th Cong. (1967) (introduction of forces into 
hostilities); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No 106-65, 113 Stat. 512 
(1999) (setting goals for military intervention in Yugoslavia); H.R. 4797, 109th Cong. (2006) (U.S. forces 
under foreign command); S. Con. Res. 13, 110th Cong. (2007) (use of force against Iran); H.R. 1212, 
112th Cong. (2011) (requiring halt to use of force in Libya). 
 195. U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., Rule XII(7)(c) (2016), http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-
rules.pdf.  The rule makes such statements for legislation received from the Senate optional at the 
discretion of the Chair of the House committee of jurisdiction.  See Rule XII(7)(c)(2).  I found no 
examples.  
  Extensive effort has been made to ensure that the data set constructed for this empirical study 
46
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss2/1
2018] THE LAND AND NAVAL FORCES CLAUSE 437 
greater textual fidelity to the Constitution, and particularly to an 
originalist view focused on narrow reading of federal powers.196  
Members (often via staff) decide which provisions to cite.197  Members 
are not required to consult any person or office, including non-partisan 
providers of legal advice on Capitol Hill.198    
The constitutional authority statements are not analyses of whether a 
bill or resolution would be constitutional if enacted.  Rather, they are 
simply bare citations to provisions of the Constitution.199  They do not 
include explanations of what powers the constitutional provisions provide 
to Congress.  The statements usually cite specific clauses.  Sometimes 
they cite to Article I, Section 8 as a whole.   
Empirical analysis and close reading of constitutional authority 
statements pursuant to Rule XII(7)(c) and their related bills and 
resolutions provide a window into how Congress currently understands 
the Clause.   
In the three completed Congresses since the rule’s advent (totaling six 
years), the Clause was cited in constitutional authority statements as 
grounding for 236 bills and joint resolutions in the House that could 
become law.  As indicated in Table 1, below, Congress cited the Clause 
at a consistent rate, between 75 and 81 times per Congress.  Congress 
cited the Forces Clause about two and a half times as often as the better-
known Army Clause (91 citations), but only about one-fifth as frequently 
as the Commerce Clause (3,615 citations) upon which so much federal 
regulatory activity depends.    
 
reflects comprehensive and systematic review of Congress’s citation habits.  The data can be regarded as 
reasonably accurate, even if it potentially may not include every citation to the Forces Clause in 
constitutional authority statements during the three Congresses studied.  This is due to lack of uniformity 
in how Members of Congress word the statements they file in the Congressional Record.  Members are 
not consistent in their names and description of constitutional clauses, quotes of their text, nor in their use 
of numerals (e.g., Arabic vs. Roman) to cite particular sections and clauses. 
 196. See Republicans in Congress, A Pledge to America: A New Governing Agenda Built on the 
Priorities of Our Nation, the Principles We Stand for, and America’s Founding Values (2010), 
http://gop.gov/resources/library/documents/pledge/a-pledge-to-america.pdf. 
 197. Members and staff can use a standard form when filing the statement of constitutional 
authority.  Interview with Judiciary Committee Counsel, Aug. 16, 2016 (notes on file with author).  Based 
on general practices in Congress on a variety of matters, we can be confident that in some offices the staff 
file bills and statements under the Member’s name without the Member actually reviewing the filing 
firsthand or being aware of them.  This is how decisions about bill introduction, cosponsorships, Member 
signatures on Dear Colleague letters, and issuance of press releases are frequently handled. 
 198. These include Senate Legal Counsel, House General Counsel, the Senate and House 
Legislative Counsel offices, and the House and Senate Parliamentarians. 
 199. For discussion, see Marc Spindelman, House Rule XII: Congress and the Constitution, 72 
OHIO ST. L. J. 1317 (2011); KENNETH R. THOMAS & TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R41548, SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND HOUSE RULE XII, CLAUSE 7(C) (2011). 
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Table 1.  Citations to Land and Naval Forces Clause in 
Congressional Record Constitutional Authority Statements Pursuant 




















































could become law 
112th 
(2011-13)   
52 2 2 1 24 81 1,241 35 6,845 
113th 
(2013-15) 
45 4 2 0 24 75 1,183 31 6,016 
114th 
(2015-16) 
30 6 1 0 42 79 1,191 25 6,634 
TOTALS 127 12 5 1 90 235 3,615 91 19,495 
 
 We can reasonably infer that the Internal Regulation understanding 
was evident in 127 total citations, versus only 12 citations for the External 
Government power.  Recent legislation introduced in the House under 
Republican majorities, in other words, relies on the Clause to control 
internal discipline 10 times more often than it does to control the 
operations of “the land and naval Forces.”       
What explains these patterns?  Introduction of legislation that would 
find footing in the Internal Regulation understanding does not necessarily 
reflect a view that the External Government understanding cannot 
alternatively operate.  Members of Congress frequently introduce 
legislation concerning the internal administration of the military and 
Defense Department because such a massive bureaucracy and its complex 
(and often perilous) activities impact the country and so many voters.  A 
large number of these issues are addressed each year in the massive 
annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the enormous 
Department of Defense Appropriations Act (DODAA).  In contrast, the 
operational uses to which the military is put tend to be higher level 
national security policy questions that emerge less frequently, on which 
Congress commonly defers to the President, and therefore on which 
 
 200. In “bills and resolutions that could become law,” I include legislation originally introduced in 
the House that could satisfy bicameralism and presentment and become the law of the land.  This includes 
bills (H.R.) and joint resolutions (H. J. Res.).  It excludes simple (one chamber) resolutions (H. Res.) and 
concurrent resolutions (H. Con. Res.), because the former could control only one chamber and the latter 
could govern only the two chambers of Congress internally, but not anything outside Congress – including 
not the “land and naval Forces.”  See Advanced Search for Legislation, Govtrack.us, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/browse?congress=112 (112th Cong.); 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/browse?congress=113 (113th Cong.); and 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/browse?congress=114 (114th Cong.). 
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Congress is less likely to legislate.   
As one would expect, the Clause has been heavily cited in connection 
with military justice, the undisputed core of the Internal Regulation 
power.201  However, Congress has been citing the Clause for legislative 
powers over military justice less often than in connection with bills 
regulating the organization, property, and personnel matters of the 
Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs.  Most commonly, these 
measures concern personnel benefits and military awards.202  House 
Members also invoked the Clause quite often regarding former military 
personnel203 and federal property.204  In other words, Congress does not 
at all seem to regard the Internal Regulation power as narrowly limited to 
military justice and discipline, nor “the land and naval Forces” narrowly 
limited to current military personnel.   
Consistent with the External Government understanding, the Clause 
has been invoked in support of legislation that would ban combat use of 
cluster munitions, condition use of lethal force against U.S. citizens (such 
 
 201. See, e.g., H.R. 2227, 113th Cong. (2013), 159 CONG. REC. H3014 (June 3, 2013) (concerning 
criminal investigation of sex-related offenses).  
 202. See, e.g., H.R. 237, 112th Cong. (2011) (concerning military housing benefits), 157 CONG. 
REC. H136 (Jan. 7, 2011); H.R. 4201, 112th Cong. (2012) (concerning child custody rights for military 
personnel), 158 CONG. REC. H1366 (March 16, 2012); H.R. 5792, 112th Cong. (2012) (require a report 
on ending exclusion of women from ground combat), 158 CONG. REC. H2812 (May 16, 2012); H.R. 5459, 
113th Cong. (2014) (concerning award of the Medal of Honor to a particular individual), 160 CONG. REC. 
H7455 (Sept. 11, 2014).   
 203. See, e.g., H.R. 168, 112th Cong. (2011) (concerning services to veterans), 157 CONG. REC. 
H42 (Jan. 5, 2011) (constitutional authority statement); H.R. 169 (concerning services to veterans).   
  I have scored several citations as consistent with the Internal Regulation understanding that 
regulate beyond a narrow understanding of “the land and naval Forces” as meaning only the uniformed 
military.  Because they so clearly support the military, a fairly easy scoring decision is presented by 
legislation concerning civilian employees of the Defense Department.  See, e.g., H.R. 1642, 113th Cong. 
(2013), 159 CONG. REC. H2159 (2013) (concerning civilian employees and security clearances).  Other 
bills for which Members of Congress invoke the Clause, however, begin to push at its limits.  For example, 
several bills would prohibit disruption of a military funeral, relying on authority to “Govern and Regulate 
the land and naval forces” to regulate public interactions with events involving not simply former 
personnel but indeed deceased military personnel.  See H.R. 961, 112th Cong. (2011), 157 CONG. REC. 
H1619 (March 8, 2011); H.R. 3755, 112th Cong. (2011), 157 CONG. REC. H10015 (Dec. 20, 2011).  One 
is certainly sympathetic to efforts to protect the dignity of funerals for slain service members, but the 
Commerce Clause, and the Army, Navy, or Militia Clauses might be more solid constitutional textual 
hooks.  Similarly, these might be better bases for legislation regulating non-government employment of 
National Guard personnel.  See H.R. 1811, 112th Cong. (2011), 157 CONG. REC. H3219 (May 11, 2011).  
The Army, Navy, and Appropriations Clauses might be more appropriate constitutional textual bases for 
legislation to ensure that states that receive specified federal funds must consider training received by 
former military personnel when granting particular licenses.  See H.R. 6008, 112th Cong. (2012), 158 
CONG. REC. H3975 (June 21, 2012).   
 204. See, e.g., H.R. 5478, 113th Cong. (2014) (concerning limitations on transfers of Defense 
Department property), 160 CONG. REC. H7617 (Sept. 16, 2014).  It is not clear, but perhaps these citations 
reflect a view of the Forces Clause as not providing primary regulatory authority over government 
property – see instead U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (military property clause); id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 
(Territory and Property Clause) – but instead over personnel and bureaucracies that manage it. 
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as via armed drone), amend the War Powers Resolution, direct removal 
of U.S. forces from Iraq and Syria, and authorize the Army to move 
against marauding invasive species in the Mississippi River.205  Here 
again, the data does not show Congress in recent years understanding the 
Forces Clause narrowly. 
This analysis’s most unexpected finding is that Congress has in recent 
years frequently cited the Clause in a way that is novel in constitutional 
history: for the proposition that the Forces Clause provides Congress a 
general government rulemaking power, not limited to “the land and naval 
Forces.”  These citations (90 over three Congresses) occurred at nearly 
three-fourths the rate of those reflecting an Internal Regulation 
understanding, and at a much higher rate than those reflecting External 
Government power.  Many of these citations have supported legislation 
that does not reference national security activities or agencies.  For 
example, the constitutional authority statement in connection with a bill 
that would bar the Federal Communications Commission from pursuing 
new internet regulations cited the Commerce Clause and “Clause 14 of 
Section 8 to make rules for the federal government.”206  Other recent bills, 
relying on the Clause’s power “To make Rules for the Government,” have 
concerned the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the federally-
designated Appalachian Region.207   
What accounts for these abundant, unexplained, and unprecedented 
citations to the Clause?  The lack of argument in the legislative record – 
or anywhere else – for this view of the Forces Clause suggests that these 
citations are strategic at best.  On this legislative history alone, intent to 
 
 205. H.R. 881, 113th Cong. (2013) (banning cluster munitions), 159 CONG. REC. H816 (Feb. 23, 
2013); H.R. 137, 114th Cong. (2015) (imposing procedural requirements on targeting U.S. citizens), 161 
CONG. REC. H43 (Jan. 6, 2015); H.R. 560, 114th Cong. (2015) (amending War Powers Resolution 
regarding funding for U.S. military operations; note that this legislation would also readily find a 
constitutional textual hook with the Appropriations and Army Appropriations Clauses), 161 CONG. REC. 
H639 (Jan. 27, 2015); H.J. Res. 57, 114th Cong. (2015) (directing removal of U.S. forces from Iraq and 
Syria), 161 CONG. REC. H4431 (June 16, 2015); H.R. 4146, 112th Cong. (2012) (authorizing Army action 
against Asian Carp), 158 CONG. REC. H1209 (March 6, 2012). 
  Other citations support legislation that might be consistent with either the Internal Regulation 
or External Government understanding, or both.  For example, the Clause was cited in connection with a 
bill concerning the military budget.  See, e.g., H.R. 413, 112th Cong. (2011) (concerning military budget, 
a subject that might in strict terms be related only to the Appropriations, Navy, and Army Clauses, but in 
a more holistic reading may also implicate the Internal Regulation or External Government understandings 
of The Forces Clause), 157 CONG. REC. H470 (Jan. 25, 2011).   
 206. See H.R. 96, 112th Cong. (2011), 157 CONG. REC. H44 (Jan. 5, 2011).  The bill does have an 
exception for national security, but again note that the constitutional authority statement excludes the 
Clause’s reference to the “land and naval Forces.” 
 207. See H.R. 5491, 114th Cong. (2016); 162 CONG. REC. H3914 (June 15, 2016) (constitutional 
authority statement also cites to the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, regarding bill authored 
by then-Rep. Mick Mulvaney (R-SC), who now leads the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)); 
H.R. 101, 112th Cong. (2011), 157 CONG. REC. H44 (Jan. 5, 2011) (adding counties to the Appalachian 
Region).   
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create a new understanding of the Constitution is difficult to infer.208  A 
significant number of Members and staff in Congress may misunderstand 
the Clause.209   
In sum, review of the overall record since the Founding and empirical 
analysis of the House legislative record in recent years show 
congressional engagement with the Forces Clause across the republic’s 
history – indeed more frequent reliance upon it than the better-known 
Army Clause.  In addition to citing the Forces Clause in ways that 
understand it to reach beyond current federal regular military personnel, 
Congress’s engagement has reflected both Internal Regulation and 
External Government understandings.  
2. Executive Branch 
As in the Legislative branch, it is impossible to review every legally 
meaningful construction of or cite to the Forces Clause generated inside 
the Executive branch.  Justice Department opinions, Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Statements of Administration Policy on 
legislation, and other opinions remain incompletely digitized and 
inconsistently published.210  Additionally, the Executive branch is the 
least transparent branch regarding the legal authorities it produces.  
Despite the Federal Register Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the 
Freedom of Information Act, and other sunshine laws, the Executive 
branch has many opportunities to avoid publication.  The Attorney 
General and the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), for 
example, write the “law of the Executive branch” and choose to publish 
some of their opinions, but are not legally required nor expected to publish 
all of their precedential opinions.211  Military courts publish only some of 
 
 208. If we presume that Congress does not hide elephantine changes to regulatory schemes in 
statutory mouseholes (see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)), surely it 
does not hide major changes to constitutional law in Congressional Record mouseholes, either. 
 209. This novel reading would have other problems.  Such a highly flexible reading of the 
Constitution would cut against the purpose of the House Rule in tethering legislation tightly to enumerated 
powers.  It might make the Necessary and Proper Clause redundant.  Also, the power to “make Rules for 
the government and regulation of the land and naval Forces” cannot plausibly mean “make Rules for the 
[entire] Government” without making “regulation of the land and naval Forces” redundant.   
 210. Regarding Office of Management and Budget Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs) on 
legislation, for example, the main database reaches back about 30 years.  However, there are no documents 
for many years and only a handful for some others.  Dozens of SAPs are typically issued every year as 
legislation moves through Congress.  Many concern national security bills.   
 211. See David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for 
Attorneys of the Office Re: Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions 1 (July 16, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/26/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf (OLC 
exercises delegated Attorney General authority to provide “controlling advice to executive branch 
officials” and should anticipate publication but publication is not a legal requirement) [hereinafter 
BARRON OLC BEST PRACTICES MEMO]. 
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their opinions, and internally binding legal interpretations by department 
and agency offices of general counsel – a vast body of legal opinion – are 
generally unpublished.  Additionally, the President, OLC, other Justice 
Department offices, and other agencies generate legal authorities that are 
classified.  Together with unclassified but unpublished legal authorities, 
these classified documents are a capacious body of Executive branch 
secret law.212  One would anticipate that citations to the Clause – a 
national security authority – are to be found therein. 
Based on available legal authorities, it is clear that the Justice 
Department in its branch-binding opinions has tended to cite the Clause 
less often than Congress or the Supreme Court.  But as in the other 
branches, the vast majority of citations are consistent with an Internal 
Regulation understanding.  In the 36 published Attorney General and 
OLC opinions that have cited the Clause since the Founding, all but a 
small handful have reflected the Internal Regulation understanding.213  As 
in the other branches, seriatim citations to the Forces Clause and other 
Article I clauses are also frequent.214 
Analysis of published Justice Department opinions shows a clear 
trajectory that mirrors the evolution of national security separation of 
powers doctrine more generally: a strong reading of Congress’s Internal 
Regulation power under the Clause through the early 1900s, followed by 
a growing but not uniform presidentialist lean thereafter.  OLC at the end 
of the first decade of this century re-admitted more room for the Clause 
to operate, and indeed to operate with dual powers.   
In opinions citing the Forces Clause through the first decades of the 
1900s, Attorneys General repeatedly sided with the Clause over the 
powers of the President and other Executive officials.  Attorneys General 
rejected presidential and administrative action to disturb or revise the 
decisions of courts martial regulated under Forces Clause authority.215  
 
 212. See Rudesill, supra note 44, at 283-300. 
 213. In Attorney General opinions issued between 1822 and 1947 that cite the Clause, 27 of 29 
reflect an Internal Regulation understanding.  Several other Attorney General opinions from the 1800s 
and 1900s engage with the Insurrection Act that incorporates the Clause’s terminology, or with Congress’s 
power to regulate the military, without explicitly mentioning the Clause or other Article I powers.  In 
seven available OLC opinions written between 1947 and 2018 that cite the Clause, virtually all reflect an 
Internal Regulation understanding, with relatively recent embrace of an External Government 
understanding at least regarding detainees (discussed subsequently in this Part of the article).  See U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, https://www.justice.gov/olc (last visited Sept. 2018).  
Review of the OLC site has been supplemented by searches on Hein, Westlaw, and Google. 
 214. See, e.g., Navy Regulations, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 413, 414 (1862) (citing Army, Navy, and 
Forces Clause powers regarding the power to fix ranks); Martial Law, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 365, 371 (1857) 
(cited Article I powers do not address martial law). 
 215. See Court Martial – Amendment of Record, 23 Op. Att’y Gen. 23 (1900) (Secretary of War 
cannot alter or act inconsistent with court martial regulated under Articles of War passed pursuant to 
Forces Clause); Case of Fitz John Porter, 17 Op. Att’y Gen. 297 (1882) (President cannot annul findings 
of court martial and renominate officer for former Army rank because inconsistent with Articles of War). 
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Another line of separation of powers opinions rejected presidential 
promulgation of a general code of regulations absent congressional 
authorization pursuant to the Clause, and sided with the Clause’s power 
to write binding “Rules” regarding mustering troops, officer and cadet 
appointments, ranks, and terms of service.216  A strong view of 
congressional power was also reflected in the single published Justice 
Department opinion during this time that cited the Clause in a way that 
reflected an External Government understanding not involving military 
justice: a Prohibition-era decision by the Attorney General that the 
President may not use the Navy to enforce the law absent an act of 
Congress.217  
By the late Twentieth Century, the Justice Department was citing the 
Clause less frequently, and in a manner consistent with a strong view of 
Executive power.  Most references to the Forces Clause in available OLC 
documents in recent decades were issued by the Reagan and George W. 
Bush Administrations.  They engaged with the Clause in the process of 
advancing their presidentialist view of separation of powers.  During the 
Reagan years, the head of OLC argued to Congress that the Forces Clause 
did not provide authority to Congress to govern military operations 
because the phrase “and directing their operations” in the Clause’s 
antecedent in the Articles of Confederation was shorn during the 
Constitutional Convention.  OLC also indicated that Congress could use 
Forces Clause powers regarding the discipline of personnel involved in 
military operations and covert actions, but that no Article I power could 
 
 216. See Mustering Regulations, 26 Op. Att’y Gen. 6, 7-8 (1906) (Secretary of War cannot add 
volunteers to Army without statutory authority pursuant to Forces and Army Clauses); Navy Regulations, 
10 Op. Att’y Gen. 413, 414 (1862) (power to fix ranks is legislative and resides in Forces Clause, in 
connection with Army and Navy Clauses); Navy Regulations, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 10, 12 (1853) (former 
President Fillmore’s general code of Navy regulations – spanning military justice, discipline, and other 
matters – was an invalid exercise of Article II powers in view of statute and Congress’s power under 
Forces, Army, and Navy Clauses, cited as a single Article I, section 8 provision).  For opinions giving 
precedence to the Forces Clause’s authority regarding military appointments over the President’s in 
Article II, see  Naval Service – Desertion – Pardon, 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 225, 227 (1918) (presidential 
pardon of court martialed and separated service member does not remove disqualification for service 
under statute enacted pursuant to Army, Navy, and Forces Clauses);  Discharge from Military Academy 
– Re-Appointment, 17 Op. Att’y Gen. 67, 68-69 (1881) (President cannot re-appoint discharged military 
academy cadet in defiance of statute based on Clause authority); cf., Relief of Fitz John Porter, 18 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 18, 26-27 (1884) (Congress’s expansive power to regulate appointments by the President 
comes from the Forces Clause and perhaps also from one or more of the Declare War, Army, and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses, but Congress cannot tell the President which specific individuals to 
appoint). As in many legal authorities created by the Legislative and Judicial branches, in these opinions 
the multiple clauses cited are not distinguished.  However, the Forces Clause is the common element, and 
it and its language are emphasized in several of the opinions.  See, e.g., id.   
 217. See Use of Naval Forces in the Enforcement of the National Prohibition Act, 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 
562 (1923).  This opinion invoked the Forces and Navy Clauses, and implicitly endorsed a Forces Clause 
connection to the Insurrection Act, discussed in Part III.B.1 infra. 
53
Rudesill: The Land and Naval Forces Clause
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
444 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
constrain “actual military operations.”218  OLC again articulated this view 
regarding deployments during the George W. Bush Administration.219  In 
the years following the 9/11 attacks, OLC maintained that the Clause 
provides authority for court martial and other discipline of U.S. personnel 
and for prosecution of enemy fighters in military commissions. However, 
due to “the President’s power to successfully prosecute war” under 
Article II, the Bush-era OLC also maintained that the Forces Clause’s 
power does not include writing laws on interrogation, military 
commissions, or other aspects of detainee treatment “considered an 
integral part of the conduct of military operations.”220  The Bush-era OLC 
added that the Forces Clause does not provide Congress power over rules 
of engagement in military operations.221 
As the first decade of this century drew to a close, the Justice 
Department changed course,  re-admitting more room in OLC doctrine 
for the Internal Regulation power and re-opening the door to an External 
Government power of unspecified extent.  In an extraordinary move 
during the last week of the George W. Bush Administration – timing that 
suggests reluctance to do it earlier – OLC withdrew or qualified the 
contents of a slate of post-9/11 opinions and announced that OLC had 
changed its interpretation of the Clause.  While emphasizing the context 
of broad presidential authority, OLC stated that the Forces Clause would 
thereafter be understood by OLC to provide Congress “a basis to establish 
standards for, among other things, detention, interrogation, and transfer 
 
 218. Oversight Legislation: Hearings on S. 1721 and S. 1818 Before the S. Select Comm. on 
Intelligence, 100th Cong. 84-85 (1987) (statement of Charles Cooper, Assistant Att’y Gen., OLC); Barron 
& Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part II, supra note 1, at 1083 (discussion).  
 219. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Deputy Counsel for the President, Re: Constitutional Issues Raised 
by Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations Bill 282 n.2 (Nov. 28, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2001/11/31/op-olc-v025-p0279_0.pdf. 
 220. See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Counsel to the President, Re: Legality of the Use of Military 
Commissions to Try Terrorists 244 (Nov. 6, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/
opinions/2001/11/31/op-olc-v025-p0238.pdf; (Clause provided authority for establishment of military 
commissions, which Congress could then use under its Define and Punish Clause authority to try 
violations of the law of war, but could not intrude on presidential power); Memorandum from John C. 
Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for William J. 
Haynes II, General Counsel of the Dep’t of Defense, Re: Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful 
Combatants Held Outside the United States 13 n.13 (Mar. 14, 2003), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-combatantsoutside
unitedstates.pdf; (preclusive power of President’s authority to prosecute war successfully); Memorandum 
from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William 
J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Dep’t of Defense, Re: The President’s Power as Commander in Chief to 
Transfer Captured Terrorists to the Control and Custody of Foreign Nations 4-6 (Mar. 13, 2002) (similar 
Executive power arguments), https://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memorandum03132002.pdf [hereinafter 
OLC DETAINEE TRANSFER MEMO]. 
 221. See OLC DETAINEE TRANSFER MEMO, supra note 220.  
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to foreign nations” of detainees.222  (OLC also recognized the Captures 
Clause as another source of such authority, and the Define and Punish 
Clause as a source of authority for military commissions to try war crimes 
and to criminalize torture in accordance with international law.)223  Here, 
the OLC can be understood to endorse a vision of shared congressional 
and presidential power over the “land and naval Forces.”  Although OLC 
could still refract separation of powers issues through an Article II lens in 
a manner favorable to its authorities and to its highest-ranking principal, 
the President, OLC was leaving behind strict presidentialism in national 
security separation of powers.224  OLC now disagreed with its earlier view 
that the Clause’s powers are limited to military discipline.225   
Even so, OLC did not take the opportunity to articulate a holistic theory 
of the Forces Clause.  Nor did OLC discuss whether it saw any Clause 
authority over military operations beyond detainee matters, an 
intersection of the Internal Regulation and External Government 
powers.226  Ultimately, as the Bush Administration departed, the Justice 
Department was responding to President Bush’s signing of legislation on 
interrogation and military commissions that restricted his powers and to 
the Supreme Court’s seriatim citation to the Forces Clause and other 
Article I, Section 8 powers in Hamdan (2006), in which the Court upheld 
the UCMJ statute over a contrary wartime presidential order.227   
3. Judicial Branch 
Review of federal court opinions shows frequent seriatim citations in 
which the Forces Clause has been invoked for general federal or 
congressional war powers, or for a specific power, without differentiation 
from its Article I, Section 8 siblings and other clauses cited.228  Many 
citations involve little or no analysis of the Clause’s meaning.229  Yet, as 
 
 222. See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Re: Memorandum for the Files, Status of Certain OLC 
Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, at 5 (Jan. 15, 2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memostatusolcopinions01152009.pdf.   
 223. See Bradbury memorandum, supra note 222, at 4-5. 
 224. See BARRON, OLC BEST PRACTICES MEMO, supra note 211 (guidance on alignment of OLC 
advice and administration preferences).   
 225. See Bradbury memorandum, supra note 222, at 5. 
 226. See id. 
 227. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006); Bradbury memorandum, supra note 222, 
at 2. 
 228. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591; Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698, 712 (1893) (Clause 
one of many national security powers of the federal government); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 890 (1961) (Clause cited without differentiation with others in Articles I and II 
for authority for the political branches to regulate access to military installations). 
 229. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 173-76 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
55
Rudesill: The Land and Naval Forces Clause
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
446 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
noted in the earlier textual analysis, the Supreme Court has said that the 
Clause is subject to the presumption against surplusage in reading the 
Constitution.230  Where courts have engaged with the Clause’s meaning, 
the pattern in the other branches holds: the Clause is well cited for its 
Internal Regulation understanding.  Additionally, the Court has signaled 
an External Government understanding, without articulating a holistic 
dual-power theory of the Clause.  The Clause and its statutes are often 
discussed by the courts in connection with the Clause’s counter-
authoritarian purposes. 
The Internal Regulation understanding of the Clause is reflected in a 
long line of cases in the Article III federal courts and the civilian federal 
military appeals courts – the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
(CAAF), and its predecessor, the Court of Military Appeals (CMA), 
Article I courts created by Congress.231  The Internal Regulation 
understanding is clear or implied in 50 of 62 Supreme Court majority or 
plurality opinions citing the Clause.232  The CAAF and CMA citations 
concern military justice, at issue in the majority but not entirety of Article 
III court references reflecting an Internal Regulation understanding.  The 
Supreme Court has deeply engaged the Clause’s origins and meaning, the 
harshness of military justice and the President’s control over it, and the 
scope of military court-martial jurisdiction.233  The Court’s jurisprudence 
reflects concern about the “dangers of autocratic military justice” to the 
rights of soldiers and civilians, both foreign and domestic.234  It has 
described the President’s power as Commander in Chief in the context of 
ultimate legislative control over the military, and emphasized the 
Constitution’s separation of military and civilian justice.235  The courts 
have given clear signals that the Internal Regulation power extends 
beyond current military personnel.236     
 
(passing reference to the Clause as authority for the military to create a hospital for mentally ill service 
members). 
 230. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549-50 (2012). 
 231. The CAAF, like the CMA before it, is a civilian appellate court between the military services 
and the Supreme Court.  It is an “Article I” court, with judges appointed for terms.  Its jurisdiction is 
limited to military justice.  The CAAF discretionarily reviews the work of the courts of the military 
services headed by uniformed military judges.  A denial of review by the CAAF, which occurs in the vast 
majority of cases, is not an endorsement of the service court’s legal reasoning.  Service court decisions 
are rarely invoked by the CAAF as controlling unless endorsed by the CAAF. 
 232. Data set on file with author.  The Clause is cited in 17 concurrences and dissents. 
 233. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 767 (1996); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 
435, 439-48 (1987). 
 234. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 765-66. 
 235. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23-28 (1957).  This is a plurality opinion, but the sentiments 
strongly stated and quoted here are well reflected in military justice jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Loving, 517 
U.S. at 765, 767-68 (the Framers distrusted “not courts-martial per se, but military justice dispensed by a 
commander unchecked by the civil power in proceedings so summary as to be lawless”).  
 236. In addition to the discussion that follows here in the main text, see, e.g., supra note 33 (Clause 
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In a decision that reflected Congress’s UCMJ rules and spurred OLC’s 
expansion of the Executive branch’s understanding of the Clause’s reach, 
the Supreme Court in Hamdan interpreted the Clause to provide Congress 
legislative power regarding treatment of the enemy.  In this post-9/11 
case, the Court invalidated a presidential order for military commission 
trial of a detainee as a violation of the UCMJ.  The Hamdan Court 
underscored that even in wartime military matters the President may not 
disregard a properly enacted statute.237  Such authority comes from 
Congress’s powers under the Declare War, Captures, Army, Define and 
Punish, and Forces Clauses.238  One could see the limitation power upheld 
in Hamdan as flowing en bloc from the cited clauses, together with the 
gloss of historical practice.  A more textual approach would distinguish 
the particular authority provided by each clause in support of the UCMJ.  
For example, the Define and Punish Clause is operative regarding 
criminal charges, while the Forces Clause’s Internal Regulation power 
provides authority for all relevant aspects of the military justice system.  
However, power over detainees straddles the Internal Regulation/External 
Government conceptual line.  Hamdan stands as a rejection of the 
Commander in Chief’s attempt to defy Congress’s governance of his use 
of the military instrument in wartime regarding third parties (detainees).   
Regarding both internal military matters and external operations 
(wherever such congressional powers originate), separation of powers 
doctrine holds generally that the President and Congress have overlapping 
and ultimately shared power.239  Both the Article I and II branches receive 
heightened deference regarding national security.240  Regarding military 
 
provides Congress authority over military retiree pay and access to military installations). 
 237. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 & n.23 (2006).  See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 
U.S. 1, 25-28, 47 (1942).  The Quirin Court invoked the Forces Clause along with other Art. I and II 
provisions that provide the federal government with war powers that make constitutional a military 
commission trying U.S. citizen as enemy combatants, but in Quirin the Court did not “inquire whether 
Congress may restrict the power of the Commander in Chief to deal with enemy belligerents,” as it did in 
Hamdan.  For discussion of Hamdan, see, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief, 
and the Separation of Powers after Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933 (2007) 
(observing that after landmark Hamdan decision reflecting formalism in constitutional interpretation, 
greater attention must be paid to specific congressional powers). 
 238. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591. 
 239. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (the Constitution “enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but 
reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or 
conjunction with those of Congress”). 
 240. Regarding Congress, see Loving, 517 U.S. at 768 (Supreme Court gives “Congress the highest 
deference in ordering military affairs”); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (citing Clause as 
one of several Article I, Section 8 provisions providing powers over military warranting judicial deference 
because of lack of judicial competence on military matters).  Regarding the President, see United States 
v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-24 (1936) (framing the “sole organ” theory of 
presidential power in foreign affairs); cf., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083-
92 (2015) (noting that while there is formidable presidential power in foreign affairs, “it is essential the 
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justice, the Courts have stated that Congress’s authority under the Clause 
is “plenary” and “at its apogee,” and in context of the Commander in 
Chief means that “Congress, like Parliament [at the Founding], exercises 
a power of precedence over, not exclusion of Executive authority.”241  The 
Supreme Court has blessed congressional delegations of power to the 
Commander in Chief in military justice cases, use of force, and other 
national security and foreign affairs matters.242  The Court has held that 
the President also has some independent power to act alone in the absence 
of legislation,243 and has stood by its doctrinal position that Congress 
cannot direct the armed forces.244  But the courts have also long made 
clear that the Commander in Chief is subject to explicit and implicit 
legislative restriction.245  Since the mid-Twentieth Century, the Court’s 
doctrine reflects the influence of Justice Robert Jackson’s Youngstown 
concurrence, which places the President at the height of authority when 
acting consistent with statute, in a zone of twilight when acting when 
Congress has not, but able to rely only on whatever authority Congress 
cannot deny the President when the Commander in Chief acts contrary to 
the express or implied will of Congress.246  As discussed above in Part 
II.B, Professors Barron and Lederman present a strong case that the extent 
of that preclusive Commander in Chief power is quite limited, but this 
question remains contested by practitioners and scholars. 
For our inquiry, Justice Jackson’s canonical concurrence is especially 
salient.  It provides the strongest jurisprudential signal from the Supreme 
Court that what this article theorizes as an External Government power 
can be rooted in the Forces Clause.   
The Forces Clause, Justice Jackson wrote, may allow Congress “to 
some unknown extent impinge upon even command functions” of the 
Commander in Chief.247  The President’s powers are akin to those 
 
congressional role in foreign affairs be understood and respected.”). 
 241. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 441, 446, 447 (1987) (also listing the Army and 
Navy Clauses as putting congressional power at its apogee); Loving, 517 U.S. at 767 (1996); Coleman v. 
Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 514 (1878). 
 242. See, e.g., Loving, 517 U.S. at 756-60, 767-68 (1996) (Forces Clause authority over military 
justice may be delegated); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (post-9/11 AUMF authorized force 
and triggered President’s war powers); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp, 299 U.S. 304 (1936) 
(upholding delegation of power to President regarding arms trade). 
 243. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) (upholding blockade of Southern States 
instituted by President Lincoln without ex ante legislative authorization or declaration of war). 
 244. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592 (“Congress cannot direct the conduct of 
campaigns”) (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139-40 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring)).  
 245. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 170, 171 (1804). 
 246. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
For key analyses, see Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11; Barron & Lederman, Lowest 
Ebb Part II, supra note 1; Heidi Kitrosser, It Came from Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and 
Article II Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401 (2010); KOH, supra note 10. 
 247. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643-44 (Jackson, J., concurring).  These should be read broadly 
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possessed by “the topmost officer of the army and navy,” who is subject 
to statute.  Justice Jackson invoked the Commander in Chief’s limitation 
by the Clause in an alarming External Government context: seizure of 
civilian industry within the United States for military supply, pursuant to 
the Commander in Chief power and in defiance of the stated or implied 
will of Congress.  In this regard, Justice Jackson emphasized Congress’s 
enactment of statutes barring law enforcement by the military but 
authorizing enforcement of certain rights (laws that in the next Part we 
address as the Posse Comitatus Act and its domestic relatives).248  The 
Justice framed his discussion of the Clause in counter-authoritarian terms.  
These statutes reflect the Constitution’s policy of congressional control 
of “utilization of the war power as an instrument of domestic policy,” one 
crafted by Framers who “knew what emergencies were, knew the 
pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how they 
afford a ready pretext for usurpation.”249  “No penance,” Justice Jackson 
warned, “would ever expiate the sin against free government of holding 
that a President can escape control of executive powers by law through 
assuming his military role.”250     
Justice Jackson’s opening in Youngstown of a doctrinal door to a Forces 
Clause carrying an External Government power perhaps explains the 
Court’s unexplained edit of the Clause’s text to exclude the word 
“Government” in 2013 in the Kebodeaux military justice-related case.251  
Nevertheless, courts have not yet explicitly stated that the Clause includes 
multiple powers.  “[D]oubts . . . about the extent of Congress’s power 
under Clause 14” persist.252   
Uncertainty is perpetuated by how infrequently the courts review 
separation of powers issues in national security.  Barriers to adjudication 
include secrecy and the classification of information about military and 
intelligence activities, together with standing, justiciability, state secrets, 
and executive privilege doctrines.253  These factors were evident in Laird 
 
abroad and narrowly at home.  Id. at 645. 
 248. See id. at 644-45 & nn.12, 13.  Justice Jackson mentions the Third Amendment and Militia 
Clauses between discussion of the Forces Clause and citation to these statutes on domestic use of the 
military.  However, the Third Amendment is inapposite to these statutes and Jackson observes that the 
Founders saw the militia as the primary federal instrument of military power.  These statutes do not rely 
on these other constitutional provisions because they do not concern quartering of troops, and to the extent 
they govern federal regular forces.  In this regard, as Justice Jackson’s discussion implies, and as Part 
IV.B discusses, these statutes rely instead on the Forces Clause.   
 249. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 644, 650 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 250. See id. at 646. 
 251. See United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 394-95 (2013). 
 252. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 441 (1987). 
 253. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (petitioners lack standing to challenge 
FISA Amendments Act provision because they cannot show surveillance by classified program); Dep’t 
of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) (judicial deference regarding classification); United States v. 
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v. Tatum, a 1972 case in which the Court ruled that petitioners lacked 
standing to challenge military surveillance within the United States.254  
Justice William O. Douglas in dissent stated his belief that Congress 
lacked constitutional authority to write legislation that would allow such 
military operations – and addressed his claim specifically to the Forces 
Clause.255  Justice Douglas wrote that the Clause is a “grant of authority 
to the Armed Services to govern themselves, not the authority to govern 
civilians.”256  It is significant in this context that six years later, in the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Congress created 
a framework statute for national security surveillance of U.S. persons 
within the United States.257  As discussed in the next Part, Congress 
understood that this intelligence collection would be carried out in 
significant part by the Defense Department’s National Security Agency 
(NSA) – and provided a thick set of rules to govern this liberty-
implicating activity of “the land and naval Forces.”   
It is to statutory frameworks based on the Forces Clause that we now 
turn. 
III.  THE CLAUSE REDISCOVERED: CONSTITUTIONAL FOOTING FOR 
STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS 
The prior Parts have explained that the Constitution’s text, the 
Founding Era evidence, and the constitutional record of explicit citation 
reasonably allow a dual reading of the Forces Clause.  This Part sets forth 
the considerable and important work that the Clause can, and indeed 
should, be understood to be doing in the modern national security legal 
regime.  The Clause’s role is in some instances explicit but in many others 
it is implicit, because the Clause has not always been recognized as 
authority for the constitutionality of a series of important laws.  
Understanding that statutes are on firmer footing the closer they are tied 
to the Constitution’s text, and that legislation can rely for authority on 
more than one clause, this Part maintains that the Clause – via its Internal 
Regulation and External Government powers – provides the best or at 
 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (qualified executive privilege); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) 
(state secrets privilege).  See also Dellums v. Bush, 752 F.Supp. 1141, 1144 n.4 (D.D.C. 1990) (Members 
of Congress had standing in suit to prevent President from using military force but case, which cites Forces 
Clause, not ripe). 
 254. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (petitioners lack standing to complain of chilling of free 
speech). 
 255. See id. at 16-19 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Marshall, 
also cites the Army and Navy Clauses but focuses on the Forces Clause. 
 256. Id. at 18-19.   
 257. Seven days before the Laird decision was decided, the Court invited Congress to provide 
national (“domestic”) security surveillance warrants.  See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (“Keith”), 407 
U.S. 297, 322-24 (1972). 
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least additional strong constitutional textual footing for a set of statutory 
frameworks at the heart of the national security legal regime. 
The source of Congress’s authority to legislate regarding the 
intelligence apparatus has been insufficiently explored by scholars and 
practitioners to date.  This Part argues that the Clause provides legislative 
authority for several of the statutory frameworks Congress uses to govern 
and regulate the Intelligence Community (IC).  The IC today is a 
sprawling enterprise of 17 elements with a roughly $70 billion annual 
budget.  It supports, extends beyond, and can operate in the field with or 
independently of the uniformed military and Department of Defense.258  
Nine IC elements are within the Department of Defense and its military 
services, six others are located in the cabinet Departments of Energy, 
Justice, Homeland Security, State, and the Treasury, and two agencies are 
entirely independent: the CIA, and the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI).259     
For Congress and for Americans generally, there is a reliance interest 
at stake: these statutory frameworks that govern the military, its 
bureaucracy, the IC, and their contractors have long been in force, 
implemented, and reflective of the Clause’s counter-authoritarian 
placement of ability to control “the land and naval Forces” with Congress.  
Passage, implementation, interpretation, and amendment of these statutes 
have contributed to the Constitution’s practice gloss for many years.  
These statutes are not necessarily unconstitutional without the Forces 
Clause.  Arguments for their constitutionality can be advanced on the 
basis of gloss or on the basis of their necessary incidence to other 
enumerated powers in Article I.  But this Part’s argument is that the 
Clause provides the best or at least strong additional constitutional footing 
for these statutory frameworks, and in so doing reinforces their 
constitutional legitimacy and their power to bind the Executive branch 
even in the face of presidential disagreement.   
 
 258. See Exec. Order No. 12,333 (1981), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,470 (2008), § 1.7 
(Intelligence Community Elements).  For budget figures, see MICHAEL E. DEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R44381, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SPENDING: TRENDS AND ISSUES 8-9 tbl.1 (2018) (national 
and military intelligence programs for fiscal 2017 totaled $73 billion), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/
R44381.pdf. 
 259. The Defense Department IC elements include the Defense Intelligence Agency, National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency (NSA), and 
the intelligence arms of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines.  The conventional understanding that 
the Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security in times of peace and part of the 
Department of Defense in times of war is simplistic.  In times of peace (and undeclared war), many 
Department of Defense and military authorities govern the Coast Guard.  
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A. Internal Regulation 
1. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 
Little more needs be said about the UCMJ, the framework statute for 
military justice.260  It is undisputed that the Clause provides Congress 
authority to write it.  The Second Militia Clause provides additional 
authority for the UCMJ as it pertains to the militia, and other provisions 
– such as the Army, Navy, and Necessary and Proper Clauses – also 
provide supplemental constitutional authority to the extent a military 
justice code is naturally incident to having a military.  However, the 
UCMJ is all the more legitimate constitutionally – and more clearly able 
to withstand a contrary Commander in Chief – because this body of 
military rules is so tightly linked to the Forces Clause.  The Commander 
in Chief’s ability to intervene in military justice matters such as defining 
offenses, trial procedures, and punishments is circumscribed.  These 
aspects of this framework statute reflect the legislative control and 
counter-authoritarian purposes of the Forces Clause by protecting against 
any potentially abusive discipline of the part of the American people who 
serve in the land and naval forces.   
2. National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) 
The annual NDAA is one of the longest, most detailed, and 
multifarious bills passed by Congress every year.261  It authorizes 
spending subject to appropriations, and sets policy for the Department of 
Defense, the military services, the multi-agency Military Intelligence 
Program (MIP), and nuclear weapons activities of the Department of 
Energy.  It concerns everything from organization of the national security 
apparatus to training to personnel benefits.  Taken together, we can 
understand the NDAAs as comprising a framework statute, one that is 
regularly updated and that builds upon the National Security Act of 
1947.262  In addition to the Forces Clause, NDAAs commonly include 
provisions that can find primary or secondary textual footing in the 
Common Defense, Commerce (in relation to the Coast Guard and 
counter-drug activities), Army, Navy, Militia, Forts and Magazines, 
 
 260. See 10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (2016). 
 261. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 ran 970 pages of 
enacted bill text.  It had a joint explanatory statement of the conferees (the final legislative report 
associated with the bill) that totaled 572 pages.  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000 (2016); H. Rept. No. 114-840, 114th Cong. (2016) (joint 
explanatory statement of the conferees). 
 262. See National Security Act, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (1947) (reorganizing national 
security apparatus after World War II).  Much of the Act is codified as amended in titles 10 and 50 U.S.C. 
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Necessary and Proper, and Appropriations Clauses.  Congress uses 
NDAAs to amend the UCMJ, most recently in a significant revision in the 
NDAA for 2017.263  The NDAAs in recent years often include provisions 
regarding detainees – an issue at the intersection of the Internal 
Regulation and External Government powers264 – such as the Military 
Commissions Act of 2009 and recent prisoner-related amendments to the 
9/11 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF).265  Finally, 
although most of the Forces Clause work done in the NDAAs reflects the 
Internal Regulation understanding, the NDAA is also a vehicle for 
changes to the law that govern military operations and rest on the External 
Government understanding of the Forces Clause.  Provisions regarding 
counter-terror kill/capture operations and cyber attack are two recent 
examples, discussed below.266  The NDAAs are, in short, intensively 
doing the work of the Forces Clause.  The power of the NDAAs as legal 
instruments is reinforced by their grounding on the Clause and alignment 
with its purpose of subjecting the national security apparatus to law 
written by the elected representatives of the people.   
B. External Government  
The following statutory frameworks constitute much of the core of the 
national security legal regime.  They are not funding restrictions, war 
declarations or authorizations for the use of military force (AUMFs) 
blessing armed conflicts, nor militia laws.  Neither are they caught up in 
creating and sustaining the federal military.  They instead reflect exercise 
of the External Government power of the Forces Clause: congressional 
limits on the operations of the “land and naval Forces,” reflecting counter-
authoritarian purposes.   
1. Posse Comitatus Act and Domestic Relatives 
The Clause is sometimes mentioned as authority for the Posse 
Comitatus Act (PCA).267  A full explanation has not been offered, 
however, of the work the Forces Clause should be understood to be doing 
 
 263. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. 114-328, §§ 5001-5542, 
130 Stat. 2000, 2894-2968 (2016) (Military Justice Act of 2016). 
 264. The Captures, Law of Nations, and Declare War Clauses are also implicated by these 
provisions. 
 265. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 
1801-07, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574-2614 (2009) (Military Commissions Act of 2009); National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, §§ 1021-22, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562-64 (2011) 
(detainee provisions). 
 266. See Part III.B.3 and Part IV.B infra. 
 267. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012); BAKER, supra note 13, at 268 (Clause as authority for PCA). 
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in providing for the constitutionality of the PCA and what we can think 
of as its domestic relatives. 
The Posse Comitatus statute has unfortunate origins as an effort to 
curtail use of federal Army regulars in the post-Civil War occupied South 
to protect the new Fifteenth Amendment right of emancipated African-
Americans to vote, in the face of violent resistance.268  In its modern 
incarnation, the PCA has become what Professors William Eskridge and 
John Ferejohn conceive as a “super-statute”: its importance goes beyond 
the statute books and commands normative force in the public mind, 
structuring understandings about the nature of law and government 
authority.269  The PCA is widely understood to stand for separation of 
military and law enforcement activities, and against the idea of military 
government.  Indeed, the PCA has so powerfully shaped perceptions of 
statutory limits on domestic military operations that senior military and 
civilian leaders responsible for acting pursuant to it often misunderstand 
it.270  In reality, the PCA’s amended text now operates as a default ban on 
active duty federal armed forces engaging in law enforcement, unless 
some other law provides such authority.   
The PCA is neither a war declaration nor major force authorization, it 
is not about commerce, and it limits the federal military, not the militia 
(in its organized modern form, the National Guard) on state duty.271  Its 
ties to the Forces Clause are plainly evident in the legislative history: the 
PCA was a response to use of Insurrection Act (see below) statutory 
authority that referenced “the land and naval forces,” and one of the first 
drafts of the PCA used the same Forces Clause terminology.272  
Ultimately the provision that passed had a standing restriction related to 
use of the Army, in addition to a funding ban, and was enacted as part of 
an appropriations act.273  In modern form, the PCA is not an 
appropriations restriction.  It also does not find an easy hook in the 
Guarantee Clause (Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution); the PCA is 
not authorizing federal troops to intervene in states to guarantee their 
 
 268. Posse Comitatus Act, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (1878) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1385 (2012)). 
 269. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001). 
 270. See, e.g., BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 92 (general in charge of troops deployed to deal 
with 1992 Los Angeles riots misunderstand PCA and Insurrection Act). 
 271. The PCA has been interpreted to apply to militia (the modern National Guard) while on federal 
duty.  See United States v. Gilbert, 165 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 1999). Under statute, the militia of the United 
States is divided into two classes: “the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and Naval 
Militia,” and “the unorganized militia,” which generally includes “all able-bodied males” ages 17 to 44.  
See 10 U.S.C. § 246 (2016). 
 272. See 7 CONG. REC. 3586 (1879) (Atkins amendment); for discussion, see Gary Felicetti & John 
Luce, The Posse Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight on 124 Years of Mischief and 
Misunderstanding Before any More Damage is Done, 175 MIL. L. REV. 86, 109-13 (2003). 
 273. See Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, supra note 268.   
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republican form of government.  Instead, the PCA restricts law 
enforcement activity by the military.  The PCA governs military 
interactions with the people in civil settings inside the United States, 
powerfully resonating with the civilian legislative control and counter-
authoritarian purposes of the Forces Clause.   
The PCA retains its super-statutory normative sway despite exceptions 
that provide the federal government significant leeway to use the armed 
forces domestically.  One exception is the statute’s exemption for cases 
and circumstances “expressly authorized by the Constitution.”  The scope 
of any Article II presidential constitutional power implicitly referenced 
here is unclear.  But, of course, the PCA statute also reflects Congress 
exercising its constitutional powers, here pursuant to the Clause.   
The Insurrection Act is especially noteworthy as a statutory domestic 
relative, antecedent, and modern exception to the PCA.274  It can find 
significant constitutional textual footing in the Forces Clause’s External 
Government power.  Generally, the Insurrection Act governs use of the 
military by the President in the event of uprisings and other disturbances 
inside the country.  The title and text of the original 1807 statute both 
explicitly referenced the language of the Forces Clause.275  A century and 
 
 274. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 251-55 (2016).  Discussed in BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 43-45, 53.  
Congress recently renumbered the Insurrection Act within Title 10 of the U.S. Code.  See National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000, 2497, § 1241(a)(2) 
(2016) (10 U.S.C. §§ 331-35 renumbered as §§ 251-55, ch. 13).  (Congress the following year designated 
unrelated provisions concerning auditing as 10 U.S.C. §§ 251-55, as well, in ch. 9A.  See National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283, 1537-42, § 1002(b)(1) 
(2017)).  Another modern domestic relative of the Posse Comitatus Act is the Stafford Act.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 5121-5207 (2013) (federal response to disasters), particularly § 5170b(c)(1) (President may direct 
Defense Department to perform emergency efforts for up to 10 days “essential for the preservation of life 
and property”). 
 275. See An Act Authorizing the Employment of the Land and Naval Forces of the United States, 
in Case of Insurrections, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (1807).  This 1807 law concerned domestic unrest and involved 
federal regular forces.  What came to be known as the Insurrection Act is a repeatedly amended 
amalgamation of the 1807 statute and other laws, several of which concerned the militia.  See An Act to 
Recognize and Adapt to the Constitution of the United States the Establishment of Troops Raised Under 
the Resolves of the United States in Congress Assembled, Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, 1 Stat. 95, 96 
(repealed 1790); Militia Act of 1792, ch.33 1 Stat. 271 (1792); Calling Forth Act of 1792 (ch. 28, 1 Stat. 
264 (1792), sunsetted in 1794 and replaced by the Calling Forth Act of 1795, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 424 (1795)).  
The 1795 law was in turn amended – and the 1807 statute implicitly amended – by the so-called Lincoln 
Law, which set out conditions under which the President could call out either militia or federal regulars 
to counter “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellions.”  See 12 Stat. 281 (1861), 
discussed in BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 43-45, 67.  The Lincoln Law was not formally a war 
declaration, but some Declare War Clause authority may reasonably have operated in addition to First 
Militia Clause and Forces Clause authority because the Lincoln Law provided authority for conduct of 
what was plainly a war against the secessionist states.  The Guarantee Clause might also be understood to 
provide authority, to the extent one could argue that the secessionist states lacked “a Republican Form of 
Government” due to slavery (but of course the Guarantee Clause along with the rest of the Constitution 
went into effect with the understanding that slavery was legal).   
  A number of related laws followed after the Civil War.  They enabled and often conditioned 
use of federal regular troops domestically.  For example, Congress invoked the language of the Forces 
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a half later its text “land or naval force[s]” was changed to “armed forces,” 
but the modern statute’s ability to find footing in the Forces Clause 
endures.276  Section 252 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides in relevant 
part that:   
 
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, 
combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of 
the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the 
United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial 
proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of 
any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers 
necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.277    
 
The statute’s state militia provision in Section 252 is plainly grounded on 
the First Militia Clause.278  In contrast, Section 252’s operation regarding 
federal regular troops (“such of the armed forces”) cannot rely on the 
Constitution’s militia authorities, nor easily on the Guarantee Clause.  The 
First Militia Clause concerns only the militia, and the Guarantee Clause 
in relevant part includes a requirement for state application for federal 
help “against domestic Violence” before the President can act – a 
requirement not found in Section 252.  The Guarantee Clause is restricted 
to “domestic Violence,” while Section 252 allows use of federal troops to 
deal with a more capacious set of conditions: “unlawful obstructions, 
combinations, or assemblages.”279     
Section 252 is an enabling law, but the Insurrection Act also imposes a 
limitation on the Commander in Chief: the President cannot employ the 
armed forces against just any unrest that in his or her view amounts to 
“unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion 
 
Clause in a statute that made state or local racial discrimination unlawful and allowed federal judges and 
marshals and the President to call out “the land or naval forces” and militia to enforce the law.  See An 
Act to Protect All Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, and Furnish the Means of their 
Vindication (Civil Rights Act of 1866), ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).  For discussion of these Reconstruction 
era laws and how they led to the first posse comitatus statute, see BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 69-
73.       
 276. See Act of Aug. 10, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-1028, 70A Stat. 1, 15, §§ 331-34 (entitled an Act 
“To revise, codify, and enact into law” titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. Code, entitled “Armed Forces” and 
“National Guard,” respectively).  By the 1950s the U.S. military also included the Air Force, and 
accordingly the term “armed forces” had come to be used more commonly than “land and naval forces.” 
 277. See 10 U.S.C. § 252 (2016).   
 278. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
 279. Of course, if a disturbance were denying a state “a Republican Form of Government,” or 
operating in coordination with “Invasion,” the Guarantee Clause might provide authority to deploy federal 
regulars without the state request mentioned in the second half of the Guarantee Clause in connection with 
“domestic Violence.”  See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.  The Guarantee Clause does not specify use of the 
military, but force is also the most obvious way the federal government could displace a despotic state 
government or protect states against invasion or domestic unrest. 
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against the United States.”  Rather, the President may only use force under 
Section 252 where the federal laws cannot be enforced “by the ordinary 
course of judicial proceedings.”  This is a significant, counter-tyrannical 
limitation.  Finally, Section 254 also requires the President to 
“immediately order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their 
abodes.”280  This is not a huge impediment to use of force, but is another 
process requirement Congress has imposed on the Commander in Chief 
before the part of the federal government most dangerous to liberty – the 
federal armed forces – may be used inside the country.281   
2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 
FISA was enacted in 1978 in response to the Church-Pike 
congressional investigations of intelligence abuses.282  It is by its terms 
the “exclusive” authority for surveillance of U.S. persons for foreign 
intelligence purposes, with review by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC).  FISA has been heavily relied upon and 
consistently reaffirmed – by Congress via repeated amendments, through 
generally consistent presidential compliance (with the salient exception 
of the immediate post-9/11 period), and via thick daily agency practice 
involving agencies and the FISC.  Thousands of particularized electronic 
surveillance and physical search warrants have been issued by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court it created.  Since the 2000s, FISA has also 
governed daily bulk sifting, collection, analysis, and distribution of 
trillions of electronic communications, including those of U.S. persons 
 
 280. See 10 U.S.C. § 254 (2016).   
 281. Note, too, Section 251.  Like Sections 252-54, Section 251 involves both militia and other 
(federal regular) armed forces.  See 10 U.S.C. § 251 (2016).  However, Section 251 concerns insurrection 
against a state, while Section 252 concerns uprisings against federal authority and Section 253 concerns 
defiance of federal law “[with]in a state.”  Additionally, Section 251 is unique within the Insurrection Act 
in requiring a state request, in accord with the Guarantee Clause’s stipulation.  For that reason, Section 
251 regarding federal regulars is best understood to be grounded primarily on the Guarantee Clause.  
(Meanwhile, the First Militia Clause and the Guarantee Clause provide constitutional authority for the 
militia aspects of Section 251.)  Of course, federal regular forces operating pursuant to Section 251 would 
still be subject to the law Congress using Forces Clause authority generally (e.g., the military criminal 
code, and FISA).   
  If under 10 U.S.C. § 252 the obstruction or rebellion against federal authority comes from a 
state government, the Fourteenth Amendment could be understood as well to provide some constitutional 
footing for this part of the Insurrection Act.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.  These parts of the 
Fourteenth Amendment more clearly provide primary authority for the next Section, 253, which 
references not only insurrection and domestic violence within a state but “conspiracy” and deprivation of 
“any part or class of its people . . . of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution 
and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse” to act. 
 282. See S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities, Foreign, and Military Intelligence, S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976) [hereinafter the CHURCH 
COMMITTEE REPORT]; REP. OTIS PIKE, CIA: THE PIKE REPORT (ed. 1997) (original date 1977) [hereinafter 
the PIKE COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
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and others not suspected of any link to foreign powers or international 
terrorist organizations.   
Intelligence collection pursuant to FISA is vast, but the constitutional 
conversation about FISA has been more limited.  Discussion has focused 
mainly on whether FISA is permissible in view of the Fourth 
Amendment’s limits on searches and seizures, the President’s 
Commander in Chief authority, or Article III’s requirements for federal 
courts.283  In contrast, the question of the source of Congress’s authority 
to enact FISA’s body of rules governing intelligence collection has been 
relatively neglected.  Sometimes, Members of Congress will invoke the 
Forces Clause as authority for FISA-related legislation.284  Other times, 
no particular Article I power is cited.  Indeed, two of the three major 
legislative reports regarding the original 1978 FISA statute – strong 
legislative history – cited no enumerated power and instead invoked the 
Youngstown framework to defend FISA’s constitutionality in the most 
general terms.285  Where textual hooks are identified, analysis of the 
legislative record shows that provisions other than the Forces Clause are 
usually cited.286  Like the sponsor of the major post-Snowden FISA 
reform bill that became law in 2015, the USA FREEDOM Act, defenders 
of FISA’s constitutionality often rely on the Commerce Clause or the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.287  Some rely on the Fourth Amendment.288   
To be sure, it is not unreasonable to find footing for FISA in more than 
 
 283. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 95-1283, at 24-25, 111-16 (1978) (House committee report on original 
FISA discussing Article II and Fourth Amendment issues, and minority Art. II and III objections); Letter 
from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Sen. Charles Schumer 2 (July 10, 2006), http://lawculture.blogs.com/lawculture/
files/NSA.Hamdan.response.schumer.pdf (disputing constitutionality of FISA in view of Art. II); Stephen 
I. Vladeck, The FISA Court and Article III, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1161 (2015) (discussing Art. III 
concerns with FISA). 
 284. See, e.g., National Security Surveillance Act of 2006, S. 2453, 109th Cong. (2006); see also 
S. 3876, 109th Cong. (2006); Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006, S. 3931, 109th Cong. (2006); see also 
S. 3929, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 285. See H.R. REP. 95-1720, at 35 (1978) (Conf. Rep.) (FISA operates in Youngstown framework); 
H.R. REP. 95-1283 (1978) (id., House committee report). 
 286. Article I, section 8 provisions other than the Forces Clause were cited in all of the statements 
of constitutional authority inserted into the Congressional Record pursuant to House Rule XII(7)(c) 
regarding the nearly three dozen bills to amend FISA introduced in the House from 2011-2016.  Data set 
of legislation on file with author.  See also Part II.C.1 supra. 
 287. See supra note regarding congressional authority statements in Congressional Record 
associated with USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) and other FISA-
related legislation, where Art. I provisions other than Forces Clause are cited; S. REP. 95-701, at 16 (1978) 
(Senate committee report on original FISA cites Art. I, § 8 and particularly Necessary and Proper Clause 
as authority for FISA in Youngstown context); Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 
735-36 n.143 (citing Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, in addition to Forces Clause).   
 288. See, e.g., FISA Court in the Sunshine Act, H.R. 2440, 113th Cong. (2013), 159 CONG. REC. 
H3928 (requiring transparency measures regarding secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
constructions of law, enabled by both the Fourth Amendment and the Commerce Clause). 
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one provision of the Constitution.289  And as noted at the outset of this 
article, the courts have made clear that a statute can find constitutional 
footing on an Article I provision even if that provision is not cited by 
Congress, if the provision’s terminology is not used, and if the real 
purpose of the statute diverges from the reasons the clause was included 
in the Constitution.  Statutes are more legitimate normatively, however, 
the closer they may be tied to the Constitution’s text and the ethos of 
relevant provisions.  With this in mind, the Forces Clause deserves to be 
recognized as the best constitutional textual grounding for FISA. 
First, FISA is not about commerce.  It is true that FISA’s text references 
“transmission of interstate and foreign communications,” and that the 
Supreme Court has held that the Commerce Clause does provide 
Congress power to permit government interception of phone calls.290  For 
these reasons, the Commerce Clause reasonably offers some authority.291  
But the Forces Clause is the best constitutional footing because FISA’s 
primary purpose is not to regulate the economy.  The statute instead 
governs surveillance (primarily of U.S. persons, but also of non-U.S. 
persons) for foreign intelligence purposes, by the military (in addition to 
the FBI or other actors).  At the time of FISA’s enactment and through 
the present day, the vast majority of foreign intelligence surveillance has 
been conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA), a component of 
the Department of Defense, headed by a four-star general officer.  The 
NSA is a vital part of the “land and naval Forces,” providing signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) to the armed forces under the Military Intelligence 
Program (MIP) and to the President, National Security Council, Congress, 
Justice Department, and other intelligence consumers through the 
National Intelligence Program (NIP).292  FISA regulates and promotes 
commerce only incidentally, by governing the companies and information 
infrastructure through which communications flow and providing rules 
that say that one’s commercial communications will not be surveilled 
unless certain criteria are met.   
FISA’s overarching purpose is to balance security and liberty as they 
 
 289. In addition to the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause (see supra), other 
provisions sometimes cited in constitutional authority statements pursuant to House Rule XII(7)(c) as 
authority for amendments to FISA are Art. I, § 1 (see, e.g., Government Surveillance Transparency Act, 
H.R. 2736, 113th Cong. (2013), 159 CONG. REC. H4725 (2013)) and Art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (see, e.g., Presidential 
Appointment of FISA Court Judges Act, H.R. 2761, 113th Cong. (2013), 159 CONG. REC. H4826 (2013)).  
These vest the legislative power in Congress, and grant it authority to “provide for the common Defence 
and general Welfare.”  These broad provisions may reasonably be read to provide some authority for 
FISA, but are not as squarely on point as the Clause in its External Government understanding. 
 290. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(l) (2015); Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 327 (1939). 
 291. The legislative authority provided by the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause 
is more important where FISA activity is being conducted by entities that cannot easily be considered part 
of the “land and naval Forces,” such as the FBI. 
 292. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 1.12(b) (2008). 
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pertain to national security.293  FISA permits collection of the 
communications of U.S. persons by military and civilian personnel under 
the ultimate (but importantly not immediate) supervision of the President 
on a showing of probable cause that the target is a foreign power or agent 
thereof.294  It also imposes court order and other requirements to protect 
Fourth Amendment rights.295  FISA’s rules were imposed by Congress in 
response to a history of unrestricted Executive branch national security 
surveillance that involved well-documented privacy violations and other 
abuses.  These included dragnet collection of the communications of U.S. 
persons by NSA without suspicion, and targeting of non-violent war 
protesters, civil rights advocates, and political and bureaucratic 
adversaries of senior government officials for surveillance.296  FISA, in 
short, is a statute that precisely reflects the Forces Clause’s counter-
tyrannical ethos and its mechanism (under the External Government 
understanding) of limiting in a non-appropriations statute the operational 
uses to which the President can put the land and naval forces.297 
FISA does impose obligations on companies involved in inter-state and 
international commerce and therefore, again, it is reasonable to see some 
support for FISA provided by the Commerce Clause.298  But as a 
normative matter, the Commerce Clause should be regarded as a 
supporting secondary constitutional authority, for the reasons just 
mentioned.  Additionally, a FISA planted only on the Commerce Clause 
would suggest that many of the military’s most sensitive and vital 
operations could be restricted significantly for purposes of commercial 
regulation.  That may be the right answer, or it may not.  In any event, the 
External Government understanding of the Forces Clause is a stronger 
foundation.  
The Necessary and Proper Clause has been cited as constitutional 
authority for Congress to regulate intelligence activities, including by the 
 
 293. See H.R. REP. 95-1283, at 22 (1978) (House committee report on original FISA states that bill 
represents balancing of security and liberty); S. REP. 95-701, at 6-7 (1978) (Senate committee report 
quotes President Carter to same effect). 
 294. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A) (2018).  Foreign powers and agents thereof include groups, 
entities, and persons involved with international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(b) (2018). 
 295. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. 
 296. See CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT and PIKE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 282. 
 297. The Attorney General, Justice Department, and FBI have key roles under FISA.  But the vast 
majority of FISA collection is conducted by the NSA.  The Justice Department and FBI roles in relation 
to NSA collection are largely procedural requirements imposed by Congress and the courts.  To whatever 
extent this work and the reality that FBI and other agencies can conduct surveillance pursuant to FISA 
might begin to stretch reliance on the Forces Clause, other clauses can be understood to provide 
supplementary constitutional support.  The point is NSA’s large role and therefore the prime reliance the 
FISA statute must place on the Clause. 
 298. See, e.g., Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 736 n.143. 
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Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in its report on what would 
become the original FISA.299  But the Necessary and Proper Clause is 
principally a general, catch-all, backstopping source of legislative 
authority.  The closer a statute is tethered to a more specific enumerated 
power, the firmer its constitutional footing. 
FISA can be understood to apply the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness and warrant requirements to national security 
surveillance.  But the Fourth Amendment is not an affirmative grant of 
authority to Congress as are the enumerated legislative powers of Article 
I, Section 8.300  The Fourth Amendment on its face also does not provide 
authority to Congress to balance Fourth Amendment rights and 
Commander in Chief powers.  This is more easily understood as the work 
of the Forces Clause. 
In short, several provisions of the Constitution are relevant to FISA but 
the Clause, in its External Government understanding,301 represents the 
firmest constitutional grounding for statutory restrictions on surveillance 
of U.S. persons for national security purposes by the intelligence 
collection apparatus the President supervises. 
3. Covert Action 
Although there is no explicit mention of intelligence in the 
Constitution’s text, there is no question that the collection, analysis, 
dissemination, and consumption of intelligence, along with conducting 
counter-intelligence (spy vs. spy) and foreign intelligence liaison 
relationships, are constitutional.  Intelligence is an inevitable incident to 
military forces and diplomacy.  Most intelligence activities – with the 
FISA exception explained immediately above – therefore readily find 
constitutional grounding in the Army, Navy, Militia, and Commander in 
Chief Clauses, in addition to the nation’s foreign relations work under the 
direction of the President.  But what of covert action – that is, clandestine 
direct action, sometimes called active measures – and particularly 
Congress’s ability to control such “black ops” by national security actors 
acting at presidential direction? 
Covert action was an administrative creature under presidential control 
for most of the republic’s history.  It was carried out abroad and also 
 
 299. See S. REP. 95-701, at 35, 72 (1978). 
 300. When the Supreme Court invited Congress to enact what became FISA, the Court did not 
specify the constitutional authority for such a statute.  See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (“Keith”), 407 
U.S. 297, 323-24 (1972). 
 301. The Clause’s Internal Regulation power might apply as well, to the extent FISA is a set of 
internal rules for a military SIGINT agency.  It also includes a criminal penalty for violation.  However, 
FISA is more readily understood as concerning operations, which is the work of the External Government 
power. 
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within the United States without any statutory framework until the 
National Security Act in the mid-20th Century.  The 1970s saw revelations 
of covert actions targeting non-violent protest inside the United States and 
other First Amendment-protected political activity, and the 1980s Iran-
Contra scandal exposed accountability problems at the highest levels.  
The modern covert action statute enacted in response imposes stringent 
targeting limitations and process requirements that are explicitly binding 
on the President.302   
The statute begins prohibitively: “[t]he President may not” authorize 
covert action unless the President takes a series of accountability steps.303  
The President must determine any covert action is “necessary to support 
identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important 
to the national security,” put that determination in a written finding, report 
that finding to the congressional intelligence committees (including the 
legal basis for the covert action), and keep the committees apprised and 
file notification of meaningful change to the covert operation.304  Defined 
as “an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence 
political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended 
that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or 
acknowledged publicly,” covert action may not be “intended to influence 
United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media.”305 
Other national security clauses or the Necessary and Proper Clause 
may reasonably provide Congress regulatory authority,306 but the Forces 
Clause should be recognized not only as permissible constitutional 
footing for this framework statute’s restrictions on the President, but the 
covert action statute’s primary constitutional hook.  The “land and naval 
Forces” may reasonably embrace both military regulars and other 
accompanying forces such as intelligence personnel.  The statute 
anticipates that military or non-uniformed intelligence personnel may 
carry out covert actions.307  The Forces Clause is a more appropriate 
source of authority for such operations than the Declare War Clause 
because covert action is not necessarily war and need not involve force.  
Influencing “conditions” is much broader, to include information 
 
 302. For discussion of what led to the modern framework statute, see REISMAN & BAKER, supra 
note 13. 
 303. 50 U.S.C. § 3093(a) (2014). 
 304. Id. § 3093(a)-(d) (2014). 
 305. Id. § 3093(e)-(f) (2014). 
 306. See REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 13 (mention of Clause along with Necessary & Proper). 
 307. The statute is activity rather than actor focused.  The common but wrong perception that covert 
actions are non-military and exclusively a CIA activity are grounded in an administrative authority.  Exec. 
Order No. 12,333 (2008) creates a presumption that the CIA will carry out covert actions, but with 
exception – which was reportedly used in the most prominent U.S. clandestine operation in recent decades, 
the 2011 joint CIA/military operation that killed Osama bin Laden.   
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operations or even lethal action that does not rise to the level of armed 
conflict.  Additionally, this framework statute’s limitations strongly 
reflect the civilian legislative control and counter-authoritarian purposes 
of the Forces Clause.  The statute’s restrictions and transparency 
requirements on the President are among the most stringent in any part of 
the national security legal regime, imposed in response to serious abuses 
of executive power.308   
Finally, military and intelligence activities have converged in recent 
years, particularly in the area of clandestine direct action.309  The raid that 
killed Osama bin Laden, for example, was evidently carried out under the 
covert action authority with CIA direction, but on-the-ground and in-the-
air action was conducted primarily by the military.310  Meanwhile, 
intelligence agencies actively assist clandestine military operations 
conducted under the authority of the Defense Department, and the 
Defense Department increasingly reports to Congress about such 
operations in a manner increasingly similar to that Congress has required 
for covert actions.311  As this military/intelligence convergence continues, 
the constitutional legitimacy provided to the covert action statute by the 
Forces Clause grows.     
4. Interrogation  
Collecting intelligence facilitates both covert and overt action, which 
in turn may result in detention and interrogation of detainees.  These 
activities are governed and regulated by Congress pursuant to statutes that 
find strong constitutional authority in the Forces Clause, among other 
clauses.  The statutory framework includes the Detainee Treatment Act, 
the Military Commissions Act, and the collection of statutes that ban 
torture.312   
 
 308. As noted in Part III.B above, OLC during the Reagan Administration believed that the Clause 
would apply in what we conceptualize as an Internal Regulation sense to covert action, but denied any 
External Government power from any Article I source.  See supra note 218 and accompanying text. The 
intelligence committees emphasized in response that they had never accepted such arguments.  See H.R. 
REP. NO. 102-166, at 28 (1991) (Conf. Rep.); see also Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part II, supra 
note 1, at 1084 n. 589.   
 309. See Robert S. Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/50 
Debate, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 539 (2012). 
 310. See id. at 539-41; CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS 257-71 (2016). 
 311. See 10 U.S.C. § 130f (2018); Robert S. Chesney, Expanding Congressional Oversight of 
Kill/Capture Ops Conducted by the Military: Section 1036 of the NDAA, LAWFARE (Dec. 8, 2016, 6:25 
PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/expanding-congressional-oversight-killcapture-ops-conducted-
military-section-1036-ndaa. 
 312. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801-
07, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574-2614 (2009) (Military Commissions Act of 2009). For the Detainee Treatment 
Act and other torture statutes, and discussion of other relevant constitutional provisions, see infra note 
313 and accompanying text. 
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The torture ban finds strong authority in the External Government 
power of the Forces Clause.  It applies to the entire U.S. government, but 
is focused on military and intelligence forces.313  It restricts what they can 
do, and what the President can order them to do, regarding enemy fighters 
and others from whom national security information is sought.  The 
original torture ban pre-dates 9/11, and has been re-enacted and 
broadened twice since.  The statutes include a ban on cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment, and generally restrict all U.S. government actors to 
the U.S. Army Field Manual’s list of approved interrogation techniques, 
none of which involve the use of force.314  Here again, the resonance of 
this statutory framework with the legislative control and counter-
authoritarian purposes of the Clause is strong.  Short of loss of life, the 
threats of confinement for national security purposes and torture are the 
most serious predations against liberty an individual can contemplate if 
faced with a tyrannous President in command of “land and naval Forces.”  
5. War Powers Resolution 
The War Powers Resolution (WPR) of 1973 is the framework statute 
for use of force abroad.315  At its core, the WPR requires Congressional 
notification when the President introduces U.S. forces into situations in 
which hostilities are imminent, the withdrawal of U.S. forces after 60 days 
(with an additional 30 day period to effectuate withdrawal) unless 
Congress has declared war or statutorily authorized the military operation, 
consultation with Congress throughout, and a ban on inference of 
 
 313. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A; 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006) (prohibition); Detainee Treatment 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1002, 1003, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-44 (2005) (non-appropriations 
law appended to the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address 
Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006) (limiting Defense Department 
interrogation to techniques in the Army Field Manual and barring “cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment or punishment” of any “individual in the custody or under the physical control” of the U.S. 
government); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1045(a), 
129 Stat. 725, 977-79 (2015) (extending requirement to follow the Army Field Manual to the entire U.S. 
government).  These statutes may reasonably be understood to operate in connection with the Define and 
Punish, Captures, and Treaty Clauses of the Constitution, as well as the Forces Clause.  U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 10-11, 14; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  See also Bradbury memorandum, supra note 222, at 4-6 (OLC 
in 2009 decided that Define and Punish and Forces Clauses provide Congress authority to govern 
interrogation, disagreed with prior view that Captures Clause does not).  Torture is barred and indeed a 
war crime under international law.  Articles 2 and 4 of the Convention Against Torture call on state parties 
to enact laws to prevent and criminalize torture.  See United Nations Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment arts. II, IV, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 
100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.   
 314. See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3: HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR 
OPERATIONS (Sept. 2006), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf (listing permitted interrogation 
methods). 
 315. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 
 [hereinafter WPR]. 
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authorization from appropriations.   
Enacted over President Richard Nixon’s veto in response to the 
Vietnam War and Nixon’s introduction of U.S. military forces into 
Cambodia, the WPR’s constitutionality has been contested since it was 
proposed.316  Its text cites the Necessary and Proper Clause.317  However, 
the Forces Clause is the stronger textual grounding.  First, the WPR is a 
non-appropriations, non-war declaration statute that imposes legal limits 
on the operational use of the armed forces by the President.  This is the 
essence of Clause’s External Government power.  Second, the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, as noted, is primarily a gap-filling statute.  An 
enumerated power that provides particular substantive authority for 
legislation is firmer footing.   
The Declare War Clause reasonably provides some support for the 
WPR, but not exclusive nor even necessarily the best constitutional 
authority.  Of course, war is in the title of the WPR.  It is risked by the 
operations the WPR governs.  However, the primary work done by the 
WPR is the Forces Clause’s External Government work of limiting 
military operations.  In contrast, the primary work of a war declaration is 
authorizing military operations and announcing the most intense state of 
belligerence between international parties.  The WPR also concerns 
“hostilities,” a statutorily undefined term but one reasonably understood 
to embrace military operations less intense than war.318  I therefore argue 
that the WPR is best understood as a “Rule” Congress has written for “the 
Government . . . of the land and naval Forces.”  Separate congressional 
action under the Declare War Clause is, by the WPR’s terms, a means of 
releasing the President from the WPR’s strictures.   
Executive branch interpretative precedents regarding military 
operations in Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011) and against the so-called 
Islamic State (2014-present) have in recent decades served to limit the 
WPR’s reach.319  All post-enactment presidents have disputed the WPR’s 
 
 316. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 101 (1984) (defending); Peter M. Shane, Learning McNamara’s Lessons: How the War Powers 
Resolution Advances the Rule of Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1281 (1997) (defending); ROBERT F. 
TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 107-33 
(1983) (contesting); YOO, supra note 9, at 159-60 (contesting). 
 317. WPR, supra note 315, at § 2(b). 
 318. But see Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Testimony Regarding U.S. 
Military Involvement in Libya, June 28, 2011 [hereinafter Koh SFRC Testimony] (arguing in defense of 
the Obama Administration continuing U.S. military involvement in Libya beyond 60-90 clock by arguing 
that the Libya mission was not sufficiently intense to trigger the WPR). 
 319. The Clinton Administration OLC interpreted appropriations for combat operations in Kosovo 
in 1999 beyond the WPR’s 90-day clock as a constructive amendment to the WPR, despite the WPR’s 
facial ban on inference of force authorization from appropriations in § 8(a)(1), 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1).  
See Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, 24 Op. O.L.C. 327, 339 (2000), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/19306/download.  The Obama Administration viewed military operations in 
Libya in 2011 as too limited to be considered “war” and trigger the WPR’s restrictions.  See Authority to 
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constitutionality except Carter and Obama.320  However, all Presidents 
since Gerald Ford have observed the WPR’s requirements the vast 
majority of the time.321  The WPR remains the framework statute for use 
of force – one for which the Forces Clause provides the best authority.     
*** 
The statutory frameworks discussed in this Part are core elements of 
the national security regulatory regime.  They all resonate with the 
Clause’s counter-authoritarian purposes, limiting what the national 
security apparatus can do and what the Commander in Chief can 
operationally order them to do.  Each statute cited above relies on the 
External Government understanding to check the military and the 
President.  The UCMJ and the statutes concerning intelligence collection 
(FISA and the interrogation laws) protect the civil liberties of the people, 
the NDAA provides the elected representatives of the people control over 
the national security apparatus, and the Posse Comitatus Act, the 
Insurrection Act, and the WPR ensure that Congress can write rules for 
use of military force.  These Forces Clause-based statutes do their work 
without exposing Congress to politically toxic allegations of “de-funding 
the troops” by denying or limiting funding for specific activities pursuant 
to the Appropriations Clause, or by de-funding-by-legislative-inaction the 
entire Army pursuant to the Army Appropriations Clause’s limitation on 
Army appropriations to two years.322  The Forces Clause in its External 
Government power is often overlooked as the basis for the 
 
Use Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2011); Koh SFRC Testimony, supra note 311.  With Congress 
unwilling to act on the President’s request for new statutory authorization, and the President preferring 
not to assert Commander in Chief authority, the Obama Administration relied on the 9/11 (2001) and Iraq 
(2002) AUMF statutes as authority for operations against the so-called Islamic State.  For discussion, see 
Jack Goldsmith & Matthew Waxman, The Legal Legacy of Light-Footprint Warfare, 39 WASH. Q. 7, 12-
19 (2016), http://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/2016/TWQ_Summer2016_Goldsmith-
Waxman.pdf; Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, 53 HOU. L. REV. 
971, 1021 (2016) (“Congress is unwilling to vote even to authorize an expanded war against ISIL that 
most Members seem to support”). 
 320. See, e.g., President Richard M. Nixon, Veto of the War Powers Resolution, 1973 Pub. Papers 
311 (Oct. 24, 1973) (arguing WPR unconstitutional); Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad 
Without Statutory Authorization, 40A Op. O.L.C. 185, 190 (1980) (Carter Administration OLC finds 60 
day clock constitutional); Robert Chesney, An Overview of Harold Koh’s Testimony on the WPR at 
Today’s SFRC Hearing, LAWFARE,  (June 28, 2011, 11:48 AM) https://www.lawfareblog.com/overview-
harold-kohs-testimony-wpr-todays-sfrc-hearing (State Department Legal Advisor Harold Hongju Koh 
testified that Obama Administration believes WPR is constitutional). 
 321. Presidents who dispute the WPR’s constitutionality have reported to Congress “consistent” 
with the WPR.  See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33532, WAR POWERS 
RESOLUTION: PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE (2012). 
 322. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.  The Army Appropriations Clause 
potentially functions as a last resort default off-switch through which each two-year Congress has the 
ability to simply appropriate nothing for the Army and thereby eliminate it in at most two years, removing 
the federal government’s largest land force from the hands of a tyrannous or otherwise unfit Commander 
in Chief.  
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constitutionality of these laws, and that should change.  Other statutes – 
for example on the military chain of command or force emplacement in 
peacetime – might find root in the Clause, as well.323  The growing body 
of congressionally-written rules for cyber operations are another 
important and emerging example, as discussed below.  The Clause is ripe 
for constitutional rediscovery.     
IV. THE CLAUSE REDISCOVERED: CONTEMPORARY IMPORTANCE 
Several contemporary trends are increasing the importance of the 
authority the Forces Clause provides Congress, and the statutory 
frameworks that find textual footing in the Clause.  That is especially true 
regarding the Clause’s External Government power and the statutes that 
reflect its exercise.  Congress’s ability to write “Rules” for the national 
security apparatus pursuant to the Clause takes on special salience in view 
of current lawmaking dynamics that make legislation harder to enact, 
change in the national security environment and especially its increasing 
cyberization, and increasingly volatile U.S. policy and politics since 9/11.  
Each trend resonates with larger global erosion in norms, increasing 
contentiousness and conflict, and accelerating rate of change.  Physics 
teaches that as linear velocity, mass, and angular momentum increase, so 
too does torque.  As in a high-performance automobile or aircraft, the 
crash risk created by rising torque makes restraints more important.  So 
too in our legal order.  In our increasingly volatile age, the guardrails 
provided by the Forces Clause’s statutory “Rules” are especially valuable. 
A. In Context of New Lawmaking Dynamics 
The Forces Clause and its statutes matter more because of an inter-
related series of recent government lawmaking process trends.  
Against the backdrop of enduring barriers to judicial review of national 
security matters, Congress is legislating less, the Executive power is 
growing, and creation of secret law has become regularized in all three 
branches, including in Congress pursuant to the Forces Clause.   
First, since the mid-2000s, the legislative process in Congress has 
become characterized by what some scholars generously term 
“unorthodox lawmaking.”324  Another fair characterization is that 
 
 323. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 162 (military chain of command, from President to Secretary of Defense 
to combatant commanders of the unified joint warfighting commands), § 163 (Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff is senior military advisor to the President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense, but is not in the 
chain of command). 
 324. See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE 
U. S. CONGRESS 52 (4th ed. 2012) (rate of bypassing of committees and other empirical data); Abbe R. 
Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 
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Congress has become dysfunctional.  It is less able to give legislation 
and nominations thorough procedural review under the traditional 
“regular order” and invest them with bi-partisan buy-in.  As 
partisanship has risen, transparency into legislative process has 
increased; seemingly all issues have become nationalized and made 
instantly accessible thanks to information technology; and Members 
of Congress have become less willing to compromise and more 
extreme in their tactics.  Compromise legislation on major issues 
facing the country has become harder to craft and pass.  Filibusters and 
holds have gone from rare exceptions in the U.S. Senate to formidable 
counter-majoritarian barriers to a large number of bills, motions, and 
nominations (and then both parties while in the majority have 
successively narrowed long-standing Senate rules allowing the 
filibuster, enabling one party to act on its own).  The number of bills 
enacted per session has plummeted.325  Those that do reach enactment 
often have skipped many usual legislative process stages.  Their 
legislative history is tangled and gap filled.326  Annual funding 
legislation is commonly enacted late or not at all.  Brinksmanship has 
driven up the number of omnibus bills – amalgamations of many bills 
that are drafted, combined, and passed amid haste and disorder.   
The net effect is that it has become harder for Congress to act.  
Updating FISA after major surveillance scandals in 2005 and 2013, for 
example, took two full years.327  Additionally, Congress’s inability to 
do its regular appropriations work on schedule and its aversion to 
“tying the hands of the military” during an age of endless war have left 
Congress less deft in using its power of the purse as a check on the 
 
COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1799-1800, 1803, 1839 (2015) (discussing tangled legislative history for omnibus 
bills); Rudesill, supra note 44, at 365-66 (discussing the difficulty associated with understanding the law 
and legislative history produced by unorthodox lawmaking as a form of secret law). 
 325. See, e.g., Drew Desilver, Congress Still on Track to be Among Least Productive in Recent 
History, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/09/23/congress-still-on-track-to-be-among-least-productive-in-recent-history/ (analysis of 
number and types of bills passed per Congress). 
 326. The legislative history since the late 1970s of three annual national security bills – the 
Intelligence Authorization Act, National Defense Authorization Act, and Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act – provide an illuminating case study in the legislative process’s severe disruption.  See 
Rudesill, supra note 44, at 367-90 (in-text discussion, and tables tracking the three Acts). 
 327. See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (update to FISA 
after 2005 leak of warrantless content surveillance); USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 
129 Stat. 268 (update to FISA after Edward Snowden’s 2013 leak of FISC orders authorizing bulk 
collection of telephony metadata); See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers 
without Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-
spy-on-callers-without-courts.html?_r=0 (original story reporting warrantless wiretapping outside FISA); 
Secondary Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the 
Production of Tangible Things from Verizon Business Network Services, Inc., on behalf of MCI 
Communication Services, Inc., No. BR 13-80 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013), 
http://epic.org/privacy/nsa/Section-215-Order-to-Verizon.pdf (FISC order leaked by Snowden). 
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Executive.  The recent Iraq War, for example, was for most of its 
duration enormously unpopular but never de-funded.  Indeed, no 
national security program of any prominence has been de-funded since 
Congress’s action in 2003 to bar funds for the Total Information 
Awareness domestic surveillance program.328  A decade later, a 
left/right effort to de-fund the NSA bulk telephony metadata collection 
revealed in 2013 by Edward Snowden failed in the House.329   
Additionally, Congress has not simply stopped formally declaring 
wars, but is unable to pass new authorizations for the use of military 
force (AUMF) when abundantly warranted.330  An early bellwether 
was Congress’s inability in 1999 to pass a war declaration, to pass an 
AUMF, or to cut off funding for U.S. participation in NATO’s war 
against Serbia to protect Kosovo.  More recently, Congress has shown 
no ability to pass a new AUMF explicitly authorizing ongoing U.S. 
use of force against Al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, Somalia, and North 
Africa (2010 onward); against Libya’s Qadaffi regime (2011); against 
Syria’s al-Assad regime (threatened in 2013, and carried out in 2017 
and 2018); and against ISIL (2014 to present).  Instead, with 
congressional acquiesce, administrations of both parties have invoked 
the President’s Article II Commander in Chief power, and also invoked 
9/11 and Iraq War AUMFs that are more than a decade and a half old 
and have been relied upon for authority to fight ISIL and other entities 
that did not exist when those statutes were passed.331   
 
 328. See, Congress Dismantles Total Information Awareness Spy Program, ACLU (Sept. 25, 2003), 
https://www.aclu.org/news/congress-dismantles-total-information-awareness-spy-program-aclu-
applauds-victory-calls?redirect=national-security/congress-dismantles-total-information-awareness-spy-
program-aclu-applauds-victory- (praising de-funding of Total Information Awareness (TIA)); DOD 
Appropriations Act for 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8131(a), 117 Stat. 1054, 1102 (2003) (statute de-
funding TIA); see also H.R. REP. NO. 108-283, at 327, 344 (2003) (Conf. Rep.) (report language regarding 
TIA). 
 329. See H. AMEND. 413 to H.R. 2397, 113th Cong. (2013), 159 CONG. REC. H5028 (2013) (roll 
call vote on de-funding bulk telephony metadata collection), https://www.congress.gov/
amendment/113th-congress/house-amendment/413/text; H. R. REP. NO. 113-170, at 11, 29 (2013) (Reps. 
Justin Amash (R-MI) and John Conyers (D-MI) amendment to de-fund bulk telephony metadata collection 
defeated in U.S. House 205-17). 
 330. The last war declaration was during World War II.  See Act of June 5, 1942, ch. 325, 56 Stat. 
307 (Declaring a state of war between the Government of Rumania and Government and the people of 
the United States).  The most recent AUMFs were passed in 2001 and 2002, regarding Al Qaeda and 
others responsible for the 9/11 attacks and authorizing the invasion of Iraq, respectively.  See 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002). 
 331. The Obama Administration unsuccessfully sought new AUMFs from Congress.  In contrast, 
the Trump Administration indicated that existing authorities are “sufficient” and that it “is not seeking 
revisions to the 2001 AUMF or additional authorizations to use force.”  See Charles Faulkner, Bureau of 
Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Letter to Senator Bob Corker, Chairman, U.S. Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee (Aug. 2, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3911844/8-2-17-
Corker-Response.pdf.  Regarding military operations against ISIL, the Trump and Obama 
Administrations have invoked the 9/11 and Iraq AUMFs, even though ISIL often fights Al Qaeda and the 
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In this context and where major laws are hard to pass, the statutory 
frameworks grounded in the Forces Clause that are already on the 
books and new updates to them – non-appropriations, non-AUMF 
statutes that govern and regulate national security activities – grow in 
importance.   
Executive power growth makes these statutory frameworks matter 
more, too, along with the Forces Clause that underlies them.  Executive 
power has been growing for more than a century, with acceleration in 
recent years.332  The Executive branch has pushed against the limits of 
Clause-based statutes discussed in Part III, via new interpretive and 
practice precedents.  The George W. Bush Administration did so (e.g., 
regarding surveillance and interrogation) under the aegis of its 
expansive minority theory of executive power and in service of post-
9/11 urgency to collect intelligence.  The Obama Administration 
broadly interpreted the President’s authority to act (particularly in 
Libya and against ISIL) after concluding Congress was incapable of 
acting due to its politics.333  The Trump Administration has deployed 
some of the same theories.334  The WPR has seen significant 
interpretive narrowing, particularly regarding military operations in 
Libya and against ISIL.335  The Executive branch’s resistance to the 
 
government of Iraq.  See April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities 42 Op. 
O.L.C. 1, 11, 13 n.4 (May 31, 2018) (slip op.), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/
attachments/2018/05/31/2018-05-31-syrian-airstrikes_1.pdf  (published Trump-era OLC opinion on legal 
authority to combat ISIL), citing Authority to Use Military Force in Iraq (2014) (unpublished Obama-era 
OLC opinion on legal authority to combat ISIL in Iraq); see also THE WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE 
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND 
RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 15-16 (2016) (published Obama-era White House report), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/framework.Report_Final.pdf.  Regarding 
strikes against Syria’s al-Assad regime, the Trump Administration has relied on an expansive conception 
of the President’s Article II powers.  See April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons 
Facilities, supra; President Donald Trump, Letter to the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore 
of the Senate, April 8, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/letter-president-speaker-
house-representatives-president-pro-tempore-senate/.  The Trump State and Defense Departments 
additionally argue that at least the 2017 strikes on the Syrian regime for using chemical weapons were 
authorized by the 9/11 AUMF as necessary to protect U.S. and allied forces battling ISIL.  Pro-democracy 
Syrian forces backed by the United States have been fighting ISIL and the Syrian government.  See Mary 
K. Waters, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Letter to Senator Tim Kaine 
at 1-2 (Feb. 12, 2018), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4383185-Kaine-Trump-
ISIS-war-power-letters.html; David J. Trachtenberg, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
Letter to Senator Tim Kaine at 2 (Jan. 29, 2018), available at https://www.documentcloud.org
/documents/4383185-Kaine-Trump-ISIS-war-power-letters.html. 
 332. Factors certainly relevant include growth in the administrative state and rise of the “imperial 
presidency,” increasing congressional willingness to delegate rulemaking to agencies and judicial 
tolerance of such delegations, increasing partisanship, and court expansion of judicial power.  For 
criticism see SHANE, supra note 148, at 3 et seq.; LOUIS FISHER, SUPREME COURT EXPANSION OF 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2017).  
 333. See supra note 319. 
 334. See supra note 331. 
 335. See discussion above in Part III.B.5. 
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Forces Clause’s statutes serves to underscore the importance of 
existing statutory frameworks if the President is to be restrained 
meaningfully. 
In addition to Congress’s inability to use its legislative power and 
expanding Executive power, there has been a third change in 
lawmaking dynamics that makes the Clause and its statutes matter 
more.  Creation of unpublished national security legal authorities – 
national security secret law – has in recent decades become well 
established in all three branches of the federal government.  These 
include classified legislative addenda given the force of law by 
Congress (a regular and expanding practice since the late 1970s), 
secret presidential orders and precedential Justice Department 
memoranda, and classified orders of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC) created nearly 40 years ago.336   
On the one hand, Congress can rely on Clause authority when it 
writes classified addenda in the National Defense Authorization Acts 
(NDAAs) and Intelligence Authorization Acts (IAAs).  Congress’s 
secret law can manage secret law in the other two branches, as well as 
manage secret fact (classified offices, programs, operations, etc.).  
According to media reports, Congress has used classified provisions to 
govern lethal drone operations – to do the Forces Clause’s External 
Government work in secrecy’s most deadly shadows.337     
On the other hand, against the darkened backdrop of secret law and 
secret fact, the Clause’s Public Law provisions provide an instrument 
for policy change by the elected representatives of the people.  The 
Clause’s Public Law statutes also provide public standards by which 
the legality of secret government activity can be measured – both for 
holders of security clearances in classification’s darkest corners and 
for the public when secret activities are revealed.338   
 
 336. See Rudesill, supra note 44 (study finding secret law claim credible regarding all three 
branches); WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & THE POWER OF 
THE PURSE 52, 65 (1994) (discussion of examples of Congress’s use of classified legislative addenda). 
 337. See Greg Miller, Lawmakers Seek to Stymie Plan to Shift Control of Drone Campaign from 
CIA to Pentagon, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/lawmakers-seek-to-stymie-plan-to-shift-control-of-drone-campaign-from-cia-to-
pentagon/2014/01/15/c0096b18-7e0e-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html. 
 338. Caveats are in order.  One is that the observations above of course apply to all publicly 
observable law that limits the Executive Branch.  The Forces Clause and its statutes are especially 
important, however, because they do such important work.  A second caveat is that public statutes, if they 
are to be meaningful, demand adherence to a Public Law Supremacy Principle: that any secret law is 
subordinate to public law, and does not grow government authority beyond what it facially appears to the 
public.  See Rudesill, supra note 44, at 337-41.   
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B. In Context of Change in the Security Environment, Especially 
Growing Cyberization 
While Congress has become less responsive and the U.S. political 
culture has become more divided and acrimonious, the global security 
environment has become more volatile.  Compared to the relatively stable 
American-designed post-World War II and post-Cold War orders, the 
world is increasingly chaotic, dynamic, and perilous.  The very nature of 
war, conflict, and security are changing.  The United States today faces a 
national security environment dominated by disruptive trends.  These 
include protracted low-intensity conflict with a metastasizing and 
adaptive terrorist global insurgency, and galloping growth in the varieties, 
complexity, and accessibility of robots, from remotely piloted militarized 
drones to autonomous weapons systems that potentially think and kill on 
their own.339  As all aspects of security, society, and economics become 
more cyberized – that is, computer dependent – the United States also 
confronts a daily deluge of cyber attacks that straddle the blurry lines 
among espionage, war, crime, and terrorism.  According to the U.S. 
military, permanent U.S. cyber superiority “is not possible due to the 
complexity of cyberspace.”340  Meanwhile, congressional legislation is 
not keeping up.  As noted, the appropriations process through which U.S. 
forces are funded and managed is often a (black) comedy of legislative 
errors, missed deadlines, and panic-passed omnibus bills.  Meanwhile, 
force authorizations dating to 2001 (9/11) and 2002 (Iraq) are silent about 
dramatically changed conflicts in Afghanistan and the middle east, and 
about new technologies. 
The changing nature of the national security context in which “the land 
and naval Forces” operate is increasing the importance of the existing 
“Rules” Congress has provided pursuant to the Forces Clause.  Looking 
to the future, to the extent that Congress does legislate, its Forces Clause 
legislative authority will prove only more relevant and useful.  Through 
these authorities Congress can update the authorities, processes, and 
organization of the national security apparatus without having to depend 
on funding limitations via the disrupted appropriations process, and 
without having to wait for legislation authorizing wars.  Authorizing 
armed conflicts or making major amendments to AUMFs written 
pursuant to the Declare War Clause plainly now require a 9/11-scale 
catastrophe, and a formal war declaration would require an even larger 
 
 339. See, e.g., Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record: 
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (May 11, 2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/
SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.pdf. 
 340. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12: Cyberspace Operations, at I-2 (2018). 
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prompt.   
Congress’s active government of cyber operations in recent years 
provides a case study in the utility of Forces Clause authority.  In the wake 
of the United States engaging in the first publicly known major state use 
of a cyber weapon against Iran’s nuclear program, and after creation of 
the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), Congress in a series of 
enactments has stipulated authorities, processes, and reporting 
requirements for Defense Department offensive cyber operations.341  
Congress has piece by piece built a structure similar in some ways to the 
covert action statute, via a patchwork of provisions in annual NDAAs.  
Congress in the NDAA for 2012 affirmed presidential authority to direct 
the Defense Department to carry out offensive operations in cyberspace, 
while also subjecting the Pentagon’s cyber weapons to the law of armed 
conflict, to other existing Defense Department law and policy, and to 
another Clause framework statute, the WPR.342  Congress has 
subsequently underscored Defense Department authority to use cyber 
capabilities to defend the United States – and U.S. persons.343  Creating 
reporting requirements for military cyber operations similar to those in 
two other Force Clause statutes, the covert action statute and the WPR, 
Congress has also required the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress 
on individual cyber operations within 48 hours and file quarterly reports 
on cyber programs and their legality344  Most recently, Congress has 
legislated that the Defense Department may “take appropriate and 
proportional action in foreign cyberspace” against Russia, China, North 
Korea, or Iran, if such a state is executing an “ongoing campaign of 
attacks . . . in cyberspace, including attempting to influence American 
 
 341. U.S. Cyber Command has been operational for nearly a decade.  President Trump announced 
that it would be elevated to the status of a unified combatant command, on par with other warfighting 
commands such as U.S. Central Command.  See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
Statement by President Donald J. Trump on the Elevation of Cyber Command (Aug. 18, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/18/statement-donald-j-trump-elevation-cyber-
command. 
 342. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 954, 125 
Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011); 10 U.S.C. § 111 note. 
 343. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1642(a), 
129 Stat. 1116 (2015) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 394 (2018)).  This statute was moved from 10 
U.S.C. § 130g by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 
1631, 132 Stat. 1636 (2018) [hereinafter 2019 NDAA]. 
 344. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1631(a), 
131 Stat. 1283, 1736-37 (2017) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 395, 396 (2018)).  This statute was 
moved from 10 U.S.C. §§ 130j, 130k by the 2019 NDAA, supra note 335, at § 1631 (report required 
within 48 hours of on off-battlefield cyber operations, quarterly reports on review of legality under 
international law of cyber weapons, and report within 48 hours on use of such weapons).  See also National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 939, 126 Stat. 1632, 1888 (2013), 
amended by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1632(a), 
131 Stat. 1283, 1738 (2017) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 484) (quarterly report required on military cyber 
operations, including their legality). 
83
Rudesill: The Land and Naval Forces Clause
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
474 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
elections.”345  Additionally, Congress provides that clandestine military 
cyber operations may be conducted as a “traditional military activity,” 
and therefore subject to military-related law rather than the espionage-
focused covert action statute.346  Congress has also stipulated that the 
military cyber operations it is governing may include operations that fall 
short of “war”: operations that do not rise to the WPR’s threshold of 
“hostilities,” are not “in areas in which hostilities are occurring,” and are 
not uses of force.347   
In short, rather than waiting for Congress to invoke its other 
enumerated Article I powers via a formal declaration of cyber war, a 
freestanding cyber AUMF, or funding restrictions, Congress has used 
NDAAs to permit operations by the military’s cyber force subject to a set 
of legislated rules.  These include following other law (e.g., the law of 
armed conflict), not applying still other law here (the covert action 
statute), observing Congress’s stipulations even when the cyber 
operations are legally and geographically not part of hostilities, and 
providing Congress transparency regarding cyber weapons that will only 
become more powerful and more potentially imperiling to liberty as the 
world becomes ever more cyberized.  None of the NDAA cyber 
provisions cite constitutional authority for their enactment.  But the 
NDAA cyber laws – an emerging new statutory framework – are on their 
strongest constitutional footing when understood as Congress making 
“Rules for the Government . . . of the land and naval Forces” in 
cyberspace, reflecting the Forces Clause’s External Government power.  
As the threat environment, technology, and U.S. government 
capabilities rapidly evolve – in cyberspace and other more traditional 
domains – Congress will assuredly continue to refine its new cyber rules, 
update the more longstanding statutory frameworks discussed in Part III, 
and write new provisions as new issues are presented.  With a need to 
respond quickly to changing and perilous circumstances, a trend of 
increasing Executive power, and enduring barriers to judicial review of 
national security activities, one can also expect pushback by presidents 
and agencies.  This suggests renewed Youngstown-contextualized clashes 
 
 345. See 2019 NDAA, supra note 343, at § 1642. 
 346. See 2019 NDAA, supra note 343, at §§ 1632, 1642.  The covert action statute excludes 
“traditional . . . military activities” from its reach.  See 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e)(2) (2014).  The 2019 NDAA 
provision resolved a legal debate inside the Executive Branch.  For discussion, see Robert Chesney, The 
Law of Military Cyber Operations and the New NDAA, LAWFARE (July 26, 2018, 2:07 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-military-cyber-operations-and-new-ndaa. 
 347. See 2019 NDAA, supra note 343, at §§ 1632 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 394) (cyber operations 
less than “hostilities” and off-battlefield), 1295 (general provision stipulating that the NDAA’s provisions 
may not be understood to authorize the use of force against Iran or North Korea, presumably limiting the 
cyber operations authorized under the NDAA to something less than a use of force regarding two of the 
four countries listed in section 1642). 
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between the Commander in Chief and the Clause’s External Government 
power (perhaps in concert with congressional national security powers 
provided by the Common Defense, Declare War, Army, Navy, Militia, or 
Appropriations Clauses).  In the process, additional practice precedent 
will be set and the Forces Clause’s contours illuminated.  In what is a 
contest as much for public support as for judicial acceptance, Congress 
will be helped by explicitly citing the Forces Clause as authority for its 
enactments.  Especially in these volatile times, the legitimacy of 
legislation will be stronger if seen as reflecting use of enumerated 
constitutional powers and embodying their animating ethos. 
C. In Context of Volatile Politics and Policy 
Congress’s declining legislative productivity and the evolving nature 
of the national security threat environment resonate with a third 
overarching trend that is increasing the salience of the Forces Clause and 
statutes grounded on it.  In a time of growing contentiousness and eroding 
norms, the country’s politics and policy as they relate to national security 
have become much more volatile.  In this context, the “Rules” the Clause 
allows Congress to write are functioning as stabilizing guardrails. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to diagnose in depth the causes of 
this contentiousness and volatility.  Suffice for our purposes to note that 
it correlates with a number of disruptive developments in the past two 
decades.  These include the arrival of a horrifying and enduring terrorism 
threat on 9/11, U.S. involvement in two costly and still open-ended wars 
thereafter, the most severe economic shock since the Great Depression in 
2008-10 amid years of stagnation in economic prospects for most people, 
and technology-driven revolutionary expansion in the amount and 
interactiveness of information about public affairs.  These globe-spanning 
developments have especially impacted the United States because they 
started here, and because they have disrupted the country’s long run of 
global preeminence, prosperity, and political stability.  Political swings at 
the polls are now wider.348  Politicians and elected leaders say things and 
suggest policies that for a long time had been outside the mainstream of 
political discourse.   
Volatility is making law more important, and especially statutes that 
resonate with the Clause’s purposes in allowing the elected 
representatives of the people to control the national security apparatus that 
the Chief Executive wields. 
 
 348. For example, a majority of U.S. federal elections since the Iraq War began (2006, 2008, 2010, 
2014) have been “wave elections” with one party overwhelmingly prevailing over the other, after a long 
prior run starting in the late 1980s in which most elections were either on balance status-quo or closely 
decided (1988, 1990, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002). 
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A salient example is detainee treatment.  The George W. Bush 
Administration’s efforts after 9/11 to carry out trials and interrogation of 
detainees – captured both domestically and abroad – were at odds with 
longstanding detainee treatment norms and with statutes that find footing 
in the Clause, particularly the UCMJ and original anti-torture statute.  As 
noted above, the Courts in Hamdan upheld the UCMJ in the face of 
contrary presidential trial order and cited inter alia the Clause.  Congress 
– with backing from Bush’s successor, Obama – affirmed military justice 
process protections and the torture ban.  Obama’s successor, Donald 
Trump, campaigned on bringing back torture.  Once in office, Trump 
faced Forces Clause-based statutory “Rules” for the “land and naval 
Forces” that prohibit it.  They keep the legal baseline centered where it 
was before the alarming terrorist attacks of 9/11 and recent years.349     
The bruising election cycle that resulted in Trump’s election coincided 
with and has been followed by more domestic unrest with racial and 
political overtones than the country has witnessed since the Civil Rights 
Era and protests against the Vietnam War.350  The Posse Comitatus Act 
and parts of the Insurrection Act, based in the Clause, would operate 
regarding any new domestic federal military deployments, just as they did 
in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.  Such Clause-based statutes keep the law 
tethered to longstanding norms.  That is important in the context of 
frequent articulations of concern about an authoritarian turn in American 
politics351 and polls showing declining support for democracy and regular 
 
 349. Trump repeatedly endorsed torture, even if it does not work because suspected terrorists 
“deserve it.”  See Jenna Johnson, Donald Trump on Waterboarding: ‘If it Doesn’t Work, They Deserve It 
Anyway,’ WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2015/11/23/donald-trump-on-waterboarding-if-it-doesnt-work-they-deserve-it-
anyway/?utm_term=.fa9f1526cb9a.  As President, Trump has appointed a Secretary of Defense and CIA 
Director who are on record against torture.  See Amy Davidson Sorkin, Mike Pompeo and the Question 
of Torture, NEW YORKER (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/mike-
pompeo-and-the-question-of-torture (Defense Secretary and CIA Director opposed to torture).   
 350. Examples include race-related unrest in Baltimore, Maryland and Ferguson, Missouri prior to 
the election, politically-related violence in Seattle, Washington and Washington, D.C., thereafter, and 
violent clashes in Charlottesville, Virginia in August 2017 that involved neo-Nazis and individuals 
violently resisting them.  In contrast to this spate of violence, the 1992 riots in Los Angeles following the 
Rodney King verdict provided an intense but isolated event. 
 351. Commentators concerned about a rising authoritarian tendency in American politics and 
increasing potential for domestic unrest point to stoking of fear of foreigners and minorities, threats to 
“get tough” with terrorists and other adversaries, demonization of urban elites, encouragement of violence 
at political rallies, threats to jail political opponents, allegations of corruption against scientists other 
professionals, and discrediting of the press and civil servants.  Trump is not alone in doing these things, 
but they are part of his style and consequently he has been a focus of sharp criticism from normally sedate 
commentators.  See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Imagining a Trump Justice Department, WASH. POST (July 22, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/07/22/imagining-a-trump-justice-
department/?utm_term=.a519f6d20751 (conservative legal thought leader describes Trump as a “fascist 
thug”); Susan Hennessey & Benjamin Wittes, Is Trump a Russian Agent? A Legal Analysis, LAWFARE 
(July 27, 2016, 1:46 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/trump-russian-agent-legal-analysis (centrist national 
security experts view Trump as acting in the interest of authoritarian Russia); David Luban, The Case 
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elections.352 
Volatility has been evident in politics and policy regarding foreign 
military deployments and traditional alliances, as well.  President George 
W. Bush ordered U.S. forces into Afghanistan and reduced them before 
invading Iraq, President Obama withdrew from Iraq and surged forces 
into Afghanistan before drawing them down, followed by President 
Trump who campaigned on withdrawal from these conflicts but has 
presided over expanded U.S. military operations in both theaters.  Obama 
involved U.S. forces in Libya and relied on covert action against Syria’s 
al-Assad regime, while Trump criticized the Libya operation and potential 
strikes on the al-Assad regime as a candidate, and then once in office 
reportedly cancelled the covert action and launched overt strikes against 
the al-Assad regime.  Operating here are not simply the 9/11 and Iraq 
AUMFs and the President’s Article II authority, but also the covert action 
statute and WPR.  Congress could go beyond these existing Forces 
Clause-based statutes to provide additional “Rules” for the “land and 
naval Forces.” 
Pursuant to the Clause, Congress can also provide law to stabilize force 
emplacements that undergird U.S. treaty commitments to its allies.  After 
seven decades of unwavering support for NATO by U.S. Presidents, 
Trump has undermined confidence in the U.S. commitment to the 
 
Against Serving, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/34404/case-serving-
trump/ (left-leaning thought leader writes that “The nightmare scenario is that Trump and his allies aim at 
an authoritarian Big Man presidency”).  Trump has praised authoritarians who have used lethal force 
against political opponents, journalists, and pro-democracy demonstrators.  For coverage of statements 
during the campaign, see Nicole Hensley, President Trump Defends Putin as a ‘Killer’ in ‘O’Reilly 
Factor’ Interview, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 4, 2017, 11:27 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
politics/president-trump-defends-vladimir-putin-killer-article-1.2964475; Marc Fisher, Donald Trump 
and the Expanding Power of the Presidency, WASH. POST (July 30, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/donald-trump-and-the-dangers-of-a-strong-presidency/2016/07/30/69cfc686-55be-
11e6-b7de-dfe509430c39_story.html?utm_term=.44dd9b499551 (Trump signals expanding executive 
authority); Kerr, supra (Trump praised Chinese government’s 1989 bloody crackdown on pro-democracy 
protesters). 
 352. See Maggie Koerth-Baker, Democracy, Meh?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 2, 2016), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/democracy-meh/ (roughly 30 percent of U.S. millennials think it is 
imperative to live in a democracy, a decline from prior trends); Ariel Malka & Yphtach Lelkes, In a New 
Poll, Half of Republicans Say They Would Support Postponing the 2020 Election if Trump Proposed It, 
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alliance.353  The reception in Congress has been chilly.354  Although other 
members of the Trump Administration have worked to reassure allies and 
facilitated a continuing U.S. military presence to counter Russia,355 if the 
Commander in Chief were to overrule them Congress could via statute 
pursuant to the Forces Clause legislate a ban on withdrawal of U.S. 
forces.356  
Legislation could provide “Rules” for the most powerful “land and 
naval Forces,” tactical (short-range) nuclear forces in Europe and 
strategic (long-range) nuclear forces based in the United States, both of 
which are part of NATO’s deterrent.357  Following five presidents who 
have kept U.S. tactical nuclear forces in Europe while working to reduce 
U.S. nuclear forces overall, President Trump has both implicitly called 
into question the future of the U.S. tactical nuclear emplacement in 
Europe via his criticism of NATO, and explicitly called for expanding 
U.S. nuclear forces overall.358  There is statutory precedent for 
 
 353. See Zachary Cohen, Michelle Kosinski & Barbara Starr, Trump’s Barrage of Attacks ‘Beyond 
Belief,’ Reeling NATO Diplomats Say, CNN (July 12, 2018),  
https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/11/politics/trump-nato-diplomats-reaction/index.html (Trump criticism of 
NATO undermining confidence in U.S. commitment to alliance); Rainer Buergin & Toluse Olorunnipa, 
Trump Slams NATO, Floats Russia Nuke Deal in European Interview, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 15, 2017, 5:00 
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-01-15/trump-calls-nato-obsolete-and-dismisses-
eu-in-german-interview (similar, before Trump inaugurated, with suggestions of deal with Russia on 
European security).  
 354. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 1248(a), 
132 Stat. 1636 (2018) (affirming U.S. “ironclad commitment” to NATO);  S. Vote No. 149 (passed 97-
2), 115th Cong., 164 CONG. REC. S4868-69 (daily ed. July 10, 2018) (motion to instruct conferees on 
NDAA to reaffirm the commitment of the United States to NATO); Joe Gould, Congress Would Stop 
Trump from Leaving NATO, Key Senators Say, DEFENSENEWS (July 19, 2018), 
https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2018/07/19/congress-would-stop-trump-from-nato-exit-key-
senators-say/ (Senators support NATO and attempt to reassure NATO allies that Congress could stop 
presidential withdrawal). 
 355. See, e.g., Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, Pence and Mattis Commit to NATO, But Ask Europe for 
More Help, NPR (Feb. 18, 2017, 7:54 AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/18/515921413/pence-and-
mattis-commit-to-nato-but-ask-europe-for-more-help (Trump cabinet members emphasize U.S. support 
for NATO). 
 356. This would set up a Youngstown Category 3 clash, of the kind that continues to be disputed 
and has been analyzed more generally by scholars including Barron and Lederman.  Congress could 
additionally or alternatively act pursuant to authority provided by the Appropriations Clause, and perhaps 
the Common Defense Clause, as well. 
 357. See NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE POSTURE 
REVIEW § 9 (2012).  U.S. tactical nuclear forces are operationally deployed in five European NATO 
countries, while a strategic triad of bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarines 
are operational from bases inside the United States.  See Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, United 
States Nuclear Forces, 73 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 48-57 (2017) (discussing current U.S. 
tactical and strategic forces); Dakota S. Rudesill, Regulating Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 102 GEO. L.J. 
99, 107-19, 141-43 (2013) (analyzing history, forces, and doctrine of U.S. nuclear capabilities).  
 358. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 22, 2016, 8:50 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/811977223326625792 (“The United States must greatly 
strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding 
nukes”). 
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congressional rule-making regarding nuclear forces: Congress in the 
1990s prohibited the retirement of nuclear-capable strategic bombers.359  
Also, the WPR facially governs all “forces” by not stipulating it applies 
only to conventional forces.360   
In the context of President Trump’s exchange of nuclear threats with 
North Korea,361 pursuant to the Forces Clause the Congress could enact a 
115th Congress bill to prohibit the first use of nuclear weapons absent 
specific congressional authorization in a war declaration, unless nuclear 
weapons have already been launched against the United States.362  Of 
 
 359. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1302(e), 
110 Stat. 2422, 2700-02 (1996) (barring retirement of B-52H bombers).  The NDAAs for 1996 through 
1999 also barred funding for retirement of planned strategic nuclear forces pending Russian ratification 
of the START II treaty (which never came).  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1404, 110 Stat. 186, 490 (1996) (original force retirement ban); National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1302(a)-(d), 110 Stat. 2422, 
2700-02 (1996) (ban, with waiver); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-85, 111 Stat. 1948, 1948-50 (1997) (ban, with waiver); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-261, 112 Stat. 2171, 2171 (1998) (extending provision in NDAA for 1998).  
The 1996 and 1997 NDAAs, like the potential statutes I postulate, do not direct the emplacement of forces, 
but rather prevent their removal.   
  Congress in recent years has in provisions that are not funding restrictions required retention 
of sufficient warheads to arm U.S. land-based nuclear forces fully.  See National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1057, 127 Stat. 622, 864-65 (2013). 
  In addition to the Forces Clause, Article I’s Army and Navy Clauses would operate regarding 
a bar on dismantlement of nuclear-capable missiles, submarines, and aircraft, and their warheads.  
Congress would be insisting on them as part of the forces Congress is providing.  See U.S. CONST., art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 12, 13.  These other clauses may operate too regarding statutes on force emplacement – operational 
deployment – but this most clearly reflects the External Government understanding of the Forces Clause. 
 360. See WPR, supra note 315. 
 361. See Dan Lamothe, If Trump Wants a Nuclear Attack Against North Korea, His Military 
Advisors Have Other Options, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
checkpoint/wp/2017/08/10/if-trump-wants-a-nuclear-attack-against-north-korea-his-military-advisers-
have-few-other-options/?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.d9df1b2a9e28 (quoting views that all presidential orders 
on nuclear weapons must be followed, in wake of President Trump threatening North Korea with “fire 
and fury” in response to its missile and nuclear weapons programs and threats to the United States and its 
allies).   
 362. See Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2017, H.R. 669, 115th Cong. (2017); 
Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2017, S. 200, 115th Cong. (2017).  A somewhat similar 
proposal was rejected by the Senate in 1972.  See FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES? ix (Peter Raven-Hansen, ed. 1987).  A variant of this idea was offered by 
the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in 1971: absent a declaration of war, no first use without the 
assent of a congressional committee.  This proposal raises a number of interesting constitutional questions, 
from whether nuclear weapons are constitutionally special to whether the FAS proposal involves a 
legislative veto.  For discussion of this idea’s constitutional aspects, see id.  A variation on the FAS idea 
would be for Congress pursuant to the Forces Clause write a rule for the nuclear forces it provides under 
the Army and Navy Clauses: the affirmative assent to a presidential first use order by one or more of a 
top military officer, the Secretary of Defense, or the Attorney General before the President’s launch order 
is transmitted.  See, e.g., Richard K. Betts & Matthew C. Waxman, The President and the Bomb: 
Reforming the Nuclear Launch Process, 97 FOR. AFF. 119 (2018) (recommending the Secretary of 
Defense and Attorney General must confirm the order and its legality).  An order thus not confirmed 
presumably would be an illegal order that must be refused.  Presidential defiance would create a 
Youngstown Category 3 dispute of the greatest severity. 
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course, a Commander in Chief who wanted to use nuclear weapons first 
might argue that an imminent threat existed even if nuclear warheads were 
not incoming toward the United States.  The President could also be 
expected to argue that new threatening facts had arisen since the bill’s 
enactment, and therefore the statute was no longer factually apposite and 
the Commander in Chief power allowed a first strike.363  Resolution of 
such a constitutional crisis in a manner that both protects the nation and 
honors the Constitution’s counter-authoritarian ethos would depend on 
the constitutional knowledge and ethical integrity of the President and the 
Commander in Chief’s advisors and subordinates, considerations that will 
be informed by a full understanding of the Forces Clause. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This article is focused on a particular, too often neglected provision of 
the Constitution.  It draws distinctions among clauses and powers.  It is 
an overdue inquiry, but being clause-focused this article also inevitably is 
to some degree a formalistic account.  One may reasonably view the 
Constitution more holistically, giving primary effect to its purposes, 
ethos, and interpretive history.  The strongest constitutional analysis, like 
the strongest statutory interpretation, draws both on considerations of 
formal text and structures, and on spirit and gloss.  Regarding the Land 
and Naval Forces Clause, all of these considerations augur toward the 
Clause vesting in Congress dual powers, having a broader ambit than the 
uniformed military (notably, to include the non-military intelligence 
enterprise), and reflecting counter-authoritarian legislative control over a 
national security apparatus with powers of surveillance, covert influence, 
detention, interrogation, and use of military force domestically and 
worldwide, to include cyber operations and nuclear weapons.     
The statutory frameworks at the heart of the national security legal 
regime that find textual grounding in the Forces Clause are important to 
the republic at any moment.  There are constant and enduring operational 
pressures and political incentives for the Executive branch to disregard 
the law and its liberty/security balancing work.  The statutory frameworks 
grounded on the Forces Clause are of special importance, however, in a 
time of chronic national insecurity: war without end against transnational 
terrorist networks and within cyberspace, and the alarm and constant 
engagement of the national security apparatus they produce.  These 
statutory frameworks safeguard liberty in the atmosphere of uncertainty 
and fear that national insecurity, together with dysfunctional government 
 
 363. Essentially, the argument would be that the new facts put the President’s pre-emptive nuclear 
strike in Youngstown Category 2 rather than Category 3, and the President could rely on Article II authority 
against imminent threats as recognized in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
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and volatile politics, produces.  Such anxiety was not, of course, unknown 
to the Framers.  As Justice Jackson wrote, the Framers “knew what 
emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for authoritative 
action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation.”364  The 
Constitution they crafted includes checks on a chief Executive the 
Framers both gave command of the federal military and viewed as 
carrying inherent authoritarian risk – checks that include regular 
elections, Congress’s power of the purse, the Bill of Rights, and the Land 
and Naval Forces Clause.   
This is accordingly a moment for the Clause’s constitutional 
rediscovery, and particularly its External Government power.  Nothing in 
the text, in our founding history, or in subsequent interpretation of the 
Constitution by the three branches of government precludes a sensible 
reading of the Clause that encompasses grants of both internal and 
external powers.  On the contrary, the best reading of the constitutional 
record is that the Clause does provide Congress dual powers.  And as 
Congress has used its constitutional powers from the Founding through 
the most recent legislation, it has repeatedly written vitally important 
statutes that find constitutional textual footing in the Clause – including 
in its External Government power.   
Courts ought to take up the Supreme Court’s implicit invitation in 
Kebodeaux to construe the meaning of the term “Government” in the 
Forces Clause.  Courts should explicitly recognize the powers the Clause 
confers over operations in the field, and over the intelligence portion of 
the national security apparatus.  But judicial rediscovery of the Clause 
will not be enough.  Clearer congressional understanding of the Clause, 
and more consistent citation to it, also will not be enough.  The vast 
majority of national security practice escapes judicial review due to 
secrecy and standing doctrines.  It escapes congressional action due to 
workload and other institutional challenges.  Rather, our constitutional 
order depends instead in the first place – and often the last – on the 
integrity, knowledge, and constitutional values of individuals applying 
law to fact in national security law’s informal practice settings.365  In tense 
Situation Room meetings run by an inevitably action-focused and 
security-focused Commander in Chief, to busy U.S. Capitol hallways, to 
forces in the field facing little time and real peril – and from unclassified 
conversations to briefings in classification’s darkest corners – leaders, 
legislators, lawyers, and personnel in the field will serve their country 
 
 364. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 365. See BAKER, supra note 13, at 32-33 (discussing the roles of informal process and individual 
integrity in making constitutional law meaningful in the national security context; “legal values as much 
as the law govern the practice of national security law”). 
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better to the extent they carry a richer understanding of the legal 
architecture.  That includes a rediscovered and fully appreciated Article 
I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the Constitution.  This article’s analysis allows 
greater appreciation for the Clause’s constitutional values of counter-
authoritarian legislative control over the national security apparatus.  
Greater appreciation for and more frequent citation to the Clause in 
connection with these values in turn puts the statutes – the “Rules” – that 
rely upon it on firmer constitutional footing. 
Congress’s authority to govern and regulate the land and naval forces 
and control their Commander in Chief is contingent.  The Forces Clause 
does not stipulate a one-way ratchet toward greater liberty protections.  
Congress could choose not to use the Forces Clause’s authority.  Congress 
could acquiesce to harsh presidential discipline of the military, 
authoritarian employment of it against the people, or reckless use of it in 
cyberspace or abroad.  Congress could use the Clause’s authority to 
weaken FISA, the Posse Comitatus Act, and other liberty-protecting laws.  
Or, Congress could choose to use the Clause’s authority actively – and 
more explicitly and consistently – to balance liberty and security 
considerations in a manner that protects both.  The Clause’s potential, like 
the republic’s fate, ultimately resides with Congress and the love of 
liberty among the people the Article I branch represents, governs, and 
protects.366 
 
 366. Accord, Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We may say that power to 
legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power 
from slipping through its fingers.”). 
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